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SUMMARY 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
CHARLES ANKISIBA 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
TRADITIONAL CHIEFS, LAND AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: A CASE 
STUDY OF THE BIRIM NORTH DISTRICT, GHANA 
 
Currently there is a resurgence of the role of traditional chiefs in the development of 
sub-Saharan African countries. It has been proposed that African countries need to 
adopt more effective and pragmatic approaches, which are rooted in local societies and 
cultures and can therefore provide developmental outcomes.  This thesis examines 
whether traditional chieftaincy in Ghana, which is a highly respected institution 
compared to other African countries can be effective and legitimate providers of public 
goods. This is done by analysing the way chiefs' exercise authority over community 
land and the revenue it produces.  
The study analysed land management practices under chiefs’ authority and the 
dynamics of the politics of negotiating compensation for land and public goods. The 
main finding of the thesis is that investment in public goods might be facilitated by the 
development of multi-institutional arrangement that ensures collaboration among state 
and non-state institutions at the local level as a form of co-production for development. 
The implications of this arrangement on the political authority of chiefs at the local level 
are examined. 
The thesis questions the notion that it is custom and tradition that makes leadership 
provided by chiefs effective, and argues that what matters for development is how 
legitimate traditional authority is exercised in practice. The main conclusions of the 
thesis are that: firstly, although chiefs’ are important traditional authorities in Ghana, 
they do not exercise political authority that is effective, as expected, for the 
development of local communities. There should therefore be caution in elevating 
traditional authority as the most effective legitimate form of locally rooted authority in 
Africa, given that Ghana is a country where chiefly authority is still extremely strong 
and respected. Attention should rather be focussed on the use of local cultural 
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repertoires and multi-institutional collaborations, which have local problem-solving 
characteristics for development. Secondly, the thesis also provides evidence that 
shows how activities of mining companies potentially contribute to development of local 
communities. As a result there is the need to take a more nuanced view of how mining 
companies operate in Africa.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.0 Overview of Thesis 
This thesis is about traditional authority and institutions that can provide developmental 
outcomes at the local level. Traditional chiefs exercise political authority derived from 
custom and tradition. Historically, custom and tradition have shaped the development 
of African societies. Chiefs are therefore important political authorities in Africa as they 
form are an integral part of the local cultures and norms of societies, although there are 
significant differences amongst countries with regards to the role and authority that 
chiefs have on land matters and development. In Ghana chieftaincy has been and is 
still extremely strong and respected institution. This thesis therefore analyses the 
authority exercised by traditional chiefs in southern Ghana, how they manage 
community land and questions whether chiefs can be effective and legitimate providers 
of development, through the provision of public goods. 
This chapter provides the background to the thesis. I discuss the nature of traditional 
authority and development in Africa and link that with the problems associated with 
chiefly authority in Ghana where chieftaincy has always been a strong political authority 
compared to other African countries. The research aim and question that this study 
addresses are explained, followed by an explanation of the research approach. The 
final section of the chapter outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Problems with traditional authority and development in Africa 
Currently there is a resurgence of the role of traditional chiefs in the development of 
sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The literature points to various debates about 
the underlying problems that are hindering Africa’s development. These have been 
attributed to problems of the lack of legitimacy of authority exercised by post-colonial 
governments in contemporary African countries (see chapter 2). The debate also 
identifies the importance of traditional authority, social capital and community cohesion 
as well as economic and political factors (Englebert, 2000; Buur and Kyed, 2005, 2007; 
Grischow, 2008; Booth, 2009; Ubink, 2008a). Within this discourse some authors have 
proposed that African countries need to adopt pre-colonial institutions, which are rooted 
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in local societies and cultures and can therefore provide developmental outcomes 
(Landel-Mills, 1992, Englebert, 2000; Booth, 2009; 2011).  
Traditional institutions, for instance, may provide alternative strategies to local problem-
solving for the development of SSA countries. This can occur under forms of legitimate 
local institutions of authority, such as chieftaincy, embedded in the norms of society. 
Traditional chiefs have long been part of the political and social elite in SSA and 
throughout history have been performing various functions in addition to their 
customary roles. Chiefs provided leadership and exercised authority over their people 
during the pre-colonial period. These characteristic features made chieftaincy attractive 
to the European administration, especially under the British system of indirect rule. 
However, this distorted the pre-colonial authority of traditional chieftaincy. Thus, this 
raises questions about the authenticity of chiefly authority as a form of legitimate 
institution of authority to provide an alternative approach to development in SSA as is 
currently being argued (Buur and Kyed, 2007, Ubink, 2008a). 
I focus on traditional chiefs in this study because of the peculiar nature of the position 
of chiefs in southern Ghana, compared to other SSA countries. Pre-colonial chieftaincy 
in the Akan areas was a powerful militarised institution in which authority was 
organized in a hierarchical structure with the king at the apex as the sovereign of a 
group of people usually with common ethnic identity, language and custom1. The 
sovereign king together with sub-ordinate chiefs and council of elders constituted the 
traditional authority providing leadership and governance under customary rules. The 
chief’s political authority extended over a stool land area2. Therefore chiefs controlled 
not only the people but also land of the whole community especially vacant 
uncultivated land.  
Traditional chiefs in southern Ghana have since colonial period claimed stool land to be 
community property which they hold in trust for the people. This imposes a 
responsibility on chiefs to act in a fiduciary capacity3. Chiefs are therefore expected to 
allocate land for both indigenous and migrant community members. The performance 
of these functions involves making decisions about land uses and transfers. This 
attracts fees and charges, which are expected to be used in ways that benefits all 
community members. However, much of the literature on stool land management have 
                                                          
1
 See detail description of this in Chapter 3 
2
 Stool is a symbol of authority of Akan-speaking people of Ghana. Stool land refers to the territory of 
the political community ruled by the chief (see chapter 3 for further discussion). 
3
 See chapter 2 and 3 
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pointed to the problematic nature of chiefly control over land especially in the urban 
and per-urban areas (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Kasanga, 2001, 2004, Alden-Willy 
and Hammond, 2001; Ubink, 2008; Boni, 2008; Tonah, 2008; Gough and Yankson, 
2000). In addition, studies on mining communities in Ghana have made similar findings 
about chiefs and the authority they exercised over stool land and the revenue it 
produces, which have become sources of conflicts in those areas. Although community 
members tend to lose their land and assets they do not enjoy the benefits as expected, 
because mining companies tend to engage in negotiations for compensation payments 
with traditional authorities instead of individual owners (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa and 
Darimani, 2001; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Yankson, 2010; Tsuma, 2010 and Ayelazunu, 
2011). In spite of the findings from these studies current discourse across SSA suggest 
that traditional authority may provide solution to Africa’s development problems. This 
study therefore examines the management of stool land under chiefly authority and the 
implications for development. The arguments in the literature suggesting that traditional 
authority may provide a solution to Africa’s development problems are linked to the 
problem of the legitimacy and authority. 
1.3 Research Aim and Questions 
This study was undertaken with the aim of understanding the nature of authority and 
leadership provided by chiefs in southern Ghana and the implications for local 
development.  This is with particular reference to how chiefs exercise authority over 
stool land the revenue it generates. Thus the central question that is analysed in this 
thesis is; how and to what extent do traditional chiefs in practice manage collective 
resources on behalf of their community? By ‘manage collective resources’ I mean how 
traditional chiefs in practice exercise authority and control over land and natural 
resources which they hold in trust. I interpret ‘on behalf of their community’ to mean the 
use of the community’s resources (land, forest products, minerals and the revenue it 
produces) to provide collective benefits (public goods and services) such as health and 
educational facilities, land use planning schemes, provision of clean potable drinking-
water and similar infrastructural facilities as well as development programmes that are 
accessible by all the members of their community. The thesis therefore examines 
whether traditional chieftaincy in Ghana, which is a highly respected institution 
compared to other African countries, can be effective and legitimate provider of public 
goods, in the way that it exercises authority over stool land.  
The research was undertaken in an emerging mining district in the Eastern region of 
Ghana. Mining investment led to the acquisition of large parcels of stool land which 
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were negotiated directly with the community members. Land is a source of wealth, 
which can be appropriated by those having legal control over it, such as chiefs do. As a 
result of the different rights which are inherent in land there is often competition and 
struggles to control it in order to maximise the potential wealth. The competing parties 
may resort to local histories and custom or even social legitimacy to back their claim. 
The mining investment at the Birim North District (BND) and the consequential land 
acquisition created opportunities for increase in revenue from stool land, of which 
payments for royalties and rents are received by chiefs on behalf of their community4. It 
is under this circumstance that this study examines the land management practices 
under chiefs’ authority and the dynamics of the politics of negotiations for 
compensation and public goods. The negotiations led to the development of multi-
institutional collaborations for the co-production of public goods. The implications of this 
arrangement on the political authority of chiefs at the local level are therefore 
examined. 
This study explores the central question using four interrelated sub-questions. The first 
question is how stool land and natural resources are actually managed at the 
community level in Ghana. It is imperative in a study of this kind which seeks to 
analyse how the authority exercised over collective resources can provide 
developmental outcomes to first establish the framework within which it is managed at 
the local level. Stool land is regulated by both customary practices and statutory law 
and it is important to examine how this operates in practice within communities. Thus, I 
examined how other institutions, apart from chieftaincy, state and non-state, were 
actually involved in the management of stool land at the local level. In exploring the 
question I looked also at the nature of relationship between traditional chiefs and all 
other actors and institutions, and the extent to which these other institutions may 
constrain or promote effective resource management by the chiefs. Examining these 
issues provided an understanding of how decisions are made with regards to the 
management of stool land and revenue utilisation. 
The second question is how in practice do chiefs manage stool land and its revenue? 
This question focuses more specifically on the role of chiefs and the traditional system 
of managing stool land. Since the aim of the thesis is to find out whether chiefly 
authority over stool land can promote development it is important to explore closely 
how that authority is actually exercised in practice within the customary and statutory 
                                                          
4
 The location of the BND and the case study communities will be discusses in Chapter 4 
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framework. This provides a basis for drawing conclusions on how traditional authority is 
exercised and its implications for development. 
The third question that is explored is what constitutes the basis of the authority that is 
exercised by chiefs in practice? This is closely related to the second questions above 
and is examined to promote an understanding of the legitimacy of the claims that are 
made by chiefs in the way they exercise authority in their respective communities. Are 
there any historical or customary and traditional bases underpinning the arguments that 
chiefs make to support how they manage stool land? In this regard I also examined the 
perceptions about the responsibilities and expectations of local citizens from chiefs. 
This is important in examining whether traditional authority can promote effective 
leadership for development at the local level. This is because the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of chiefs depends very much on how their communities perceive them, 
and how morally acceptable they find their authority. 
The fourth question examined two unusual systems of negotiations for land 
compensation and the provision of public goods. The specific question asked was what 
are the outcomes and implications of the negotiations systems for the authority that 
chiefs exercise over stool land and their communities? The way chiefs exercise 
authority over the use of community resources can help or hinder the provision of 
public goods (outcomes). I examined the negotiations for compensation for land and 
property affected by mining lease and the provision of public goods at the BND to 
promote an understanding of the dynamic interplay of political authority. The question 
therefore explored the extent to which traditional authority is adapting to changing local 
circumstances, as a result of mining investment and urbanisation. The negotiations 
provided arenas for the interaction between traditional system of political authority 
exercised by chiefs and other local level institutions (state and non-state) within mining 
communities in Ghana and its implications for development in similar settings in Africa. 
The question also helped to provide an understanding of how the changing local 
circumstances can have on the authority of chiefs. 
1.5 Approach to the Research 
Using the Birim North District (BND) as a case study I analysed data to provide 
empirical evidence for the conclusions drawn in this thesis. Two interrelated reasons 
explain the choice of the BND for this study. Firstly, since the study is about traditional 
authority and politics of development this is one of the areas in Ghana where chiefs 
exercise the legal authority (custom, common law and statute) to manage stool land as 
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a collective property. This therefore provided opportunity to explore how that affects 
development at the local level. Secondly, the discovery of gold through the explorative 
activities of a multi-national mining company provided another dimension to explore the 
implications of how chiefs manage the revenue from royalties and rents in addition to 
what is often derived from land transactions. This is examined to find out how that 
affects the way chiefs exercise authority at the local level. The above are therefore 
important factors in the BND case study. 
The BND provides the opportunity to examine the unusual system for negotiating 
compensation and public goods in a mining community. This happened within two 
committees where chiefly authority is exercised within a multi-institutional public space 
for development purposes. The use of a multi-institutional collaboration strategy for the 
negotiations had implications for the authority and leadership provided by chiefs within 
the District. The two Committees were constituted by selected local inhabitants to 
represent the interest of all the people living in the mine affected communities and state 
institutions The study examines how chiefs manage stool land outside of this multi-
institutional collaborative forum and explores what happens at the negotiations arenas. 
The study analyses data from a set of four case study communities in the District. 
These are New Abirem, Adausena, Ntronang and Praso Kuma. The first three 
communities are within the areas described as mine affected communities. This is 
because operations of Newmont have relatively direct impact on the lives of local 
inhabitants and the representatives of the two negotiations committees are drawn from 
these communities. The fourth although within the district is not directly affected by 
activities of the Company5. Praso Kuma was therefore not involved in the negotiations 
for compensations as no stool land is required for mining.  However, Praso Kuma was 
included in the case study to examine and  provide an understanding of the exercise of 
chiefly authority where there was relatively less wealth to be derived from stool land 
without the potential influence of mining activities. 
1.6 Arguments of the thesis 
This thesis questions the notion that it is custom and tradition that makes leadership 
provided by chiefs effective, and argues that what matters for development is how 
legitimate traditional authority is exercised in practice.  Ghana is a country where 
chiefly authority is still extremely strong and respected. Chieftaincy commands 
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 That is Newmont Golden Ridge Limited. It is the company investing in mining in the BND (This will be 
discussed in section 5.5 and chapters 7 and 8) 
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considerable authority in land allocation and management and in dispute resolution 
(Ubink, 2007, 2008; Odotei and Awedoba, 2005; ECA, 2007; Crook, et al, 2007; Crook, 
Asante and Brobbey, 2011; Crook, 2008). Chiefs’ legal position as custodians of stool 
land means that they are expected to manage land only in their capacity as fiduciaries6. 
But the trusteeship principle under which chiefs are expected to manage land has 
become the subject of contestations. This is because some chiefs often act as though 
they were the absolute owners of stool land.  
Since the colonial period there have always been conflicting claims between chiefs and 
their subjects over stool land especially in areas of rapid land transactions. The 
conflicting claims affect the political relationships between chiefs and their subjects and 
question the legitimacy of the authority of the chiefs. Studies undertaken in the urban 
and peri-urban areas as well as in mining districts in Ghana, where rapid 
commercialisation and exchange of land is occurring have shown how chiefly authority 
over land is being contested (Ubink,2007,2008; Kasanga,2001; Akabzaa, 2000; 
Akabzaa et al, 2007; Tsuma,2010; Andreasen et al, 2011). Despite these contentious 
and problematic issues about chiefs, the perception about the institution of chieftaincy 
is that it is important and relevant to society (Ubink, 2007). Although this may be the 
case this thesis cautions against elevating traditional authority as the most effective 
form of authority for local development. As the findings in this thesis will show some 
chiefs are able to adapt to changing circumstances better and use it in ways that 
facilitate private gains rather than can be realised by their communities. The search for 
authentic authority which is rooted in cultural values for development should rather be 
focussed on the use of local cultural repertoires and multi-institutional collaboration (as 
shown in this thesis) which have local problem-solving characteristics for development.  
1.7 The thesis structure 
This thesis is organised in nine chapters. Following this is chapter 2 which sets out the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. I discuss the nature of political authority from an 
historical perspective to provide an understanding of the influences and changes that 
have occurred from pre-colonial to the post-colonial period. I focus on the legitimacy of 
political authority and discuss the literature which argues that the disconnection 
between pre-colonial and post-colonial forms of authority explains Africa’s state of 
development (Englebert, 2000). I also reviewed the literature on pre-colonial forms of 
authority across Africa and the effect that colonial administration had on these forms of 
authority, in particular traditional authority (Colson, 1969). This helped to examine the 
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  The 1992 Constitution Article 36(8) and 267(1) 
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discourse on the resurgence of traditional authority linked to the arguments about 
traditional authority as the legitimate form of authority for development. The literature 
shows the divergent views on the legitimacy of political authority and points out that 
throughout the colonial period this was the object of contestation (Crook, 1987). This 
thesis questions how traditional authority, which has been subjected to colonial 
influence, can be an effective and legitimate form of authority for development. This is 
examined in this study. I also examined the concept of co-production in the final section 
of the chapter to find out how that can help promote development at the local level. 
I have indicated that chieftaincy in Ghana, compared to other African countries, is 
extremely strong and respected. In chapter 3, I focus on chiefs and politics of land in 
Ghana. This is to promote an understanding of the historical development and position 
of the chiefs with regards to the development of customary law and the notion of 
communal ownership of stool land. The background of the nature of traditional authority 
and how it is derived is important for a study on traditional chiefs in Ghana. Although 
the focus is on the Akan areas of southern Ghana (because of its relevance for the 
case study) some comparison is drawn with non-Akan areas in the country. The 
discussion is on the political authority of chiefs with regards to control over stool land in 
addition to their customary ceremonial functions. I highlight the effect of colonial rule on 
the authority of chiefs and the implications for subsequent development of the 
institution of chieftaincy under post-colonial governments, in particular the Convention 
Peoples Party. I examine the problematic nature of chiefly authority over stool land and 
the claims that are being made. This discussion focuses on the implications of 
urbanisation on the extant notion of community ownership of stool land. The literature 
on how chiefs exercise authority over stool land questions the custodianship principle 
under which they are expected to manage land. 
Chapter 4 describes how the study was designed and the methodology that was used 
in this research. I explain the research approach that was used to investigate and 
analyse traditional authority exercised in practice by chiefs over land and the resulting 
outcomes based on data collected from field work. I also explained the theoretical basis 
for the choice of the case study and the rationale of using a set of four communities in 
the BND. The chapter provides an overview of the BND and explains how the four 
communities were selected to constitute a case study for the research. This is followed 
by a description of the methods used in collecting data, the selection and categories of 
respondents interviewed. I provide an explanation of why and how quantitative data 
was collected through a popular survey and how I utilised this data. The chapter 
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provides an explanation for the choice of mixed method approach to data collection 
and observation for the case study. 
This thesis has four empirical chapters. Starting with Chapter 5 I describe the different 
political actors and institutions with interests and authority in the Birim North District. 
For each category of actors and institutions, I discuss their legal responsibility and 
source of authority with regards to stool land and development in the District. I also 
examine the nature of interaction and areas of collaboration amongst these local actors 
and institutions. This is to help identify in the subsequent chapters the basis of authority 
exercised by the different actors and institutions in the negotiations for compensation 
and public goods. The chapter shows that there are a multiplicity of actors and 
institutions in the BND with varying levels of authority and interests in land, which 
perform different roles for the development of the respective communities. The specific 
details of the analysis on the authority exercised over stool land and the negotiations 
are examined in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Chapter 6 analyses the politics of managing stool land and the revenue it produces. It 
explores the different types of stool land revenue, the framework for managing stool 
land and how revenue is utilised. Using evidence from field work I examine how stool 
land is managed in each of the four communities and draw on the implications of the 
stool land management practices for the authority of traditional chiefs and development 
of the communities. Interview data is combined with a popular survey to show how 
traditional chiefs are perceived in the communities based on the way authority is 
exercised over stool land. I also examine how benefits and revenue from stool land are 
mobilised and utilised and assess whether or not this is beneficial to the community 
members. The evidence presented on each community helps in explaining the 
differences in the popular perceptions about the way chiefs exercise authority over 
community stool land.  
Chapter 7 is the first of two chapters that uses evidence from negotiations taking place 
in the District as a result of mining investment. The chapter highlights an unusual 
system of negotiating compensation for land within mining communities in Ghana. The 
significance of the negotiations forum is that it provides a public space where access to 
stool land is provided not by traditional authorities alone but with the direct involvement 
of beneficial users of the land and other representatives drawn from local actors and 
institutions. The chapter examines the role of traditional chiefs, as well as the other 
actors, and assesses the implications of the negotiations for the authority of chiefs over 
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stool land and over their communities. The evidence presented shows that this unusual 
system of negotiation can be used to prevent dispossession of land and benefits from 
the community members of stool land.  
In chapter 8, I present evidence of what happens in the communities affected by the 
mining project with regards to provision of public goods. This chapter is also based on 
the negotiations amongst the local actors and institutions resulting from mining 
investment in the BND.  I examined the multi-institutional arrangement under which the 
provision of public goods is negotiated. This is explored within the concept of co-
production. The chapter also analyses popular perceptions about traditional authority in 
the provision of public goods. This is followed by examining the outcomes and politics 
of negotiating development and its effect on the authority of chiefs. The evidence 
shows that the multi-institutional negotiations provide an opportunity for development 
since neither traditional chiefs nor the local government authority are able to do this on 
their own. However, it does shift the expectations of community members from how 
chiefs use stool land revenue. 
 
The final chapter draws together the main findings of the study and discusses these 
within the theoretical framework linked to the arguments made in the thesis. The 
chapter discusses the proposition that it is custom and tradition that makes chiefs 
effective leaders for development and argues that what works for development is how 
legitimate traditional authority is exercised in practice. The thesis therefore concludes 
that: 
 
a) although the authority of chiefs in Ghana is still extremely strong and respected and 
therefore important for development to take place at the local level in Ghana, chiefs do 
not help political authority to be effective as expected. Caution should therefore be 
exercised in elevating traditional authority as the most effective form of locally rooted 
authority in Africa. It is important to explore the use of local cultural repertoires and 
multi-institutional collaborations, which can be used to solve local development 
problems.  
 
b) The BND case study provides evidence for a more nuanced less negative view of 
how mining companies are working to contribute to development within mining 
communities.  
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Chapter 2 
The Nature of Traditional Authority and Development: A Theoretical Framework 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework for this thesis. The study is analysed 
within the context of the authority exercised by traditional chiefs and the politics of 
development. Politics and development are interwoven with significant impact on the 
nature of traditional authority in Africa.7  It has been argued that understanding the 
nature of politics, and political relations [institutions], is a prerequisite for development 
(Hyden, 2006 and Leftwich, 2000). Traditional institutions in SSA have the potential to 
contribute to development on the continent.  For this reason it is important to have a 
holistic understanding of the repertoire of local cultural institutions that have over the 
years evolved within societies in Africa.  
There is extensive literature about traditional chiefs in Africa because they constitute 
important political authorities. This chapter examines the nature of political authority 
exercised in Africa from the pre-colonial to colonial and post-colonial periods. Critical 
attention is focussed on how the authority exercised by traditional chiefs was 
transformed at the different political stages of development and how chiefs adapted to 
these changes in the post colonial period (Crook, 1986, Rathbone, 2000; Dunn and 
Robertson, 1973). Some recent studies have highlighted the resulting dilemmas of 
chiefly authority and seem to link these with policies of both the colonial and post 
independent African governments (Herbst, 2000; Alden-Willy and Hammond, 2001; 
Englebert, 2002; Oomen, 2002; Buur and Kyed, 2005; Ubink, 2008).  Currently in the 
literature there is the proposition for a more involving role of traditional authorities in 
development in Africa.  This literature shows the contribution that chiefs can make to 
the development of a modern society (ECA, 2007; Ubink, 2008a; Körling, 2011). I 
examine the discourse about the resurgence of traditional chiefs within the context of 
the proposition being made that institutions rooted in customs and norms provide a 
better opportunity for the development of African people8. Before concluding the 
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 Leftwich, 1983: Chapter 1- Politics is defined as ‘all the activities of conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation involved in the use of, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, 
whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in the private or public domains’. 
8
 The Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) makes the proposition that in many African countries, 
at the local level, there are more legitimate and effective institutions which could make up for the 
failures of states to meet the provision of developmental outcomes (Crook and Booth,2011:7) 
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chapter I examine the concept of co-production and its relevance to analysing how 
chiefs and local citizens might effectively collaborate with state and non-state 
institutions to invest in public goods in local communities. This chapter draws on the 
literature on the nature of political authority in Africa and the problem of legitimacy in 
contemporary African states and its implications for development. 
2.1 Political authority and development in Africa 
There is a body of work that argues that Africa’s current state of [under]development is 
because post-colonial states inherited weak formal political institutions that lacked 
legitimacy and also the coercive capacity of the colonial regime. This has been further 
compounded by an economy that is predominantly dependent on the export of 
agricultural products and/or minerals (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; van de Walle, 2001; 
Leonard and Straus, 2003; Sandbrook, 1985; 2005). Post-colonial political leaders 
were therefore faced with the difficult challenge of securing legitimacy and political 
authority to design policies for growth.  This fragile state of affairs, it has been argued 
proved to have affected the development of political authority as well as  the ability of 
state governments to pursue effective development programmes (Landell-Mills, 1992; 
Englebert, 2000). 
The literature provides some explanatory factors on what happened in the post-colonial 
period leading to the current state of Africa’s development. Landell-Mills (1992) has 
stated that African governments’ have failed to deliver on the anticipated policies 
required for development mainly because they have adopted development paradigms, 
which are often not rooted in local cultural institutions. Post-independence 
governments lacked legitimacy of authority and pursued development based on models 
linked to countries of their colonial authorities. Without legitimacy of political authority 
the capacity of state governments' to design development policies and institutions for 
growth will be handicapped resulting in economic stagnation and development 
(Sandbrook, 1986; Englebert, 2000). The implication of this is the development of neo-
patrimonial9 rule across Africa (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Sandbrook, 1985, 1986; 
                                                          
9
 Neo-patrimonialism is derived from Max Weber’s patrimonial authority (Weber, 1968). In patrimonial 
political systems individual’s rule according to their interests and preferences rather than rules of the 
state. This is distinct from the legal-rational authority where the public and private interests are clearly 
governed by laws and bureaucratic institutions manned by public officials. In sum it ‘incorporates 
patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions’. This political system has been argued to be the core 
feature of politics in the third world and especially in Africa (Clapham, 1985:2). There are some recent 
claims that it promotes development (Booth, 2012). 
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Landell-Mills, 1992; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001; Englebert, 
2000; Leonard and Strauss, 2003; Bates, 2005). However, neo-patrimonialism seems 
to have had further implications for the problem of legitimacy of African political 
institutions and weakened state capacity to develop. This is because under this form of 
rule state resources are controlled by few elites and their close associates leading to 
further economic stagnation. 
Legitimacy as defined by (Crook, 1987:553) is the ‘moralization of political authority’; 
that is, as an acceptance of the ‘right to rule’ of the authority concerned, of which 
compliance is more or less voluntary (Weber, 1968 in Oomen, 2005:167; Lintz and 
Linder, 200410). The significance of legitimacy of authority is to be found in Englebert’s 
argument that African states do better at solving the problem of development in the 
post-colonial period when based on pre-colonial identity. Englebert (2000: 4-5) argues 
that: 
The state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its 
own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institution. 
African states are faced with structures of governance created by colonial 
regimes which were abandoned or taken up after independence by an 
emerging political elite group. These institutional structures were not the 
endogenous creations of local history and therefore not rooted in local power 
relations. Hence, lack of legitimacy. 
What this argument suggests is that where there is harmony between pre-colonial and 
post colonial political structures, political leaders have legitimacy and are therefore free 
to concentrate on developing and implementing policies that enhance development. 
They do not require establishing their political authority since their authority is already 
rooted in society. As a result they channel the states resources into the delivery of 
social goods and services through the implementation of efficient policies. This further 
enhances their legitimacy (Englebert, 2000:6). On the contrary, where there is lack of 
legitimacy of authority, as was the case with post-colonial governments, the new 
leaders resorted to neo-patrimonial relations as a way of securing their authority and 
power.11  
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 Legitimacy is based upon the extent to which citizens accept and follow the decisions made by 
political authorities. Citizens will accept authority when they see political authorities and their decisions 
as legitimate (Lutz and Linder, 2004) 
11
 Englebert’s analysis point out that neo-patrimonialism is not an African cultural feature but rather the 
equilibrium outcome of a set of historical conditions, which he characterised as state legitimacy 
(Englebert, 2000:6). 
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The above arguments seem to suggest the existence of established forms of political 
authority in pre-colonial African states which were legitimate and facilitated 
development.12 If, as argued by Englebert the existence of pre-colonial form of 
authority facilitated the formulation and implementation of  policies that solve collective 
action problems in the post-colonial period, then it raises issues about what happens in 
states that are not based on single traditional identity? This might be achieved through 
multi-institutional forms of co-production.  Traditional authorities and other non-state, as 
well state institutions, based at the local level constitute respected institutions that have 
authority to find solutions to local developmental challenges. This study therefore 
examines whether or not chiefs are able to provide legitimate form of authority for 
development. In the next section I first examine the variety and complex forms of pre-
colonial political authorities in Africa. This is then followed by discussing how colonial 
rule impacted on the forms of political authority and the implications for development. 
2.1.1 Pre-colonial forms of authority 
Before the arrival of Europeans in SSA there existed diverse forms of political authority, 
which had their roots in traditional and customary practices. Colson (1969) outlines the 
range of political authority and structures in pre-colonial African states by categorising 
them as those established in centralised states and kingdoms under powerful chiefs 
and those found within the non-states with no traditional chiefs. 
Centralised forms of political authority 
Within pre-colonial traditional societies there existed structured, and sometimes 
militarised, order of authority with powerful chiefs (or religious leaders) at the helm of 
affairs exercising political authority. These ranged from authority exercised under 
religious leaders, who claimed legitimacy based on religious orthodoxy and right of 
conquest. This form of authority was found among the Fulani kingdoms in Niger and 
Nigeria where political authority was exercised by Islamic leaders. In some jurisdictions 
political authority was exercised by monarchs (chiefs and kings). Monarch’s had the 
authority to rule by virtue of being drawn from royal lineages of communities in 
accordance with custom and tradition. This form of authority was found in the 
Kingdoms of Dahomey and in Ashanti in West Africa. However to some extent how 
authority was exercised within these kingdoms and chieftains differed. For instance, in 
Dahomey the king exercised authority as an absolute monarch and could appoint and 
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 'Authority will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the 
sanctity of age-old rules and power’ (Weber, 1968:226). 
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dismiss officials of the kingdom, whereas under the Yoruba political system the king 
could be likened to oligarchies of ancient Greek (Colson, 1969:40). Political authority 
exercised by kings of Asante provided another variety of rule by a monarch. The 
Asante kingdom was made up of a confederacy of independent towns under the 
leadership of the Asantehene13 (ruler of its capital town Kumasi). Each of the towns 
that made up the Ashanti Confederacy was ruled by a council.  The councils were 
directly responsible and accountable to the local citizens who they ruled and 
represented. Within each town however, there was an association of Young men, who 
held no office in the town. They were ordinary citizens of the town and usually had a 
leader, Nkwankwahene14.  The young men acted as a pressure group to influence 
decisions of town councils and could mobilize to demand disposition of local chiefs. 
The hierarchy of authority under the Ashanti Confederacy ensured some form of local 
autonomy and allowed each town’s councils to appoint and dismiss its officials. 
Non-centralised forms of political authority 
In some pre-colonial stateless societies there were no traditional monarchs, as above. 
These societies had no chiefs and were governed through loosely linked segmentary 
political system of authority.  For instance, in East Africa political authority was found in 
age-set associations. These were territorial or community based associations of 
initiated men about the same age. Among the agriculturalist Kikuyu’s and pastoralist 
Masai’s age-sets leaders were used for the adjudication of disputes between local 
districts , waging wars and represented their respective age-sets in negotiations with 
other age-sets in the district.  On the other hand lineages often formed the nucleus of 
local communities15. Leaders of lineages took responsibility to provide guidance and 
protection to their members. The leaders’ performed activities such as control over 
property. Groups of lineages formed segmentary lineages for purposes of defence. 
Early Europeans found this type of political organization in Southern Sudan, Northern 
Uganda, Northern Kenya and Central Nigeria.  A varied form of segmentary system of 
political authority was also found among the Dagabas of northern Ghana and Tonga of 
Zambia.  These societies often formed loose political structures with no recognised 
government and therefore had characteristic weak central authority. Generally, 
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 Ohene means chief (Twi one of Akan languages in Ghana) thus Asantehene means chief [king] of 
Asante. 
14
  Means commoner but was used to refer to the ordinary young men in the towns without titles. 
15
 (Colson, 1969:51-52) defined as small corporate groups of people who traced their relations to 
another through descent from a common ancestor.  
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segmentary lineages had no permanent leaders and so political authority was transient 
at the segmentary level but more established within the smaller lineages. 
The above discussion draws out a number of issues about the nature of pre-colonial 
political authorities before the scramble for Africa (see Colson, 1969).  Firstly, that there 
existed a diverse variety of political authorities in SSA.  
Secondly, the diversity of political authority contributed to the different approaches to 
colonial rule and levels of change when the Europeans first arrived on the African 
continent. Notwithstanding the diversity of political authorities in pre-colonial African 
states, Colson (1969: 37 and 48) argues that: 
They [Africa states] shared a common concept of office and regards for 
centralisation of authority under a ruler who controlled outlying districts or 
provinces through a hierarchy of officials responsible to himself. 
It is important to note here that while some political units such as chieftaincy remained 
relatively unchanged others were completely disintegrated or modified to suit colonial 
administrative arrangements. The colonial government had the authority to give 
recognition and maintain some existing chiefs. However, in some areas which before 
did not have chiefs the colonial authorities imposed newly appointed chiefs. Generally, 
chieftaincy, in most British colonies, survived from this diversity of pre-colonial political 
authority and became part of the governance structure of the colonial administration in 
SSA. 
In the next section I discuss the development of the colonial system of indirect rule and 
how it affected traditional authority in SSA. This is examined to provide an 
understanding of the implications of colonial administration for chiefly authority. 
2.1.2 Legacy of colonial administration on traditional authority 
Chiefs’ constitute the core of traditional institutions in most SSA countries. From a 
traditional and cultural perspective the authority that chiefs exercised is expected to be 
in accordance with custom and tradition, which is the fundamental source of chiefly 
authority. Leadership provided by chiefs’ is one that is often legitimized by the people 
they rule and therefore makes chiefs' important political authorities in SSA. This might 
help to explain why chiefs became the fulcrum for the implementation of colonial 
policies in Africa.   
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The colonial systems of administration 
European domination of SSA was implemented under various systems of colonial 
administration16. In the Francophone countries, the French instituted a system of direct 
rule of administration, while an indirect rule system was implemented in the 
Anglophone countries. Under the direct rule system chiefs mainly acted as agents of 
the French administration. This affected the autonomy of chiefs’ with respect to 
decision making. On the other hand indirect rule17; defined as ‘a system for a single 
government in which native chiefs had well-defined duties and acknowledged status 
equally with British officials’, rested on the principle of incorporating African Institutions 
into colonial law and administration (Lugard, 1918 in Mann and Roberts, 1991: 20; 
Smith, 1970:16; Maclean, 2010: 106). Under the system of indirect rule traditional 
authorities became legally constituted as native authorities to facilitate local 
governance of the colonies by the British officials who had little or no knowledge of the 
socio-cultural structures of the continent which they had come to colonize. The goal of 
the British was to establish a system that was able to ‘adapt, as far as possible, the 
indigenous African institutions’ for administrative purpose. From the perspective of the 
colonial officials this was both economically and politically efficient. Economically, the 
system allowed fewer European officials who relied on indigenous political institutions 
to govern. Also for political expedience, the British drew on the legitimacy of chieftaincy 
to govern thereby reducing opposition to British rule (Maclean, 2010:106) 
As a result of the above chiefs became an integral part of the colonial system of 
governance and indeed became front runners in the administration and development of 
their communities.  
The colonial system of indirect rule  
Mann and Roberts (1991) outline the main characteristics features and factors that 
enhanced the development of the colonial system of indirect rule, which was officially 
developed in northern Nigeria as follows: 
a) The British recognised the Emirs (Islamic traditional leaders) as native 
authorities and used them as intermediaries between the local peoples and the 
colonial state. The Emirs were empowered to  maintain order, adjudicate 
conflicts, organise labour and  tax collection;  
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 Apart from the British and French there were the Portuguese, Belgians and German colonial regimes. 
17
Or Native Administration, as it was referred to in some countries ( e.g. Sierra Leone) was introduced in 
the mid-1920s in British Colonial Africa 
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b) The establishment of Native courts which were presided over by Islamic judges. 
These courts applied customary and Islamic law together with English law as 
was embodied in rules drawn up by the courts or chiefs and approved by the 
Governor of the colony18 . The courts  had the authority to apply the death 
penalty and, 
c) Emirs were given the authority to impose and collect tributes form their subjects 
and to maintain Native Treasuries. Taxes were assessed by the English 
authorities, but were collected by the Native Authorities. Additionally, indirect 
rule maintained that customary law should be applied among locals, unless 
where it failed “the repugnancy test” or contravened local statutes (Mann and 
Roberts, 1991:21). 
The above shows how the traditional authority of the Emirs was left intact while 
bolstering it with statutes. Generally, the Europeans sought to colonise the African 
countries and to rule with minimal resistance (Smith, 1970; Crowder and Ikime, 1970). 
As a result under the indirect rule system the British fostered collaboration with the 
chiefs in all their colonies rather than pursue direct rule as was the case in the French 
colonies (see above). 
The literature about colonial rule in Africa suggests that before indirect rule was 
officially introduced in Northern Nigeria similar administrative and governance 
arrangements, which allowed indigenous traditional leaders to be involved in local 
administration of the colonies, were already in place in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) 
and Sierra Leone (Crowder and Ikime, 1970). For instance, in Sierra Leone the 
introduction of the Native Administration system of colonial rule was precede by a 
system called Protectorate Administration under which traditional authorities had been 
given a limited role. This was established when the country became a British 
Protectorate in 1896. Traditional authorities were involved in the maintenance of law 
and order. Under this chiefs resolved disputes on marriage, divorce, rituals and 
property inheritance (Kilson, 1966:14-18). The system of native administration as was 
practiced in Sierra Leone was therefore similar to what was developed in Nigeria, 
although indirect rule is said to have been introduced in the country in 1937. 
Also in Uganda the British found the Buganda system of traditional rule a convenient 
tool to establishing their hegemony in the country.  The centralised hierarchical 
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 However, it is worthy to note that what colonial officials treated as established customary law was 
itself the product of historical struggles unfolding during the colonial period. 
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administrative structure of the Buganda Kingdom (suitable for indirect rule) was 
adopted and used as a model over the other geographical areas of Uganda; to the 
Eastern, Northern and Western parts of the country. As in all territories where  indirect 
rule was introduced, in Buganda too the chiefs were responsible for tax collection, 
maintenance of law and order, promotion of cotton production, conscription of forced 
labour for construction and maintenance of roads and for the colonial state (Jørgensen, 
1981:186). The Buganda Kingdom had its own governmental structure headed by the 
Kabaka (King), who served as the link between the chiefs and the colonial officials, 
except for tax collection where the chiefs were directly accountable to the colonial 
state.  
An important characteristic feature of the system of indirect rule was the passage of 
succession of laws by the colonial government. These sought to formalise the authority 
of chiefs to enable them to implement policies of the British authorities. For instance, in 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana) several legislations were passed to incorporate 
chieftaincy structures into the colonial system of administration (Maclean, 2010:106). 
This included the 1925 Ordinance to establish Provincial Councils in the three 
territories of the Gold coast; the 1927 Native Administration Ordinance which was 
passed to strengthen the authority of chiefs and Councils; the1935 Native Authorities 
Ordinance established to unify the central and native administration and also allowed 
native authorities to be appointed by the British Governor. Also the 1939 Native 
Treasuries Ordinance was passed to regulate the management of revenue by chiefs. 
Prior to the 1939 Ordinance chiefs collected tributes and managed tax and land 
revenues. The 1944 Native Authority Ordinance required chiefs to impose direct form 
of taxation on their subjects. The impact of these laws on the authority of traditional 
chiefs was twofold: Firstly, it can be argued that this was an interference that weakened 
the traditional authority exercised by chiefs. This was because every action taken by 
chiefs had to conform to provisions of the relevant Ordinance. Secondly, the 
regulations provided chiefs opportunities to perform various roles at both the local and 
national levels. These had implications for development and the authority of chiefs19.  
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2.1.3 Implications of the colonial system of indirect rule for traditional authority 
Firstly, traditional authorities were transformed by the colonial regime into a neo-
traditional elite group20. What is significant though is that throughout this period chiefs 
always maintained their claim to traditional authority. The literature has shown that 
indirect rule was premised on developing indigenous institutions towards increasing 
local self-government through a decentralized approach to administration. Indirect rule 
thus facilitated the maximization of the power and maintenance of traditional authority. 
The long term impact was nevertheless to create wealthy and powerful neo-traditional 
elite especially in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Sierra Leone, different from the 
Francophone colonies. The French system allowed for the direct intervention in the 
governance of communities through local chiefs. The legacy of colonial administration 
therefore shows that the British and French ‘had contrasting normative views about 
who they were governing and how best to go about it’ (Crowder and Ikime, 1970: xix; 
Maclean, 2010:100).   
Secondly, although the systems of colonial administration under the British and French 
differed in many respects both systems undermined the effectiveness of traditional 
control mechanism on potential abuse of chiefly authority. For instance, the powers of 
chiefs were sometimes used to the disadvantage of their subjects since their actions 
could no longer be questioned by extant traditional mechanisms, such as the power of 
Council of Elders (in southern Ghana). This was because state laws now regulated 
chiefly activities. Indigenous chiefs became more or less dependent on the colonial 
administration. This affected the pre-colonial independence of traditional authority 
exercised by chiefs. Thus, Brempong (2007) argues that although colonial authority did 
not interfere with the extant customary and religious functions of the chiefs in the Gold 
Coast period, significant political changes were made to their authority through 
Ordinances enacted between 1874 and 1941. These redefined the functions of native 
authorities (see section 2.1.2. Among others, chiefs were required to maintain a good 
treasury for the provision of public goods and services (Brempong, 2007: 3). Thus, 
chiefs were no longer in control of customary revenue such as taxes and levies. This 
had significant impact on the economic base of chiefs’ authority.  
Thirdly, the enactment of laws to strengthen the authority of chiefs under colonial rule 
in reality did undermine the legitimacy of their authority because they now derived 
authority from the colonial administrative system. There was therefore ambivalence 
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about their role. They were essentially an appendage to the colonial administration and 
had to exercise their authority in ways that did not conflict with the policies of the 
British. They could therefore be gotten rid of by their masters if they failed to keep order 
or became too corrupt, although the British were very reluctant to do that.  At the same 
time they were expected to act in the interest of their subjects, which could not be 
realised under the circumstances and subsequently led to opposition from their 
subjects. The policies of some post independent states in Africa, such as Ghana and 
Uganda, reflected strong opposition to chiefly authority (see section 2.2 and chapter 3).  
The political circumstances of the immediate post-colonial period led to policies that 
were aimed at relegating the effectiveness of traditional authority. However, recent 
literature on traditional authority seems to highlight the significant role of chiefs in 
governance and development in Africa. The argument in the literature is that this is 
happening as a result of the failures of state institutions, leaving neo-traditional 
authorities to take over challenges for development in local communities (Buur and 
Kyed, 2007; ECA, 2007; Oomen, 2005; Ubink, 2008; Cammack et al, 2008). These 
claims are examined further in the next section.  
2.2 Resurgence of the role of traditional chiefs in Africa’s development 
As a result of the implications that colonial rule had for the authority of chiefs (see 
section 2.1.3) the African elites who took over the helm of affairs in the newly 
independent states pursued deliberate policies to weaken (as in Botswana and Ghana) 
or abolish (as in Uganda and Tanzania) the institution. In Ghana this led to the 
abolishing of the native courts system which was adjudicated by chiefs thereby denying 
them any formal role in the settlement of disputes. Also, the Nkrumah led Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) passed legislations that took away the legal responsibility of 
chiefs in the management of land and revenue collection.21 It is to be noted that the 
control over land resources constituted an important economic base for chiefs in 
Asante and Akyem (Rathbone, 2000; Firmin-Sellers, 1996). In Botswana the 
responsibility for health, land allocation and levying of taxes was passed on to newly 
established District Councils and Land Boards (Ubink, 2008a:10). In effect the 
prominence that chiefs had received under colonial administration was drastically 
eliminated across SSA states.  
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However, current literature points to increasing attention and recognition for the 
restoration of traditional authority in these countries. This is because traditional 
authorities are regaining formal recognition and playing important roles in local 
governance, dispute settlement and resource management in SSA countries such as 
Ghana, Uganda and Niger (Buur and Kyed, 2005; Crook and Addo-Fenning, 2005; 
Körling, 2011; Ubink, 2008a; ECA22, 2007). Thus, the proposition that what works for 
Africa’s development is rooted in the social and cultural norms and practices might find 
relevance in the current literature. Booth (2011:7) has suggested that:  
Institutions that work best for development within the African context are ones 
that by design or otherwise have a local problem-solving character and build on 
relevant components of the available cultural repertoires, whether in the form of 
extant beliefs or values or in the form of widely recognised behavioural 
templates. 
The above proposition has been made following from observations that over the last 40 
years continued developmental assistance to African states have not been able to yield 
the expected developmental outputs to better the lives of the people since post colonial 
period. Thus, scholars of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) proposed 
that what might work better for Africa’s development might be found in some pragmatic 
approaches rooted in the cultures and society of the people. From the perspective of 
the APPP these are institutions that ‘work with the grain’ of African societies and are 
rooted in extant traditions and cultures (Booth, 2009:3). Embedded within the traditions 
and cultures are a repertoire of local institutions that perhaps are adaptive to the way 
Africa people are able to utilize their own resources to produce developmental outputs 
for the wellbeing of community members. 
In societies where chieftaincy exist chiefs have always performed customary functions, 
which includes exercising control over local resources and people, organizing and 
mobilising local people for community development and often acted as gate keepers of 
the community and intermediaries between the local inhabitants and the government. 
Politically, they are a strong force and also serve as the conduit for political lobbying for 
votes at the local level (Nugent, 2004, Buur and Kyed, 2005; Körling, 2011). The 
discussion above suggests reasons that partly accounted for the role of chiefs’ in 
colonial administration, especially in the British colonies. However, the role played by 
chiefs in colonial administration turned them into political enemies of post independent 
African leaders. As a result these post colonial leaders worked to curtail chiefs’ 
involvement in local administration and resource management.  
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Notwithstanding all the attempts to eliminate the power of chiefly authority in SSA, 
chieftaincy survived and has subsisted till date in most of Africa; even in countries such 
as Uganda where it was completely abolished.  Thus, the New Constitution of Uganda 
in 1995 has given recognition to the customary role that chiefs play in the management 
of land resource management (Herbst, 2000; Englebert, 2002). Generally, chiefs in 
Ghana, apart from their customary functions now play important roles in local 
governance, resource management and as agents of development (Dunn and 
Robertson, 1973; Addo-Fenning, 2008; Crook and Addo-Fenning, 2005).  
One explanation for this recent trend is noted by Brempong (2007: 122) who asserts 
that in Ghana ‘a ruler who assiduously succeeds in attracting support for 
development23 is acclaimed as a progressive ruler’. This is in spite the fact that by law 
District Assemblies (including Area and Unit Committees) are responsible for planning 
and implementation of development at the local level. Oomen (2005) also argues that 
in South Africa traditional chiefs, apart from their traditional and ceremonial functions, 
perform functions that central government would have done or has failed to do. Chiefs 
have been found to offer support to elected local administrative officials in the provision 
of local infrastructure and development projects. As a result some chiefs were able to 
lobby and attract projects to their area. Chieftaincy is therefore viewed as a localised 
institution of the state. Oomen argues further that except for the developed urban areas 
where there is a vibrant influence of the local government, local inhabitants continue to 
rely on traditional leadership for their economic and socio-cultural needs (Oomen, 
2005; Maclean, 2010). Furthermore, Ubink (2008a:5) contribution to the discourse on 
the resurgence of African traditional authorities’ roles in governance and development 
suggests that this has been partly due to various interests by development partners, 
donor organizations and by African governments themselves.  
The role of local institutions [including chieftaincy] in development has also been 
studied by scholars of APPP. From 2005 to 2012 the APPP focussed on researching 
forms of governance and institutions at the local level in Africa that ‘work’ for 
development. The emphasis of this research project was on finding institutions that are 
rooted in African cultures and have development characteristics. The institutions do not 
have to be formally created or designed by externally funded bodies. This implies that 
they should have evolved from locally recognised norms and practices. The APPP’s 
proposition on this is noted by Crook and Booth (2011: 99) that: 
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Greater recognition is needed that ‘what works’ may be rooted in very localised 
and complex ways of doing things which co-exist within forms of governance 
which, out of necessity are not formalised and penetrated by local 
arrangements and pay-offs, deals and political clientelism. 
These forms of 'locally rooted' institutions might be found within a range of local 
‘cultural repertoires’ that facilitate development. The aim of the APPP was therefore to 
unravel, if any, local problem solving strategies for development by institutions which 
are not necessarily the creation of the state system but might be constituted by an 
integration of both state and non-state actors. 
The authority exercised by chiefs during colonial rule was perceived negatively by the 
emerging political elites who had become powerful and taking over the realm of affairs 
in the period leading up to and immediately after independence. The politics of post 
colonial governments in the newly independent states of SSA such as Ghana and 
Uganda resulted in the introduction and superimposition of institutions on existing 
traditional structures. In Ghana in particular there seem to have been a deliberate 
political strategy of the CPP government to exert state control over traditional authority 
and land resources (discussed in sections 2.1.3 and 3.1.1). The states' control over 
land and invariable chieftaincy allowed it to exercise authority over access to land and 
investments in mining. Subsequently, post independence governments in Ghana since 
the CPP have either pursued policies that enhanced these controls or have rather 
sought to empower chiefs to exercise authority over land, as it was before 
independence. For instance, during reign of the National Patriotic Party (NPP) 
government (2000-2008) chiefs were gradually assuming more authority, especially 
over land, compared to what pertained under the CPP government. This is because at 
that time the CPP perceived that powerful chiefs who controlled land revenue provided 
finance for, and supported opposition parties.  Since then chiefs’ have become more or 
less caretaker managers of mineral resources for the state and expected to act as 
fiduciaries to stool land.  But the political relationship between state authorities and 
chiefs’ continue to evolve. One might therefore argue that in Ghana the authority that 
chiefs' exercise over land reflects the political history of post colonial governments. 
It is as a result of the above that this study examined whether traditional authority can 
be an effective legitimate form of authority for development in Ghana, with implications 
for Africa? Given all that has been analysed about the problematic nature of chiefly 
authority since the colonial period do chiefs represent the form of authority that can 
bring development?  
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2.3 Is Traditional authority a legitimate form of authority for Africa’s 
development? 
In Africa, people tend to give preference to the authority of traditional chiefs over that of 
political leaders because of the apparent lack of trust in politicians and the state 
system. This may appear to be the case, although legitimacy of the authority often 
exercised by their traditional leaders, especially over collective resources such as stool 
land in Ghana, continues to be problematic. Arguments about authority in Africa have 
always been a product of the failure of legitimacy after independence. The literature on 
authority and legitimacy of African leaders provides divergent opinions about what has 
been explained by scholars who have studied governance and development in Africa 
(see section 2.1).  
The problems of authority and legitimacy experienced by post-colonial states are often 
explained in terms of a ‘colonial legacy’. Thus, Crook (1987) examined the validity of 
this proposition in the case of Ghana by analysing changes in the kinds of legitimacy 
claimed by the state from the colonial period through decolonization to independence. 
The conclusion drawn by Crook is that: 
Whilst the most enduring legacy of colonialism was the attempt to found 
legitimacy in particularistic, indigenous systems of law, the decolonization 
process failed to transfer any one of the new, competing claims to legitimacy 
which emerged (Crook, 1987:552). 
The above seems to underscore the point made that throughout the colonial period the 
legitimacy of authority was the object of contestation. Indirect rule supported chiefs as 
‘natural rulers’ but this produced difficulties and weaknesses of the system. It 
legitimized chiefs’ authority by upholding indigenous law and custom through the native 
courts system (Ibid: 555). This led to the transformation of what was considered by 
local African courts at the time as traditional custom relating to private property, 
property and crime into judicially recognized law. Thus Chanock’s argument that what 
was upheld as customary law was the creation of the native courts crystallized in the 
historical context of the economic and social conflicts of colonial society. It could 
therefore not have been an authentic customary law (Chanock, 1998: 8-10, 22). This, 
Ranger (1983) argues was an ‘invented tradition’ which in practice reflected colonial 
circumstances. On the other hand this contradicts Crook’s argument that the law of the 
African courts during colonial period was not all invented by the colonialists; African 
chiefs and litigants were the original sources. 
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Despite the above claims that traditional authority was partly invented some scholars 
have suggested that the authority and leadership provided by traditional institutions is 
the legitimate form of authority that Africa needs to develop (Landell-Mills, 1992; 
Ayittey, 1992 and Englebert, 2000). For instance, Englebert (2000) emphasises the 
importance of modern states being based on pre-colonial ethnic identity and argues 
that most Africa states suffer from weak capacity to develop because the post-colonial 
state governments faced the challenge of establishing hegemony over heterogeneous 
society.24 
Ayittey (1992) provides a polemical argument that traditional authority is a more 
legitimate form of authority and that the failure of postcolonial African leaders to 
integrate the ‘democratic’ principles of traditional African institutions was to be blamed 
for the state of the continents political development. Ayittey’s argument is derived from 
a study of the political system of the Igbo people in eastern Nigeria. In this study it was 
found that chiefs consult on all issues and indeed decisions were only taken after 
series of consultations and consensus with Council of Elders and in some cases with 
the whole community. Based on this Ayittey argues that there were controls on the 
chief’s powers and authority, which formed the basis of legitimacy for actions taken by 
chiefs. Traditional chiefs therefore govern according to the will of the people (Ayittey, 
1992). According to Ayittey this is in tune with democratic principles, and so the 
traditional African chief is not an autocrat as portrayed by observers who appear not to 
understand the nature and source of power of traditional authority. The conclusion 
drawn from this is that traditional institutions were more democratic and egalitarian and 
have the potential relevant for Africa’s development25.  
However, as discussed above, what actually existed in the more centralised Kingdoms 
of Asante and Dahomey and in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria was that there were 
powerful and highly authoritarian chiefs. It can therefore be argued out that what 
happened in some pre-colonial village states26 cannot be taken as a generalisation for 
African states. In those village level segmentary states chiefs were less powerful and 
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had no overarching state authority. This could not therefore be the basis of the 
‘democratic’ and legitimate nature of the authority of traditional chiefs. Despite claims 
that seek to promote traditional chiefs as effective and legitimate authority for 
development, post colonial African leaders failed to adopt the so called ‘democratic’ 
principles in traditional institutions. However, there are countries that have been able to 
successfully integrate traditional (indigenous) and modern state governance systems. 
These include Botswana (also Lesotho and Swaziland), where traditional Tswana 
chiefs play key roles in governance and remain respected and influential at the local 
level (Landell-Mills, 1992). 
A review of the literature shows that post-colonial African political leaders did not 
pursue governance structures that had the potential of holding them accountable to the 
people. In SSA there was a preference in the 1960’s for one-party autocratic political 
systems. This provided opportunities to control power and have access to state 
resources. For instance, Nkrumah of Ghana, Kaunda in Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania 
and Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire consciously pursued political systems (one-
party states) that effectively subdued the development of opposing parties and in the 
process declare themselves life presidents of their respective countries. Houphouet-
Boigny is noted to have remarked that “there is no number two, three or four......... in 
Cote d’Ivoire there is only a number one: that is me and I don’t share my decisions” 
(Ayittey, 1992:64).  Perhaps what the post-colonial leaders of SSA found worthy of 
emulation about traditional authority was the use of symbolic titles that dignified chiefly 
authority in African chiefdoms27. This may seem to show that chieftaincy is a more 
legitimate form of political authority in Africa. Perhaps Ayittey’s argument resonates 
and finds its roots within the views of those who have argued that the nature of post 
colonial political structure lacked legitimacy for the leaders at the time. However, it is to 
be noted that legitimate authority does not have to be ‘democratic’. It can be based on 
religious belief, or belief in the divine character of the king.  
2.3.1 Role of traditional authority in public goods investment 
It has been argued above (see section 2.1) that Africa's developmental challenge has 
been partly because political authority is not rooted in pre-colonial forms of authority, 
which was based on traditional identities and mostly respected (Englebert, 2000). The 
problem today is about legitimacy of authority linked to state identity. Thus, post-
colonial African countries (e.g. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) that were able to 
integrate traditional authority with modern system of governance have done better at 
                                                          
27
 For instance, Ghana’s first President used the traditional title Osagyefo (warrior) 
28 
 
development compared to countries that experienced a disconnection between pre-
colonial and post-colonial forms of political authority (Landell-Mills, 1992). However, in 
SSA countries such as Ghana and Uganda, although traditional authority was 
powerfully exercised in pre-colonial and colonial periods it was subjected to strong 
political controls by their respective post-colonial governments. This, the literature 
shows, affected the state of development in these countries where traditional authority 
could not be effectively incorporated into the emerging political structures because of 
the potential divisions it could create. 
This thesis would show that legitimacy of traditional authority alone may therefore not 
account for development in Africa. What matters for development is how political 
authority is actually exercised in practice. This is important especially in the context of 
southern Ghana where chiefly authority over community resource such as stool land is 
expected to be exercised in a way that benefits all the members of a political 
community. Custom and statute has provided chiefs with legitimate authority to control 
stool land and the revenue it creates and are bound by law to manage stool land in 
fulfilment of the fiduciary role they are expected to play. This is because although stool 
land is under the authority of chiefs, there are a wide range of interests and rights in 
land. These rights are held by a range of actors and institutions such as the family 
heads, community members who hold customary land rights in land and those that 
have acquired legal determinable interests for investment, as well as state regulators 
who constitute the Public land Sector Agencies. All these actors have interest in how 
land is managed and administered for development28. However, chiefs' reinterpretation 
of extant customary law and claims to 'own' stool affects the level and quality of outputs 
to be realised from their management of collective resources (see Figure 1 below). This 
contradicts the fiduciary principles under which chiefs are bound by law (the 
Constitution) to manage stool land. Land therefore presents an interface for 
contestation between traditional and modern systems over authority to manage the 
wealth derived from land.   
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Figure 1 Expected role of chiefs' in public goods investment 
  
         =  
 
Source: Author, 2013 
2.3.2 Decentralisation, urbanisation, mining and public goods investment 
Notwithstanding the above argument modern concepts of local governance such as 
decentralisation have placed emphasis on state institutions to plan and implement 
development programmes for respective local communities. Decentralisation policies 
being pursued by modern states have therefore shifted responsibility for local 
development to local government authorities. In Ghana District Assemblies (DA) have 
the legal mandate to ensure development. Thus, the planning and implementation of 
development might appear now to be mainly the responsibility of the state rather than 
traditional authorities, although some local inhabitants in parts of southern Ghana 
where chiefs still control stool land, might still look up to their chiefs. 
Also mining, urbanisation and the increasing demand for effective land management 
systems presents challenges for the ability of chiefs to provide development using 
revenue from land. Attempts made by post colonial governments to control customary 
lands under chiefs and the regulatory measures that were put in place and recent 
commercialisation of land, which provides an opportunity for wealth creation have led 
to contestations about chiefly authority over land. In urban and peri-urban areas chiefs' 
engage in land transactions as if there were land lords and treat stool land revenue as 
private income. Furthermore, studies conducted in some mining communities in Ghana 
strongly critiques the practice whereby mining companies negotiate compensation 
entitlements and resettlement packages with traditional chiefs when stool land is 
acquired for mining projects (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Tsuma, 2010; 
Ayelazuno, 2011). Generally, the conclusion in the literature is that existing practices of 
compensation and royalty payments for collective resources through local chiefs seem 
to only benefit a minority group of people leading to property dispossession amongst 
the majority of community inhabitants (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Yankson, 
2010; Tsuma, 2010, Ayelazuno, 2011).  
In recognition of the problems and contestations (as noted above) about chiefs control 
over stool land and the revenue it generates mining companies are facilitating the 
developing of new approaches that allow access to land for mining and minimising the 
 
CHIEFS 
 
 
Legitimate 
Authority 
Trusteeship Role 
STOOL LAND 
+  
REVENUE 
OUTCOME 
PROVISION OF  
PUBLIC GOODS 
30 
 
potential loss and dispossession of property to citizens in their operational areas. As a 
result various forms of local arrangements are being developed to facilitate investments 
in public goods. One such approach is co-production involving a variety of local actors 
and a mining company for investment in public goods.  
This thesis therefore explored the concept of co-production and its relevance for the 
provision of public goods in the BND. The relationship between the actors and 
institutions identified in the mining affected communities in the BND and the provision 
of public goods for development is conceptualised as a multi-institutional form of co-
production.   I use the notion of co-production to help understand how this might lead to 
development in local communities. Thus, in the next section I discuss the concept of 
co-production and use it to examine how this might help to provide explanatory account 
for the observations and workings of the multi-institutional collaborative arrangements 
for development in the Birim North District in Ghana. 
2.4 The concept of co-production of public goods  
The state, through local government authorities as in Ghana, might share the 
responsibility to provide public goods for the development of local communities with 
other non-state institutions such as Non-Governmental Organisations, churches and 
corporate institutions.  The literature on public goods provision in developing countries 
shows that this is occurring under various arrangements often as a result of the state’s 
weakness in service delivery (Ostrom, 1996; Joshi and Moore, 2004; Masud, 2002; 
Olivier de Sardan, 2011).  Joshi and Moore have described these local arrangements 
which have become prevalent in the developing countries as ‘unorthodox’ co-
production arrangements for the provision of public goods. 
Following from the conceptualisation of what may constitute public good by scholars of 
the APPP the term is used in this study to refer to all physical infrastructural facilities , 
public order and regulations (to guide the use of facilities) that contribute to the 
attainment of developmental public outcomes (Cammack and Booth, 2008). Public 
goods (including services) thus extends beyond the classical economist definition 
which limits it to those goods that tend to be non-excludable (that are available to all 
and no one can be denied access to a service paid for by others) and non-rival(when a 
specific good can be enjoyed by more than one person at the same time). Leonard 
(2000:8) has stated that ‘public goods exist when the benefits of a service ‘spill over’ to 
other members of the community’. Often it is the state that tends to provide these 
public goods, as from an economic point of view there is no incentive to invest in a 
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good that cannot be excluded from being consumed free of charge (Olson, 1965).  
However, the literature on the provision of public goods shows that this can occur 
under various forms of co-production arrangements.  
As pointed out in section 2.3 above globalisation, urbanisation and democratisation 
now means that the provision of public goods is no longer the responsibility of only the 
state. Public goods might be co-delivered as a result of the interaction amongst forms 
of institutions and actors under various local level arrangements such as co-production.  
Ostrom (1996: 1073) defined co-productions as “a process through which inputs used 
to produce a good or services are contributed by individuals who are not in the same 
organisation”. By employing this concept Ostrom shows that in Brazil public officials 
actively encourage citizens’ participation in the production and supply of low cost 
sewage systems to poor communities. The citizens cooperated with government 
officials and were involved in the planning, construction and maintenance of sewers 
(Ostrom, 1996:1078). Similarly, the literature also shows that this is being done through 
a diversity of ‘hybrid’ institutional arrangements. It is now more common to find citizens, 
non-governmental organisations and the state engaged in various forms of 
collaborations to provide public goods of immediate benefit to the local community 
(Lam, 1996, Masud, 2002, Joshi and Moore, 2004, Cammack, 2011; Olivier de Sardan, 
2011 (a) and (b), Workman, 2011; Leinweber, 2012). 
For instance, Masud’s case study, which focused on citizens working closely with state 
police in Karachi to improve policing, has been described as a hybrid arrangement for 
the provision of public services due to the breakdown of conventional governance 
arrangements (Masud,2002: iii and 1). The citizens, comprising mainly voluntary non-
political groups of influential business people  were given formal authority by the 
Governor of the city to make contribution to the provision of security in the city of 
Karachi, which was becoming intolerable. The groups formed the Citizen Police Liaison 
Committee (CPLC) and used own funds to provide the local police with a computerised 
data base of crime in the city. This was to facilitate the police in detecting and 
combating serious crimes such as kidnappings for ransom that were occurring in the 
city. The CPLC worked in close collaboration with the local police to  improve security 
and policing in the city (Masud, 2002; Joshi and Moore, 2004).The relationship 
between the CPLC and the police was one of partnership between state and non-state 
actors to provide a public service that the state, was not able to provide alone. Masud 
describes this as a ‘hybrid’  arrangement and used the term co-production to define the 
provision of public (services) goods through an institutionalised, long term relationship 
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between state agencies and organised group of citizens, where both make substantial 
resource contributions (Masud, 2002:28).  Furthermore Joshi and Moore expanded 
Masud’s definition of co-production and defined public services to include regulation. 
They also argue that: 
In poor countries services are often delivered through unorthodox 
organisational arrangements which tend to be assumed as relics of ‘traditional’ 
arrangements, which are undesirable and ineffective and unworthy of serious 
attention (Joshi and Moore, 2004:45). 
These arrangements were often recent and represented institutional adaptations to 
specific political or logistical circumstances. Co-production in using these unorthodox 
local repertoires appears to be relatively widespread in poor countries as a result of a 
number of factors including, weakened government capacity in public goods provision, 
rapid urbanisation and globalisation which all have affected development. Co-
production therefore represents the available alternative to the provision of public 
services in developing countries. The question is what makes these arrangements 
workable and acceptable to local citizens. Above all there is the need to seek 
understanding of the workings of these arrangements in terms of what makes them 
more or less affective (Joshi and Moore, 2004:31).  
Joshi and Moore (2004) articulate their argument with the analysis of two cases: the 
CPLC in Karachi (see above) and the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) 
in Accra, Ghana. The GPRTU case study was about a private association of owners 
and employees in the road and transport sector of Ghana. The GPRTU was the 
creation of an arrangement between the military government29 that ruled Ghana in the 
80s (1987) and the private association in the collection of taxes from its members. This 
brought about improvement in the collection of income taxes from the informal and 
fragmented private sector. A common feature of the two unorthodox arrangements 
above is that they have helped to fulfil a core state responsibility for its citizenry 
(Masud, 2002:38). 
Furthermore, Joshi and Moore categorised institutional co-production into two. What 
they have labelled as (1) governance drivers of co-production, which takes place where 
government no longer provides certain services very effectively and as a result 
organised groups of citizens with something at stake to move in to help shore them up . 
The CPLC and GPRTU are examples; and (2) the logistical drivers of co-production; 
this refers to situations where some services cannot be effectively delivered to the 
                                                          
29
  That was the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
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ultimate recipients by state agencies for reasons that are more ‘natural’ because the 
environment is too complex or variable and the costs of interacting with very large 
numbers of poor household are too great (rural areas). To that extent institutional co-
production may be an effective means of meeting some of these logistical challenges. 
This is of particular relevance to the tripartite negotiations arrangements under the 
Compensation Negotiations Committee (CNC) and Social Responsibility Forum (SRF) 
in the BND (this will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8). However, the BNDA case 
shows an acceptable variant of the Karachi and Accra case studies above.  
Mining investment in the BND and the incidental requirement for access to large tracts 
of land had implications for investment in public goods. To address some of the 
emerging challenges a collaborative multi-institutional arrangement was developed to 
facilitate the provision of better public goods. Figure 2 shows the resulting interactive 
forum established for planning and implementation of public goods with better 
outcomes than might be provided by the individual institutions. 
The key actors and institutions and the nature of relationship between them are 
represented with the triangle in Figure 2. Broadly the three key institutions that form the 
multi-institutional co-production arrangement are: (1) traditional authorities and 
community groups of mining-affected people, (2) the BNDA and (3) the mining 
company, Newmont. These entered into an agreement which is referred to locally as 
tripartite agreement (an agreement amongst the three main parties that constitute the 
forum). The arrangement creates an arena for multi-institutional interaction and 
collaboration resulting in co-production of public goods. It also represents an interface 
for interaction between traditional and modern systems for development. This is 
because chiefs' are by custom and statute expected to exercise legitimate authority, as 
fiduciaries, over stool land in which individual members of the community have varying 
interests. At the same time local government authorities, such as the BNDA, are 
empowered by law to plan development at the local level within modern concepts of 
decentralisation. However, mining investment by the multinational private company, 
Newmont, are key to initiating discussions about investment in public goods and 
thereby facilitate the process of collaboration between the two systems of authority 
(traditional and state) for development in mining affected communities in the District. As 
a result, under the tripartite arrangement the BNDA not only exercise its legal mandate 
over planning and implementation decisions but is also expected to contribute financial 
resources (up to 20% of total costs) for investment in public goods in respective mining 
affected communities. 
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The multi-institutional arrangement shown in Figure 2 and the important role of the 
mining company might be due to the Company's attempt at fulfilling a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in their areas of operation30. The fulfilment of this social obligation 
in the mining affected communities of BNDA contributed immensely to the 
establishment of a Social Responsibility Forum (SRF) where the company contributes 
up to 70% of total cost of all projects agreed for implementation towards the provision 
of public goods (this would be discussed further in chapter 8). 
From the above it could be realised that mining investment in the BND created some 
level of interdependence amongst the three main categories of institutions; the chiefs 
and community groups, the mining company and DA. Each of these institution derive  
its authority from one of the following; custom and tradition, statute or the popular 
recognition of that authority. The level of participation and inclusiveness of both 
ordinary citizens of communities affected by mining, and bureaucrats and other 
professionals (acting collectively as observers) to engage in negotiations helps to 
generate acceptable solutions to collective action for the provision of better local public 
goods (see also chapter 8). 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 CSR is a concept whereby companies do not only fulfil their legal expectations but allows them to go 
beyond compliance and voluntarily integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders (Yankson, 2010:358). It ensures that 
companies investing in a community respond to the social, economic and environmental expectations of 
society. Social licence to operate refers to the approval of local communities to enable companies to 
proceed with a project ( http://socialicense.com/definition.html [last accessed on 01/09/2011]) 
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Figure 2 The concept of multi-institutional co-production 
 
Source: Author, 2013 
I draw on the literature about political authority and the analysis of the multi-institutional 
local arrangement for the provision of public goods and argue that the observations 
made at the BND represent a form of co-production for development. Although I will 
show in this study that under the multi-institutional arrangements in the BND there 
remain important issues about what will make the role of chiefs effective and 
accountability within these tripartite committee. This might require an effective 
regulatory role of the state.  
Perhaps some lessons for the above might be drawn from Lam’s (1996) case study of 
irrigation associations in Taiwan which examined the successful experience of irrigation 
governance and management in Taiwan as a means of understanding how joint efforts 
can be established and sustained through institutional arrangements (Lam, 
1996:1039). Lam argues that high degree of complementarities between government 
officials and farmers is necessary for the effective provision and production of many 
public goods and services.  This conclusion suggests that the state still has a very 
important role under co-production arrangements to ensure standard provision of public 
goods. The lessons from Lam’s case study are of relevance not only to irrigation 
management but can be drawn on to understand institutional forms of co-production. 
36 
 
While different forms of co-production arrangements have been noted in the literature 
what is relevant for this study is the way traditional chiefs and local level institutions 
have collaborated with a mining company to produce different kinds of public goods 
according to specific needs of communities, such as schools and health care facilities, 
in the BND under specially agreed local tripartite arrangement. This is in spite of the 
expectations that both chiefs and local government authorities who receive revenue 
from stool are expected to provide public goods for the local communities (this will be 
discussed in chapter 3, 5, 6, 8). 
To what extent is the concept of co-production as discussed in this chapter an 
explanatory factor in what is observed in the BND? Co-production makes use of 
organised local units exerting different levels of authority to facilitate development. It 
also involves the direct participation of citizens in the provision of public goods. I will 
show that the relationship that allows for the co-production of public goods in the BND 
is one that is dependent on continuous negotiations and Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) without contractual obligations. It is one that is based on mutual 
need and dependence (Workman, 2011) and therefore might not fit within known 
repertoires of models for co-production of public goods. The existence of an 
arrangement for co-production at the BND provides opportunities to bring development 
to local communities.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The literature discussed in this chapter is about the nature of political authority and the 
problems with legitimacy of authority in contemporary Africa. I also examined the 
resurgence of current discourse about the role that traditional authority, as a form of 
locally rooted institution, can play for the development of SSA countries. The findings of 
this study question the notion that chiefly authority is a legitimate form of authority for 
development. I examined the concept of co-production to promote an understanding of 
how the different levels of political authority might collaborate with regards to 
management of collective resources for investment in public goods and development. 
The discussion pointed out the arguments that link Africa’s development problems to 
the lack of legitimacy of authority of post-colonial governments. This has been 
explained as the result of the disconnection between pre-colonial political authorities 
and contemporary forms of authority in SSA countries that are not performing well in 
terms of development. However, traditional authority was only one of form of a wide 
variety of political authority that existed in pre-colonial histories and survived both 
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colonial and post-colonial impacts. The literature fails to establish what constitutes the 
pre-colonial form of political authority that might work better for the development of 
African countries. The varieties of pre-colonial authorities were impacted differently 
during colonial rule. Thus, chiefly authority was transformed under the different 
systems of European rule in Africa.  
Chiefly authority was also regulated and this had long term repercussions on the 
authority they exercised. This affected the perception of ordinary citizens and in 
particular post-colonial government’s attitude towards traditional chieftaincy. In spite of 
this various scholars have argued that traditional forms of authority, of which 
chieftaincy is one of them, are more suited for Africa’s development. Some have even 
argued that it is the legitimate authority that can lead to development in Africa. There is 
the proposition in the literature that seek to elevate traditional forms of authority as the 
most effective form of authority for governance and development in Africa. This 
assumption seems in part to be based on the notion that institutions which are rooted in 
local customs and traditions and therefore ‘African’ by origin might work for the 
development of African people. However, these are developed on fluid and negotiated 
social relations and therefore are subject to change (Berry, 1993).  Chieftaincy is a 
dynamic institution capable of adapting to changing circumstances, which helps in 
explaining the problematic nature of chiefly authority over the management of stool 
land. This is because chiefs seem to exercise their authority in response to factors 
such as urbanisation and commercialisation of land resources with implications for 
development. As a result expectations of citizens from chiefs' management of stool 
land resources are not being fulfilled.  
The chapter also discussed how as a result of the failings of chiefs' authority over stool 
land and the lack of development in mining affected communities, innovative strategies 
are being developed to facilitate investment in pubic goods. The concept of co-
production was therefore examined to provide insights into how development through 
investment in public goods might be achieved where there was a multiplicity of actors 
and institutions at the local level with varied interests in land. This might be in the form 
of collaboration that takes into account the range of local actors and institutions. Based 
on the APPP’s proposition of identifying and making use of local ‘cultural repertoires’ 
that have a problem-solving character within communities, the concept helped to 
analyse the multi-institutional collaboration for development  in the BND as form of co-
production that results in the provision of public goods.  
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Thus, the literature on political authority and legitimacy of authority in Africa and the 
notion of co-production as contextualised in this chapter is used in this study to 
promote an understanding of how development might occur in Africa. Linked to these 
the next chapter examines chiefly authority and the politics of land in Ghana from an 
historical perspective.  
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Chapter 3 
Traditional Chiefs and Land Politics in Ghana 
‘Chieftaincy was and is part of Ghana’s long history and part of what makes 
Ghana distinctive and remarkable’ (Rathbone, 2000: ix). 
3.0 Introduction 
One of the pre-colonial political institutions that survived British colonial rule in Africa is 
chieftaincy. Under colonial rule in Ghana chiefs constituted the native authorities and 
derived their authority from both custom and statutory law. However, chieftaincy in the 
form designated by the colonial officials as native authorities was peculiar to the Akans 
of southern Ghana. The historical role that chiefs performed during colonial rule had 
implications for pre-colonial land tenure relations in Ghana. It is therefore important to 
look at the nature of pre-colonial and colonial forms of traditional authority in Ghana. 
This is to help understand how that helped in shaping the development of land tenure, 
in particular customary law on land as applicable in the law courts of the country. 
This chapter discusses the nature of traditional authority in Ghana from the pre-colonial 
to colonial period and the changes that occurred with regards to chiefly authority over 
land. This leads to a discussion on the customary land tenure system in Ghana with 
particular reference to the development of customary law and the types of interest that 
this has established. The last section focuses on the changing trends in land tenure as 
a result of the way chiefs have exercised their authority over land in Ghana. This helps 
to understand urbanisation and its implications for the extant customary land relation in 
Ghana. 
3.1 Traditional authority in Ghana 
In Ghana traditional authority is a form of political institution that is often derived from 
customs and tradition of particular societies. Chiefs are the main elements of traditional 
authorities under the political institution of chieftaincy in Ghana. Until colonial 
domination the form of authority exercised by chiefs was outside the domain of state 
laws. Traditional authorities are now regulated by state laws and governments. Thus, 
the 1992 Constitution31 of Ghana and the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) in addition to 
providing legal basis for traditional authority also defines a chief as: 
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Articles 270 (1) and 277 of 1992 Constitution; sections 57(1) and 58 of Act 759. 
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A person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly 
nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief 
or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage. 
In the pre-colonial period chieftaincy as it exists today in Ghana was known mainly in 
the Akan states (aman) of the southern part of the country. How chieftaincy exists in 
most parts of northern Ghana today was actually the creation of the colonial 
administration based on the model they discovered amongst the Akan States. Among 
the Akans chiefly authority is a hereditary right that is exercised by a particular family 
through matrilineage within a traditional community, and is usually represented as the 
royal family. No member of the royal family has an automatic right to ascend to the 
throne when it becomes vacant. A chief is selected from potential contestants within 
the royal family (Rattray, 1929: 81; Busia, 1951; Addo-Fenning, 2008). The selection of 
a potential chief is done through consultations by the ‘kingmakers’ led by the queen 
mother. Once a chief was selected he had to be presented to the subjects for approval 
and to legitimize his authority. The process of selecting and installing a chief through 
this elaborate consultative system of elders and family members followed by popular 
approval from the subjects ensures that the authority was derived from the people. It 
also makes it difficult for chiefs to be removed randomly as it has to go through a 
similar elaborate process. 
Under Akan customary principles chiefs are expected to exercise their authority and 
make decisions in regular consultation with Elders and Council (Rattray, 1929; Busia, 
1951; Addo-Fenning, 2008). Although Addo-Fenning argues out that the system of 
selecting chiefs which denied the direct involvement of ordinary citizens, and the 
aggregation of all powers in the hands of the chief without due regard to concepts of 
separation of powers and the lack of transparency and accountability of the institution 
defied any suggestion of chieftaincy being a democratic institution for governance 
(Addo-Fenning, 2008). This argument is of particular importance given that the 
traditional mechanism that had the potential to check abuse of authority by a chief was 
provided by the council of elders and the asafo32. The former positions often tend to be 
filled with elders who are sympathetic to the surviving chief and therefore render them 
ineffective. It is the threat of destoolment which remains a more effective check on 
potential abuses of chiefs. 
On the other hand in some parts of northern Ghana, before the arrival of the 
Europeans, there were no village chiefs and land was under the control of the earth 
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 The Commoners comprising the young men of the community 
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priests33. At the time most people in this part of the country lived in settlements under 
the headship of earth priests. The earth priest’s position entitled him to hold land both 
as a custodian and spiritual leader of the political community. As a result the earth 
priest fulfils a religious function and performs sacrifices to the gods at the start of every 
cultivation season and in the event that a member of the community commits a 
sacrilege against the earth [land] (Kasanga, 1996; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). The 
allocation of land to both indigenes and migrants was done by the earth priest. 
However this changed under colonial rule when the position of chiefs was ‘invented’ 
and introduced in most parts of the northern territories. Clan heads were made chiefs 
and representatives of their communities. These ‘invented’ chiefs were entrusted with 
delegated powers by the colonial administration.  This diminished the authority of the 
earth priest. Currently in some parts of the three northern regions of Ghana chiefs are 
found to be exercising political authority, while the earth priests perform spiritual and 
religious functions for their communities (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Lund, 2008). 
 
3.1.1 Traditional authority under colonial administration 
Colonial officials designated chiefs as native authorities. As noted (in chapter 2) chiefs 
were part of the governance structure of colonial administration. The relationship 
established between indigenous chiefs and the colonial officials provided legitimacy for 
British rule. The chiefs became clients of the British officials, and used their positions 
not only to facilitate the implementation of colonial policies but also to seek personal 
wealth. Although, chiefs enjoyed much authority and power during the colonial period, 
their new found status and authority did not last for long because of local government 
reforms and political party activities. Although there are variations in the literature about 
when the reforms for decolonization started, what is worthy to note is that significant 
progress was made before the 1950’s. By the mid-1940’s reforms were under way to 
turn the indirect rule system into a local government that was more representative of 
the colonial society (Crook 1986:78-79). Calls for the reforms in local governance were 
made due to a number of reasons: 
Firstly, chiefs were accused of abusing their powers and of being corrupt in their 
practices. Chiefs were heavily opposed especially by the westernized educated elites 
who lived in the Colony. Indeed not only did they challenge the position of the chiefs 
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 Usually this is referred to in the literature as Tindana or Tindemba. Traditional earth priests in 
Northern Ghana are usually the descendants of first settlers on land in a community. They perform 
rituals and sacrifices on land and are recognized in most traditional areas as the owners of land. The 
different tribes in the north refer to them differently according to their tribal language. 
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but colonialism as a whole and all those who worked for it (Rathbone, 2000:14). Chiefs 
were accused for deliberately prolonging the settlement of disputes and the charging of 
high court fees at the Native Courts, which they controlled. The fees (and fines) which 
were charged for sessions in the Native Courts were not accounted for but shared by 
the chiefs.  As a result chiefs lost favour even with the colonial regime, which was the 
force behind them and by 1958 the Native Courts, one of the key areas of chiefly 
power, were abolished.  
Secondly, the Native Courts were said to be a weak system and therefore needed 
reforms. This was because it lacked professional lawyers. Lawyers were deliberately 
excluded from pleading in the Native Courts by chiefs who preferred to rely only on 
their authority in the administration of justice (Rathbone, 2000:49). This led to calls for 
the abolition of the Native Courts in 1951. This seemed to have started a process of 
ending chiefly control over local justice. 
Thirdly, after the triumph of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in the 1951 Gold 
Coast elections, the party grew stronger and rallied support from the masses. The 
failure of chiefs to support the Nkrumah-led CPP government led to chiefs being 
marginalised after the elections in 1951. There was open campaign to subdue and 
control chieftaincy. Thus, by 1952 chieftaincy had been relegated to the background in 
the reformed local councils. However, chiefs who were loyal to the CPP were duly 
rewarded by being upgraded or elevated to paramount status without recourse to the 
appropriate customary procedures (Dunn and Robertson, 1973; Rathbone, 2000).  
Such state sanctioned chiefs derived the legitimacy of authority and protection from the 
government rather than from tradition and custom. On the other hand chiefs who had 
openly refused to campaign for support for the CPP were destooled. For instance, the 
destoolments of the Offinsohene in Ashanti and the Okyenhene of Akyem Abuakwa at 
the time were endorsed by the CPP (Rathbone, 2000:127)34. Similar, depositions and 
elevations of chiefs took place in the Ahafo area (Dunn and Robertson, 1973). As 
noted above, the CPP embarked on a deliberate policy to curtail the powers of its 
opposition by patronising chiefs who supported it. The CPP government therefore 
became noted for its vindictiveness towards chiefs who opposed it. Subsequent events 
following this period had further implications for the authority of chiefs and the 
development of chieftaincy in Ghana.  
                                                          
34
 Ohene is a chief and thus Offinsohene refers to the chief offinso and Okyenhene is the chief of Akyem 
Abuakwa. 
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The CPP’s anti-chief policies in the country, following the widespread imposition of 
limitations on chiefs’ judicial and executive competence, control over economic 
resources and control of their enstoolment and destoolment, led to the regulation of the 
functions of chiefs. This was mainly for administrative convenience.  Although, chiefs’ 
power became weakened and reduced, the institution of chieftaincy was not abolished. 
In fact, paradoxically legislations were passed to guarantee the survival of chieftaincy 
in Ghana. For instance, Ghana’s First Constitution in 1957 guaranteed and preserved 
chieftaincy. The Chieftaincy Act of 1961 regulated activities of traditional chiefs by 
placing them the Minister of Local Government (Dunn and Robertson, 1973). This 
arrangement was carried over into the 1969 Constitution which also safeguarded the 
institution of chieftaincy together with its traditional councils as established by 
customary law and usage (Firmin-Sellers, 1996; Rathbone, 2000). Currently, the 1992 
Constitution also guarantees status of chiefs and chieftaincy as secured and 
guaranteed35. This shows how since 1957 chieftaincy as a political institution has been 
regulated by Acts of parliament in Ghana, ensuring that it survived as a political 
institution.  
 
The CPP’s pursuit of chiefs ensured that by the time the Native Courts were completely 
abolished in 1958, chiefs had also lost the power to collect stool land revenue, among 
others (Crook, 2008:131). The CPP controlled and regulated stool land and revenue 
through state agencies at the national level.  This was because the CPP government 
believed that some Akan chiefs had used stool revenues to support the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM), a party that was Nkrumah’s arch enemy during the 
elections that the CPP won. The President therefore vested all stool lands under the 
Ashanti and Akyem Abuakwa stools with two legislative enactments; The Ashanti Stool 
Land Act 1958 and the Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act No.78 of 1958. These laws 
effectively transferred the legal interest in the land to the government leaving the 
beneficiary interest in the community. Similar legislations such as the Stool Lands 
Control Act 1960 (Act 79) and the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) were 
passed with the aim of further curtailing chiefs control over land. In practice, however, 
the government had become the absolute landlord and controlled all the management 
powers including the allocation, collection and distribution of revenue.  
Furthermore, although chiefs’ power and authority were greatly subdued, as explained 
above, they were integrated and given roles in local government under the Local 
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Government Ordinance 1951. However, they were still denied the control over 
economic resources. The government’s policy was to ensure that local government 
was democratised so as to ensure fair representation. On the other hand it aimed to 
neutralise the powers and authority that chiefs’ had during colonial administration. . 
However, chieftaincy remained respected as part of the African tradition and culture 
and had values which could be tapped for local development. For instance, in 1949 the 
Coussey Commission made the recommendation for the integration of chiefs into local 
government so that chiefs could avail their local expertise for national benefit. The 
Commission stated among others that “No African of the Gold Coast is without some 
admiration for the best aspects of chieftaincy”36. 
The practice (or perception) of governments being instigators of the enstoolment or 
destoolment of chiefs has always been there since the post-independence period in 
Ghana. There is the perception in Ghana that ruling governments tend to develop 
patronage relations with chiefs and this belief is held in traditional areas where there 
are recurrent chieftaincy conflicts. The Bawku and Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts in 
northern Ghana are case examples. This is because local conflicts about the rightful 
occupant of the throne in these areas often coincided with a change of government. 
Different claimants to the throne have aligned themselves with the two main political 
parties in Ghana; the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC).Thus, a change in government after an election has been used as opportunity to 
seek government support to destooled the occupant, who is usually perceived as 
having been ‘unlawfully’ installed as chief with support from the previous political party. 
3.2 Nature of customary land relations in Ghana 
Under pre-colonial societies in Ghana customarily institutional arrangements and 
authorities determined land relations at the local level.  At the community level in the 
Akan states of southern Ghana village chiefs controlled and allocated land to indigenes 
of a stool in accordance with customary practices.37  
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 A Commission set up to investigate the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast 
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 A stool is the symbol of authority among Akans of Ghana. It represents the embodiment of a political 
community in which allegiance or political jurisdiction implies also recognition of rights over land. A 
stool is also a symbol of unity and its responsibilities devolve upon its living representatives, the chief 
and his councillors (Busia, 1951:44; Crook et al, 2007:28). ). Land owned by such a state (community) is 
referred to as stool land (National Land Policy, Ministry of Lands, 1999 in Kasanga and Kotey, 2001:13). 
Note that a skin is synonymous with stool in the context of traditional authority. It is the seat of 
authority of traditional chiefs from the 3 northern regions of Ghana. 
45 
 
According to Busia (1951) chiefs in Ashanti are custodians of stool lands.  It is a belief 
among Ashantis that land belongs to the ancestors who have passed land to the living 
for their use. Thus, Ashantis will say ‘land belongs to stool’ or ‘land belongs to the 
chief’. These expressions were meant to be the same that land belongs to the 
ancestors. The stool symbolised the unity of the ancestors and their descendants 
(Busia, 1951:44). The chief who was the occupant of the stool of the ancestors was the 
custodian of the land. The custodianship of the chief entails some rights and 
obligations. The chief performs customary sacrifices on the land, leads the community 
in defence of their land and held it for the wellbeing of all stool members at all times 
(Rattray, 1929; Busia, 1951). In the Akyem area of Ghana chief was also entitled to a 
share of treasure found within his jurisdiction and the provision of labour to work on his 
land (Field, 1948).  
The system of customary tenure was such that any piece of land to which no lineages 
had claim to came directly under the chief in a fiduciary capacity. By custom a chief 
cannot sell land alone, without the consent of the elders in council. Each member’s 
access to stool or ancestry land was through the respective head of family. By custom 
no individual could also alienate any part of lineage land alone, to deprive others of 
their source of livelihood (Field, 1948; Busia, 1951:56). All community members 
therefore had perpetual use rights38 in land, from their ancestors, and which they were 
to hold and hand it on to posterity (Ollenu, 1962). 
Contrary to Busia’s claim that by custom Ashanti chiefs could not alienate stool land 
through sale, in other Akan jurisdictions chiefs were engaged in the outright sale of 
land to migrants, especially in the cocoa and oil palm producing areas of the Eastern 
and Western regions of the country (Hill, 1963; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). 
According to Hill (1963) the notion of land sales to migrant farmers had been in practice 
by chiefs in the Akyem Abuakwa area for centuries (dating back to 1890s). The chiefs 
will usually consult with their elders and sold unoccupied lands to pay stool debts, 
although individual stool members were prohibited from selling uncultivated forest land 
(Busia, 1951; Hill, 1963:139). However, Hill’s study of the Akyem Abuakwa area 
revealed that access to land during the cocoa boom in the 1920’s was facilitated 
through outright purchase of land under the traditional concept of land ownership and 
rights at the time. The sale of land was often marked by the performance of traditional 
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 Customary freehold or usufructuary right.  
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ceremony39. According to Hill this was contrary to the widespread misconception at the 
time that because chiefs were trustees of the land. There were therefore necessarily 
prevented by custom from selling the land outright to strangers (Hill, 1963:12). As Hill 
argues these sales were usually outright sales and that there was no doubt that this 
was intended by the chiefs. However, by the 1940s the ‘powerful Ashanti chiefs were 
able to state the claim for  land that it could not be sold at all, but only leased on terms 
set by themselves on behalf of their communities’ (Crook et al, 2007:26). Their 
argument was based on a claim that land was an intergenerational property during the 
opposition to the Lands Bills of 1897 (This will be discussed in section 3.2.2). 
3.2.1 Customary land tenure  
In Ghana, an estimated 80% of the total land40 is categorized as private land,41 owned 
by stools (and skins), families and private individuals. Most of these category of lands 
are vested in stools (in mostly the Akan speaking areas), in skins in parts of the three 
northern regions and in families within Ga and Ewe communities. Among the Akans the 
stool occupant is vested with the highest interest in land (allodial title42) for and on 
behalf of that community. Thus, land owned by the community is said to be stool land, 
which is communally owned under current laws in Ghana43. All the members of the 
stool derive a customary freehold interest in land from this title44. The right of indigenes 
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 Allot (1960:252) noted in his Essays in African Law that “conveyances formed no part of sale by native 
law and custom. Such sales depended on their validity and on the proper performance of the guaha 
ceremony”. Among Akans the guaha refers to a customary ceremony to signify complete sale of land. 
40
 A greater proportion of customary lands are in the rural areas mainly used for agricultural activities. 
This encompasses all the different categories of rights and interests held outside of state control. 
41
 The remaining 20% constitute Public lands i.e. lands that have been acquired through enacted 
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in land is a usufructuary right, which is a use right that is perpetual and inheritable 
under customary law. The customary freehold is an inherent right so long as one owes 
allegiance and performs the customary incidence of being a member of the community. 
This customary rite may be the payment of annual tributes to the stool, active 
participation in communal labour and the observation of customs and taboos of the 
people. The usufructuary interest is extinguished only through abandonment, or with 
consent and concurrence of the interest holder (Ollenu, 1962; Woodman, 1996). For 
the non-member of the land owning stool (usually referred to as stranger or migrant), 
the allocation of land requires the offer of ‘drink money’.45 This difference in land tenure 
arrangements defines ‘the boundaries between locals and strangers’ (Lund, 2008:10).  
Generally, in Ghana land is conceptualised as belonging to generations of the past, the 
present and future (Ollenu, 1962). This notion of land presents challenging issues in 
the governance of stool land by chiefs (see section 3.2.2 and 3.4).  
3.2.2 The notion of communal land ownership  
The origin of the development of this notion of communal land ownership may be 
traced back to the attempted passage of the 1897 Lands Bill by the colonial 
government. The Bill was proposed to vest all vacant land in the Crown. It had the 
objective of controlling the rampant alienation of vacant land by local chiefs to migrants, 
who required land to grow cocoa during the cocoa boom, for mining and timber 
concessions in the colony (Hill, 1963; Firmin-Sellers, 1996; Rathbone, 2000). The Bill 
was proposed by the colonial government to enable it take control over the 
administration and allocation of rights over all unused land [wasteland] and therefore 
the absolute ownership of the land to be vested in the Crown (that is the British 
monarchy). 
However, the Bill was strongly and successfully opposed by both chiefs and the 
educated elites who had then formed the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS). 
The ARPS argued that there was no such thing as un-owned or “waste” land in the 
Colony. They argued further that any unused land was “community land” vested in the 
stool which held it in trust for the benefit of all members of the community (Firmin-
Sellers, 1996; Rathbone, 2000). According to Ollenu (1962) the chiefs and the 
educated elites argued that land was an inter-generational property and therefore 
belonged to all generations; the past, the present and the yet unborn. The Bill, if 
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passed had the effect of extinguishing this customary land relationship. The notion of 
communal ownership of land, it was argued was part of the customary laws of society.   
The implications for the existence of communal land ownership meant that under 
customary law individuals had no absolute titles (ownership) to land in their community. 
This customary principle was established by the powerful Akan chiefs in the colony. 
However, they failed to clarify which stool the absolute title was vested, i.e. whether 
that of the community in which hitherto village level chiefs directly controlled the land or 
that of the paramount chief of the people46. An example of this ambiguity led to a long 
lasting dispute between the Asamankese stool (a subordinate) and the Akyem 
Abuakwa stool (paramount) from 1902 to 1934. This was because the Okyenhene of 
Akyem Abuakwa passed a law after the 1897 failed Lands Bill that all alienations of 
land within his stool area will have to be made with his consent (Rathbone, 1996; 
2000).  
The notion of communal land was upheld by the British throughout the period of 
colonial rule. It was understood not to be an interest for the private individuals who 
occupied the stool but that land was vested in the stool as an institution. Thus chiefs 
became responsible for the allocation and use of vacant land within their jurisdiction. 
Land was therefore supposed to be managed for the benefit of all the citizens.  
However, the chief's position was that of a fiduciary (a trustee), and all the members of 
the community including the chief were supposed to have equal access to community 
land47. However, Larbi (1994) makes the point that although the term 'communal' or 
'group' [land] is often used in Ghana, the land is hardly used on a communal basis by 
the group as a whole (Larbi, 1994:61). What this means is that chiefs tend to enjoy 
better rights and access to stool land than all the members of the community. Thus, in 
practice there is no such thing as communal stool land, although this seems to be a 
fundamental principle of customary land relations and the interpretation given to stool 
land in the country48. 
The colonial governments’ insistence on the application of the notion of communal 
ownership of land prevented chiefs from to turning themselves into absolute landlords 
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and from engaging in acts that would have amounted to rent-seeking over stool lands 
under their jurisdiction. This would have been a complete contradiction to their earlier 
claims of land being community property, as discussed above. As Crook argues, it was 
therefore the British policy in the Gold Coast to protect the peasantry from the ‘evils of 
landlordism and indebtedness’ (Crook, 1986:91).This was important since in a highly 
agrarian society such as existed in the Gold Coast at the time if land was controlled by 
a few as private property it was going to increase the commercialisation and scarcity of 
the resource through the rapid sale of all unused land. It is also to be noted that this put 
a check on the exploitation of stool land revenues by the chiefs. 
3.3 The development of customary law: the role of traditional authority 
The notion of communal ownership of stool land, as articulated above was fundamental 
to the development of customary law in Ghana. It facilitated the integration of these 
customary tenure relations into state laws on property based on what was then 
perceived as local custom by the British colonial authorities (Crook, 1986; Woodman, 
1996). Thus, it has been argued that customary laws were not perpetuations of pre-
colonial norms but evolved as a new system of law and adjudication based on colonial 
administrators’ interpretations of African tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; 
Chanock, 1985, 1998).  
As a result of the above the core of the customary law that is now applied in Ghana’s 
states courts was developed through the instruments of colonial policies which 
facilitated the operations of the native courts. The official recognition of chiefs as 
fiduciaries of communal land, of which they were vested with the highest interests for 
and on behalf of their community allowed chiefs to apply this customary notion in the 
native courts. As Berry argues British colonial officials did not impose English laws and 
institutions or their own version of traditional African ones onto indigenous societies 
(Berry, 1992:328). Rather they sought information on traditional social systems and 
identities to facilitate the application of customary rules in the governance of the 
people. On the other hand Africans were engaged in renegotiating rules and social 
identities to cope with or take advantage of the colonial rule and commercialisation of 
land. Access to land was therefore negotiated and the outcome in any particular 
transaction depended on the history of relations between the parties involved and the 
way they were interpreted at the time (Berry, 1992:337-338). This enabled chiefs to 
apply, interpret and in the process invented customary tenure as they deemed suitable 
in the native courts.  
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Thus, customary law, as was practiced and interpreted became incorporated into the 
common law of the state courts. These have been described as the ‘Anglo-Ghanaian 
common law’ or the ‘lawyer’s customary law’ by Crook (1986) and Woodman (1996) 
respectively. It has been argued that the development of customary law in this manner 
seemed to have ‘consolidated the transformation of part of the process of legalisation 
of African Institutions’ fashioned during the colonial period rather than a continuity of 
tradition or custom (Chanock, 1998). According to Chanock customary law as was 
applied in the native courts was based on historical accounts and narratives by 
traditional leaders who had found favour in the colonial administration. Customary law 
in Ghana was therefore developed based on the interpretation of histories and 
traditions, which were largely reinvented in the process49. These established customary 
laws and usages continue to be subject of (re)interpretations and (re)inventions by the 
chiefs who by their actions are attempting in some cases to even change the extant 
customary claims they had applied in the Native Courts during colonial administration 
(Firmin-Sellers, 1996; Berry, 2001; Ubink, 2008; Lund, 2008). Thus, as argued by Berry 
(1992) in Africa as in Ghana, customary land tenure remains contestable, fluid and 
negotiable. The protection of it depends largely on social relations, against claims 
rather than on legal instruments. 
3.4 Urbanisation and its implications for the traditional concepts of customary 
land tenure 
Since the post-colonial period population growth and its incidental increases in demand 
for residential, commercial and industrial facilities have led to a land valorisation 
process50, especially at the urban and rural interface where change is rapidly taking 
place. This is an area where opportunities for economic investment activities tend to 
out bid the value of land for subsistence agriculture. Within this area there is increasing 
scope of (re)interpretations of customary land practices in ways that tend to influence 
access to and control over land in order to reap direct [personal] benefits from the 
returns on land resources. This practice has turned some chiefs into rent-seeking 
landlords. In many areas, chiefs now deal with land as if it were their personal property. 
This is happening because there appears to be systemic failures and weaknesses of 
both the traditional and state institutions to guard against chiefs from engaging in this 
form of rent-seeking. Chiefs are taking advantage of the commoditisation of land to 
rake in wealth, but this poses challenges to their land use and management capabilities 
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as well as challenges the presumptions that chiefs represent developmental agents 
(Grischow, 2008; Ubink, 2008a). There are a number of issues and implications 
emerging from this.  
The changing values in land have intensified attempts to redefine land tenure 
relationships in Ghana where land is controlled by chiefs as communal property with 
severe implications for members of stool land areas (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Boni, 
2008 and Ubink, 2008). This has the potential to weaken or completely extinguish the 
customary freehold interest that has long been held by subject members of stool land 
in the country (Berry, 1993, 2001 and 2009; Alden-Wily and Hammond, 2001; Lund, 
2008; Ubink, 2007 and 2008). Even in those areas where there is less 
commercialisation of land, struggles and contestations over the control of land is 
increasing. For instance, in the northern Ghana earth priest and chiefs continue to 
contest over the legitimate right to control and manage land (Kasanga, 2001; Tonah, 
2002; 2008 and Lund 2008). Kotey, 1995 (in Kasanga and Kotey, 2001:14) has stated 
that: 
The Tendamba have lost their ultimate authority in land in much of the northern 
region. In the Upper East and Upper West regions some chiefs now assert land 
holding rights and management functions. These assertions of power over land 
by chiefs, however, are relatively modern developments and have no basis in 
indigenous systems and practices.  
 
In fact in some parts of the three northern regions the legal position of the earth priest, 
who historically were regarded as the legitimate ‘owners’ of land, is weakened by the 
administrative practices of state public land sectors agencies51 who now only recognize 
chiefs to certify land transactions for documentations (Tonah,2008).The question of 
who controls the community’s skin land remains a contested issue in some areas such 
as Bolgatanga, Navrongo and Wa in the Upper East and West regions of Ghana 
respectively (Lund,2008; Crook et al, 2007). While land values are relatively low 
compared to southern Ghana, the struggles for control over land might be more for 
political expediency than for the potential economic gains in the resource. The 
continuous contestations over land are also linked to chieftaincy disputes52.  
 
With increasing urbanisation (and mining) the historical notion about communal 
ownership of land is fading. Chiefs are now claiming that once rural land becomes 
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engulfed in urbanised activities it reverts to the chief to administer and to allocate it for 
other uses (Ubink, 2008). Even though it is not legally within the authority of chiefs’ to 
decide when land use changes occurs in stool land areas53, it is their claim for absolute 
ownership rather than as custodians, of land which raises serious queries. To this end 
Ubink (2008) is puzzled why community members who are entitled to the beneficiary 
interest in communal land fail to challenge or demand accountability from the chiefs. As 
fiduciaries it is to be expected that chiefs will act in the utmost interest of the 
beneficiary community when dealing with stool land. However, this has often not been 
the case and yet chiefs remain unquestioned. On occasions it is the wealthy indigenes 
(living locally or in the urban centres) or the youth that have challenged some 
traditional authorities in state courts about the claims they make for land and the 
revenue that it produces.  
Chiefs have also made the claim that stool land belongs to the royal family of which the 
chief is a member (Ubink, 2008). This claim, which some chiefs often make seem to 
imply that stool land is private property for which the occupier of the stool has the ‘right’ 
to allocate or convert its use without consulting the community. This effectively reduces 
the interests of the customary freeholder to that of a tenant at the will of the chief. If this 
were so then it would be contrary to the established principles of customary law, which 
established customary freehold as a perpetual interest (see section 3.2.1).  
As noted in section 2.3.2 Akabzaa and Tsuma’s studies in three different mining 
districts in Ghana (Wassa West, Obuasi and Adansi) showed the presence of high 
level of disillusionment and great concerns about the negotiations for compensation 
and resettlement between mining companies and traditional authorities. This is 
because of ongoing property dispossession amongst the majority of community 
inhabitants (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Yankson, 2010; Tsuma, 2010, 
Ayelazuno, 2011).  The study examined the impact of mining activities on the lives of 
the inhabitants and pointed out that anticipated benefits to be derived from chiefs’ 
management of stool land remain unfulfilled while stool land is taken over by mining 
companies creating widespread property dispossession.  Thus in these mining districts 
chiefs are generally perceived as agents of the mining companies (Akabzaa, 2000:94-
95; 2007; Tsuma, 2010). 
Within the above context questions have been raised about the import of the 
custodianship role of chiefs with regards to stool land in Ghana. This is because it is by 
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virtue of that legal responsibility that they have been allocating land to both indigenes 
and non-indigenes, protecting it from other stools and negotiating for its release for 
other uses such as mining and other public uses when required by the state. It is 
through the performance of these customary and statutory duties that some chiefs now 
seem to rely on to claim absolute ownership for land. The rhetorical ‘tradition’ that 
chiefs have often relied on to claim legitimate authority over land as they do is now 
tainted by their parochial interests (Chanock, 1991; 1998; Hobsbawn and Ranger, 
1983). However, these claims are ferociously contested by some customary 
freeholders in both the urban and rural forest zones (Ubink, 2008; Amanor, 2008; Boni, 
2008; Gough and Yankson, 2000). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed chiefs and politics of land in Ghana from an historical 
perspective. I examined the nature of traditional authority, with particular reference to 
pre-colonial chieftaincy authority over stool land in Akan societies and how distinctive 
that was from what pertained in other areas of the country, such as the northern 
regions. The chapter also points out the implications of the political recognition of 
chiefs’ authority over land and how that shaped the customary land tenure (the notion 
of communal land) and the development of customary law, which is now applied in the 
courts of Ghana. In addition the chapter discussed the problematic nature of chiefly 
authority over stool land in Ghana and the implications of urbanisation and the 
increasing commoditisation of land which is creating wealth for those who control and 
can provide access to land. 
Pre-colonial system of political authority varied across the country. Among the Akans of 
southern Ghana there existed a powerful and highly militarised traditional chieftaincy 
system. This was organised in a hierarchical order with extant rules on succession, 
exercise of authority and control over land. On the other hand in most of the northern 
section of the country communities existed without this form of traditional authority. 
Chieftaincy was the invention of colonial rule. Prior to colonialism land was controlled in 
most of these areas by earth priests. This chapter has pointed out how chieftaincy 
under the Akan system facilitated the colonial policy of indirect rule as a result of which  
the model was ‘invented’ in those areas that had no chiefs.   
Under colonial rule chiefs became part of the colonial administration and their authority 
was bolstered with legislation. Colonial policies were indirectly implemented by 
traditional chiefs and this made them unpopular as they were perceived as 
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appendages to the colonial government. The significant impact of indirect rule over 
traditional authority is the development of customary law and land tenure system. 
British colonial officials belief in the knowledge and authority that traditional chiefs had 
over local custom facilitated the reinterpretation and invention of customs, which were 
often made to suit the circumstances of chiefs rather than that which was actually 
based on extant traditional practices (Chanock, 1991; Ranger, 1993). The notion of 
communal land was subsequently developed and has since been incorporated into the 
customary laws of Ghana. The idea that land was a community property with the 
absolute title vested in the chief on behalf of the political community was therefore 
created at the time of colonial rule. This chapter showed that since colonial rule stool 
land in Ghana has been interpreted as communal land, which chiefs are expected to 
manage on behalf of their respective political community. This allowed chiefs to 
exercise authority over land transactions and to control the revenue it produces.  
Colonial administration did provide additional source of power for chiefs but this 
created problems for them in the run up to independence. Chiefs’ authority under 
colonial administration was strongly opposed prior to independence in 1957. The 
dislike for chiefs’ authority in the native courts and in land matters continued when the 
CPP government took over the helm of affairs in the country. Under the CPP 
leadership various legislations were passed that took away the authority of chiefs in 
local justice and control over land and revenue as part of the process that was aimed at 
curtailing the political significance and authority of chiefs.  By 1961 the institution of 
Chieftaincy was controlled and regulated by the state. Subsequent Constitutions in 
1969, 1979 and the current 1992 guarantee the institution of chieftaincy in Ghana, with 
a requirement that the customary enstoolment of chiefs should be gazetted for state 
recognition. This effectively ensures state control over the traditional institution of 
chieftaincy. Furthermore, revenue that accrues on stool land is collected and 
administered through the state agency; the OASL.  Despite these measures chiefs still 
engage in land transactions and collect rents that the state is not able to hold them to 
account for (this will be discussed in chapter 6). 
This chapter also discussed how the dynamics of increasing demand for land resulting 
from urbanisation and commercial investment is affecting extant customary tenure in 
Ghana. The customary freehold interest, for instance, is an important interest in stool 
land that is perpetual, inheritable and cannot be extinguished by the allodial title vested 
in chiefs. However, a review of the literature shows the problematic nature of chiefly 
authority over stool land, and how this in some cases threatens the customary freehold. 
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This forms the basis of land conflicts and contestations across Ghana.  In the following 
chapters I focus on how this study was conducted and analyse the empirical data from 
which findings and conclusions are made.  
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Chapter 4  
Research Design and Methods 
4.0 Introduction 
Over the previous three chapters I have developed the research aims, questions and 
the theoretical framework for this study. In this chapter I describe how the study was 
designed and the methodology that was used to investigate and analyse how 
traditional authority is exercised in practice by chiefs over land and the resulting 
outcomes based on data collected from field work.  
This research is on a case study of four selected communities within the BND. These 
are used to explore local strategies that have been adopted for development following 
land acquisition by a multinational mining company investing in mining in the District. 
This has implications for the authority of chiefs and other local institutions of authority 
over land management and development in the BND. Apart from traditional chiefs, who 
are the main focus of the study, a multiplicity of actors and institutions at the local level 
were identified who constituted key sources of data which were collected for analyses. 
Different methods were used to gather relevant data for the thesis (details to follow). 
This thesis analyses empirical data that was gathered from field work in Ghana in two 
phases between December 2009 and December 2010. This included a one month 
preliminary fieldwork (from December 2009 to January 2010) and then 10 months 
fieldwork (April to December 2010) during which time I lived in New Abirem one of the 
case study communities in the BND. During the 10 months period I attended local 
negotiations meetings between members of the local community (including traditional 
chiefs), state institutions and mining company where I interacted and observed the 
dynamics of the actors and institutions at play. Additional qualitative data was collected 
mainly through interviews and discussions and quantitative data from a survey of 
popular perception of local inhabitants. The research plan and specific data collection 
methods that were used is explained in this chapter. The design and methods 
employed were aimed at ensuring that a wealth of quality data was generated for 
analyses and understanding of what takes place at the local level. 
The chapter is structured as follows: an overview of the case study district and its 
location within Ghana is followed by description of the research design. The case study 
approach to the research is explained. This leads on to the selection of the set of 
communities within the BND for the study by highlighting on the principles used in 
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selecting the four communities.  Following that is a description of the methodology and 
explanation to why specific methods were used for the study. The final section of the 
chapter is the conclusion. 
4.1 The research location and communities 
Ghana is divided into 10 administrative regions54 (see Figure 3), which are subdivided 
into a total of 170 districts55.Birim North District (BND) is located in the Eastern 
Region56 and represents one of twenty-one districts in the region. Until 1987 Birim 
North was formerly part of the Birim District before it was carved out as a separate 
district as part of the Government of Ghana’s programme of promoting decentralisation 
and development in the country. Population for the district is estimated at 78,907 living 
in about 89 communities.57 There are not many towns within the district that have a 
population exceeding 5000 people. The administrative capital town of the BND is New 
Abirem, which is located approximately 180km North-West of Ghana’s capital city 
Accra. 
 
Administrative Authority 
Ghana’s current local government system has a three-tier structure at the district level, 
which is made up of the District Assembly, the Urban/Town/Area Councils and the Unit 
Committees. For effective local administration, the BND is sub-divided into 4 Town and 
Area Councils and 29 Unit Committees58. The Birim North District Assembly (BNDA) is 
the highest administrative and political authority in the district with the mandate to 
initiate and coordinate all development efforts aimed at sustainable development at the 
local level. The BNDA is the local government authority with responsibility of planning 
and funding development in the district (section 46 of the Local Government Act, 1993 
(Act 462). In this respect the BNDA prepares Development Plans for the District with 
the approval of the National Development Planning Commission. The BNDA in the 
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performance of its mandate ensures that communities participate in the formulation of 
the district’s development plans (this will be discussed in Chapter 5.2.1).  
Figure 3: Map of administrative regions in Ghana showing the Eastern Region 
 
Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/geography/maps.php59 
Under Ghana’s decentralisation system the town/area/zonal councils are established 
and named based on the size and nature of settlement. Over 1300 town/area/zonal 
councils have been established since 1988 when Ghana first implemented the current 
decentralised system of local government (Crawford, 2004:12). These councils are not 
elective bodies but are instead composed of five representatives of the District 
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Assembly, ten representatives of unit committees in the area and five persons 
appointed by the government. Essentially, the town/area/zonal councils are 
implementing agencies of the District Assemblies.60 Urban councils represent urban 
settlements of over 15,000 people, and zonal and town councils represent mostly rural 
settlements with populations between 5,000 to 15,000 people.  
The third tier of the decentralisation system is the Unit Committee (UC). It forms the 
base of the District Assembly system. The UC is therefore situated below the sub-
metropolitan district councils, urban or zonal councils, town or area councils in the local 
government structure, and represent the community.  Members of the committee are 
elected to serve a term of 4 years but may be re-elected for another term. They 
perform voluntary community service to the people they represent61.  Originally for 
each unit area62 there were supposed to be no more than 15 UC members comprising 
10 elected residents and up to 5 residents who are nominated for approval by the 
District Chief Executive (DCE) on behalf of the President of the Republic (Act 462; 
ILGS, 2008:8). However, since 2010 this has now been scaled down to 5 elected 
members under a new Legislative Instrument (LI1967). The number of UC in the 
country which were over 16,000 were also ‘reduced to 5,000 to be at par with the 
number of electoral areas in the country for district level elections’63.The first election 
for the Unit Committees in Ghana was held in 1988 under the Local Government Law 
1988 (PNDCL 207). The UCs have been designed to enhance and extend scope for 
citizens’ participation in the democratic process , thus its members take part in decision 
making and recommendations, among others, on local issues that have direct impact 
on the development of the people (Crook and Manor,1998). Unit Committees (UC) 
perform administrative functions such as the registration of births and deaths, public 
education campaigns, revenue raising and the organisation of communal labour for 
local projects. District Assemblies may delegate any of their functions, excluding the 
power to legislate, levy rates or borrow money, to sub-metropolitan district councils, 
town, area, zonal or urban councils or UCs (Crawford, 2004:13).  
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Traditional Authority 
The main ethnic group in the BND is Akan64 comprising mainly of Akyems who are 
predominantly from the Eastern region.  There are three main divisions of the Akyems; 
these are the Kotoku, Abuakwa and Bosome. Thus, there are three traditional areas in 
the district one of which is Akyem Kotoku. The people of BND are mainly Akyem 
Kotoku constituting about 85% of the Akyem population. Four main stool lands (New 
Abirem, Adausena, Ntronang and Afosu) have been affected by the mining operations.  
The highest traditional authority is in chieftaincy which is organized in a hierarchical 
order with the paramount chief at the top. That authority is located at the headquarters 
of the Akyem Kotoku people at a town called Oda. As is typical of the Akan militarised 
chieftaincy structure there are five heads of divisions under the paramount chief to 
which all the subordinate chiefs and people in the Akyem Kotoku division belong65. The 
Akyem Kotoku state (Oman) constitutes one traditional area headed by the Paramount 
chief (Omanhene) who is the head of the Traditional Council of the area. Below the 
Paramount Chief there are a number of divisional and sub-divisional chiefs (Ahene) 
who head and represent traditional towns and villages. For instance, the chief of New 
Abirem (capital of the District) is a divisional chief of the Akyem Kotoku traditional area, 
who also has sub-chiefs at the village and community levels. Within the District, the 
paramount chief of the traditional area exerts control over the divisional and sub-chiefs 
of the area and even over lands in the area in accordance with the customary practices 
of the people. In some parts of the district66 migrants have acquired the allodial interest 
through alienation and are now land owners in those areas. All these traditional 
authorities play important roles as custodians over land and natural resource 
management. 
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 The Five Divisions are Nifa, Benkum, Gyase, Kronti and Adonten. Each of this is headed by a chief. 
When the Oman (native state) was set up as a confederation of groups of people (under a stool) it was 
entirely for military convenience. The army was made up of 5 winged Commanders who controlled 
groups of towns or stools under their wing. These were the Nifahene (Chief of the Right wing of the 
army); the Benkumhene (chief of the left wing); The Adontenhene (head of the advance guard, the 
Commander in Chief); The Gyasehene (Commander of the body guard. He acts as the regent in the 
absence of the Omanhene); the Krontihene (Commander of the main body and political head if the 
towns in that section) (Danquah, 1928: 26-33; Field, 1948: 1, 13-14).The Akyems had three military 
unions each headed by an Omanhene (the supreme or paramount head).  
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4.2 Research design: developing the case study and methodology 
This study examined the research question by using data that was collected from 
multiple sources by applying a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
(Creswell, 2008; Bryman, 2009; Yin, 2003; Gerring, 2007). The case study approach 
was adopted to facilitate the use of a mixed approached to the collection of primary 
data. A wealth of data was collected during an extensive period of fieldwork which 
focussed on generating qualitative and quantitative data by conducting field interviews, 
participatory observation and a popular survey on the perception of people about 
traditional authority and provision of public goods. 
Case studies can be designed as a study of single or multiple cases (Yin, 2003).  Thus, 
at an early stage of research, before data collection the decision has to be made 
whether a ‘single case or multiple cases are to be used to address the research 
question’ (ibid, 2003:39). Furthermore, Yin (2003) outlines five rationales for which 
single case studies are appropriate; where the single case represents the critical case 
in testing a well-formulated theory, or where the case is an extreme or unique case, or 
the case is representative or typical so that lessons from this can provide information 
about experiences, or a case is revelatory and provides an opportunity to observe 
phenomena previously inaccessible to scientific investigation or it is a longitudinal case 
so that the same single case is studied at two or more different points in time. This 
thesis is based on data collected from a single case study. The single case of the role 
of traditional authorities in ongoing negotiations for compensation at the Birim North 
District provides a unique case for exploring local problem solving strategies for the [co] 
provision of public goods and more generally development within mining communities 
in Ghana. What is happening as elucidated in this thesis is an unusual practice that 
requires exploration using empirical data analysed to facilitate understanding and 
knowledge of the observed outcomes. 
To achieve this required an in-depth study of what was happening within the case 
study area. Thomas (2010) has argued that a case study method is a kind of research 
that concentrates on looking at one thing in detail, without seeking to generalise from it. 
It is about the particular “thing” as a whole rather than the general (Thomas, 2011:3; 
Yin, 2003). Yin (1994; 2003:5-8) also points out that a case study is preferred when 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are asked. This is because they seek explanatory reasons 
for the kinds of outputs that result from the exercise of authority over stool land by 
chiefs in the BND. This research therefore explores how combinations of actors and 
institutions that have overlapping rights and interests in, and exercise varying degrees 
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of authority over stool land can affect developmental outcomes of local communities. 
This lends itself to the case study approach (Gerring, 2007:48). Adopting the case 
study approach allowed an investigation through in-depth study of particular local 
situations, ‘drilling deep’ to collect good data and to provide a 3-dimensional view of the 
research issues for a comprehensive understanding (Yin, 2003; Thomas, 2011:4-9).  
Again, Thomas (2011) argues that this provides a way of ‘getting close to reality’ about 
phenomena. It encourages critical thinking through experiences and intelligence of 
drawing inferences from data from the research objects (ibid: 6).  
Using the case study research approach helped to generate different kinds of 
information from the various actors and institutions I engaged with during my field work. 
At the initial stages of my study the case study approach helped me to define clearly 
the boundaries of my research (Thomas, 2011, Yin, 1994). It guided my choice of the 
research objects and the communities within the District ensuring that I was able to 
explore and unravel the meanings of the phenomena I was questioning. Thus it was 
more important for me to select a location and respondents that can provide data to 
help understand the ‘how’ and ‘why’ local institutions of authority operate they way that 
they do and to provide explanatory account for the observed outcomes. 
At the beginning of this study I realised that there was limited documentation on the 
specific nature of my research focus to provide understanding on how the use of local 
cultural repertoires can lead to the production of public developmental outcomes. The 
use of a case study was therefore useful to make up for the limited documentation by 
facilitating the generation of data sources, and more importantly to allow for the use of 
methods that provide opportunities to observe and explore in all dimensions the 
political interaction between actors and institutions at the local level.  The conclusion 
was made that the case study was more suited for this study because it allows for the 
use of two important sources of evidence where there is limited source of existing data 
that can be relied on for the research; the use of direct observation of events being 
studied and interviews of the persons involved in the events within a locality (Yin, 
2003:8).  
To ensure rigour, validity and diversity in the findings and conclusions a popular survey 
using structured questionnaires as well as extensive review of existing literature 
provide multiple sources of empirical data for triangulation. These helped to address 
challenges often associated with validity and reliability of research findings and 
conclusions. 
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4.3 Selection of communities from the Birim North District 
Generally, the BND extends over a large expanse of land fertile for agricultural 
production, forest products including timber resources and the discovery of large 
deposits of mineral reserves (in particular gold).67 The availability of these resources 
comes with potential economic benefits to communities that are located in close 
proximity to the resources. The BND attracts investments in timber and mining in the 
area. This is also having significant implications for the conversion and 
commercialization of land from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. The choice of the 
BND  and in particular the four stool land areas, as a set of case studies, were as a 
result of a number of factors; location within the same local government authority, the 
influence of local investments in resource exploitation and land uses as well as having 
similarity in customary land tenure arrangements.  
 
Four communities (New Abirem, Adausena, Ntronang and Praso Kuma) which were 
selected to constitute a set of case studies for this thesis are within the same 
geographical location of the BND (see Figure 4). They are under the administrative 
jurisdiction of the BNDA, which has the responsibility of planning development in all 
these communities. The communities lie within two (out of four) area councils in the 
district; New Abirem falls within the Abirem and Afosu Area Council while Adausena, 
Ntronang and Praso Kuma are in the Praman Area Council.  
New Abirem and Ntronang are relatively two big towns in the district that are 
experiencing a high influx of activities peculiar to urban and peri-urban areas in Ghana 
due to ongoing mining investments in the district. Thus the commercialization and 
conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural uses is on the ascendency in 
these towns.  Although Adausena is a relatively small community, compared to New 
Abirem and Ntronang, its inhabitants are the most affected by the ongoing mining 
activities. This is because the core of mining activity is located on land that belongs to 
the Adausena stool (located between New Abirem and Ntronang (see Figure 4). 
Adausena together with Ntronang are the two communities that have large tracts of 
arable and forested land affected by the large scale mining investment in the District. 
This has affected a complete suburb of the Adausena stool resulting in the resettlement 
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of its inhabitants68. These areas have therefore been affected directly or indirectly by 
timber and mining activities and were therefore selected to provide opportunity to gain 
insights into how chiefs manage stool land under their authority. The availability of stool 
land and natural resources such as timber and minerals provide great source of 
revenue to the people.  In addition oil palm is the major crop in the mining area 
estimated at over 40% of total crop cover. Cocoa accounts for almost 29%, and 
together these are the predominant crops in the area (RAP 2010:16).   
The fourth town Praso Kuma is a relatively small rural community lying outside of the 
areas that are directly affected by the mining investment and the land acquisition 
process in the Birim North District. It was selected to study how decisions with regards 
to the provision of public goods are made given that revenue generated from stool land 
in such rural settings in Ghana, as a result of the level of land transaction, is often low.  
Praso Kuma has a voter population of about 600 people69. Preliminary fieldwork had 
revealed that the chief and local inhabitants are able to mobilise collectively for the 
provision of public goods, although revenue generated from stool land was low. 
According to the District OASL officer there are no official records of stool land revenue 
for the area because it has a low potential to generated revenue from land transaction 
and natural resources70. This therefore provided an opportunity to explore how the 
stool land is managed under the chief and how public goods are provided given that 
the people living in this community did not take part in the negotiations for 
compensation and public goods provision.  
Another consideration for the choice of the set of four communities for a case study 
was because lands in all these communities are predominantly under the authority of 
chiefs as stool land. Stool lands are expected to be managed in accordance with Akan 
customary land tenure principles, as trust property (discussed in chapter 3). The 
selected communities were therefore chosen to provide contrasting modes of 
management by chiefs. 
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 Yayaaso is the community at the epicentre of the mining area.  Inhabitants of the community had to 
be moved to a different location within the stool land to make way for mining operations.   
69
 From the electoral roll of 2008 and matches the list compiled by the local Chairman of the Unit 
Committee  
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 Interview with District OASL officer on 11/08/2010 
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Figure 4: Map showing the location of the case-study communities in the Birim 
North District 
 
Source: Courtesy Yeboah-Siaw’s GIS data base71  
The selection of these communities within the same district was deliberate for case 
study analysis and to ensure a balance between actors and institutions in different 
localities under different traditional leadership but within a common administrative 
boundary (Yin, 2008). This was to facilitate the examination of data on how stool land is 
managed and the implications for development in these areas. For instance, the choice 
of New Abirem was influenced by positive perceptions from local inhabitants that the 
chief had established a land management committee to facilitate prudent management 
of stool land the revenue it generated. On the other hand at Ntronang a contrary view 
of what was happening at New Abirem seemed to be the case72. Here the chief was 
said to be directly in control of stool land transactions and management of all revenues. 
This seemed to suggest that local inhabitants had limited involvement and knowledge 
about land transactions and what the revenue that is generated is used for. Thus, at 
the outset these two communities suggested contrasting perspectives on how 
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traditional authority over land is exercised. There was therefore the need for further 
investigation into the local situation to understand how and why traditional authority 
was exercised differently within these two contiguous stool land communities and the 
implications for the development of these areas.  
In essence New Abirem, Adausena and Ntronang, were chosen because of the direct 
impact of mining activities on the communities stool and property resulting in land 
acquisitions and the emerging issues of negotiations and co-production of public 
goods. On the other hand Praso Kuma allows for comparison of the extent to which the 
observed outcomes about the provision of public goods are influenced by mining 
investment and the resultant negotiations in those communities. The four communities 
were therefore chosen because of their differences and the opportunity they provide to 
compare different influences on local outcomes.  
To explore traditional authority in the case study communities in an attempt to 
understand how it operates within the context explained above required the use of a 
multi-methods approach to data collection and analysis. In the next section I provide 
explanations for the methods used to provide empirical evidence.  
4.4 Data collection methods 
This section explains the research strategies adopted for data collection, analyses and 
interpretation of the findings. As noted above I relied on the combined use of data from 
qualitative and quantitative sources for the thesis. Qualitative data were mainly 
generated from interviews using semi-structured interviews and participant observation 
methods. This involved extensive writing of notes and documentation of responses 
about the opinions and perception of the selected respondent in the selected 
communities and institutions.  Embedding myself as a participant in the communities 
enabled me to observe and gain first-hand information and understanding which was 
helpful in explaining the nature of local cultures, the relationship between the various 
actors and institutions and in particular the arenas for negotiations for compensation 
and provision of public goods which forms a central part of this study.  
4.4.1 Interviews and observations  
To undertake expert interviews and engage in participant observation in a study of this 
kind entails constant interaction with the research objects over a predetermined period 
of time. To facilitate this I mapped out a broad categorisation of the actors and 
institutions within the study communities. The prior knowledge of ongoing negotiations 
in the communities affected by mining helped me to categorise the actors into: 
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(1) Inhabitants of the communities (including traditional authorities), 
(2) The state institutions at the district level (this comprised the public land sectors 
agencies and the local government authority together with all the decentralised state 
institutions at the Birim North District) and  
(3) The Newmont Golden Ridge Limited, the mining company acquiring land for its 
mining operations73. 
The essence of combining interviews with active participant observation is derived from 
the need to explore the nature of authority exercised by traditional chiefs over 
communally owned land resources and to examine the implications for the provision of 
public goods. This is an explorative research which required depth of local knowledge 
and how this may have been varied over time. Interviews conducted with the three 
categories of actors above provided opportunities to learn about the roles of these key 
actors within the local community and in particular within the negotiations arenas (these 
will be discussed in detail in chapters 7 and 8). 
Interviews 
All the interviews were done using semi-structured questionnaires for each category of 
actors (Appendices A and B). This provided opportunity to have guided conversations 
rather than structured questionnaires (Yin, 2003:89). It was also to enable me to ask 
questions in an unbiased manner with some flexibility during interviewing and 
encouraged follow up questions for further probing. Chiefs, older community members 
and key informants74 who were interviewed provided historical accounts of the 
traditional authority and land tenure relations in the communities. Interviews with youth 
leaders, opinion leaders of the communities and traditional authorities provided 
narratives on what constitute legitimate authority and how local people perceived the 
authority that is exercised by chiefs. The conversational interviews were followed up 
with subsequent more focussed interviews with selected respondents using 
predetermined questions. This was done to clarify or corroborate information gleaned 
from the interviews with some of the respondents. Apart from the individual interviews, 
group discussions (4-6 people) were held with the local association of the youth and 
women in some of the communities (Adausena and Ntronang) and these were 
particularly useful. Groups were formed by drawing on members of these associations 
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 People were either indigenes or have lived in the community for long as well as experts in the relevant 
fields of chieftaincy, land and natural resources. 
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who also represented their communities in at least one of the two negotiations 
committees (these will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8). The leaders of the group 
helped in indentifying the members of the association who were also on the 
negotiations. These category of people brought insights into what happens both within 
the communities and at the negotiations. This process led to better insights into the 
interviews that were conducted with the various actors. 
Interviews were conducted with state officials at the district. These comprised the Birim 
North District Assembly including the Town and Country Department, agencies of the 
Lands Commission and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (Appendix A-2). 
This was to establish and understand the legal framework within which they operate at 
the district level and most importantly gain insights into the evolving roles they have 
assumed within the mining district. It was of relevant importance to get a clear 
understanding of the roles of these state institutions, how they are performing and their 
level of authority within the negotiations for compensation and public goods provision. 
Each of these state institutions have legal mandates but preliminary investigation had 
revealed that apart from being in the district to fulfil that legal responsibility they were 
also engaged in the negotiations process, which was an unusual development within 
mining districts in Ghana. Thus, I focussed on those state institutions which were 
involved in the negotiations process rather than all the existing district level state 
institutions. 
Interviews with officials of Newmont working at the Birim North District were conducted 
to understand the rights and responsibilities of the company over the land and 
resources in the District. This engagement provided valuable insights into the historical 
development of the negotiations process adopted in the community and what the 
Company perceived as its social obligation to the mining affect communities. Although, 
as I will elaborate in the Chapters 7 and 8, the provision of public goods by mining 
companies to communities in which they operate in the way it is negotiated at the BND 
is an unusual finding in Ghana. 
Participant Observation 
The decision to engage in participant observation was due to awareness about the 
sensitivity surrounding mining and land acquisitions in areas where mining investments 
have taken place in Ghana (Akabzaa, 2000;Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001; Akabzaa et 
al, 2007; Yankson, 2010; Tsuma, 2010; Ayelazuno, 2011). Within mining enclaves in 
Ghana various parties with different levels of interests are often engaged in some form 
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of ‘negotiations’ and disputes about land required for mining. These often include 
members of local communities and their traditional chiefs, mining companies, non-
governmental organization and officials of state institutions such as the Minerals 
Commission, Environmental Protection Agency and the Ghana Police Service 
(Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007). As a result of persistent levels of agitations 
recorded in such areas, relying only on data from the use of structured (and semi-
structured) questionnaires and surveys which employ direct face to face engagement 
has the potential for data distortion. This is because local inhabitants may feel insecure 
to provide information for fear of being indentified. Likewise officials of both state 
institutions and mining company may not be willing to divulge some information, which 
could potentially be made public.  
Furthermore, insight about negotiations strategies being developed by the parties 
involved might not be revealed through other forms of interviews. It was therefore 
necessary for me to engage in participant observation in the communities. To do this I 
had to seek approval to enable me attend and observe meetings where the actual 
negotiations were conducted. This required some skill in observation as well as trust 
and cooperation from the community inhabitants and all the parties to the negotiations. 
I therefore had some training in ethnography before setting off for fieldwork75. To gain 
sufficient trust and cooperation of the local inhabitants, I relied on my previous 
relationship with a private consulting firm that provided advice on land access to 
Newmont. The firm introduced me to the negotiations committees and sought formal 
permission for me to attend and observe negotiations proceedings.76 Both Newmont 
and the local community representatives did not object to this request. This immensely 
facilitated my research because I was able to attend both plenary sessions and sub-
committee negotiations meetings to observe and take notes on the dynamic of the 
process (see chapter 7 for details). Through a similar process I was able to establish 
contact with all the traditional authorities in all four communities. While I lived and spent 
most of the time at New Abirem I was able to move in and out of the other communities 
freely to conduct my research without difficulties.  
The opportunity to live in the communities for most of the 10 month field work period to 
interact with local inhabitants and observe negotiations proceedings gave me additional 
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insights about the feelings and thoughts of the local people, their culture, and decision 
making processes. In fact this approach enabled me have an understanding of the 
lived realities of everyday lives of the local inhabitants: social and cultural life of the 
people; the way people relate and conceive meanings of things happening around 
them. It enhanced my understanding of people’s actions, power and political relations 
and how these impact on others with regards to land and natural resources in the area. 
Through this approach I was also able to construct what constitutes a good 
outcome/service and how these are accessible by members of the community. Being 
able to speak and understand the local language (Twi) spoken by the inhabitants was 
helpful. This was important in helping to understand the notion of development from the 
perspective of the local inhabitants. To the local people development (mpuntu) and 
public goods meant more or less the same. A public good refers to a local public facility 
which no one controls privately. Examples given include roads and bore-holes to 
supply potable water, hospitals and schools. 
Furthermore, engaging in participant observation provided the opportunity to 
understand what people say and behave within meetings during negotiations, where 
their personal interests are not represented because all the parties are representatives 
of a group or institution, and how they express themselves outside within the 
communities. Observation of proceedings at meetings in particular enabled me to 
observe the intricacies of the negotiations and most importantly about the power 
dynamics within the negotiations arena: who could speak and what they said at these 
meetings provided important dimension to the data collected outside of the meetings. 
Knowledge of all these combined effectively and facilitated the analyses and 
interpretation of the data from interviews and observation. Key to the observations was 
keeping a record of events in a field note book and personal diary, which was useful for 
noting initial reflections about interview responses and observations to support the 
documentations that were being made. In chapters 7 and 8 I provide detail discussions 
on the observations made at the different levels of negotiations between the parties. 
It is important to note that my presence in the community and in particular at 
negotiations meetings did not in any way affect how the local inhabitants would 
normally behave. Outside of the negotiations committee perhaps I was not even 
noticed. This is because as a result of the mining activities there had been an influx of 
people into New Abirem, where I was based most of the time. New arrivals in the town 
were either perceived as workers of the mining company or had come to do some 
business connected with the new investment in mining. Within the negotiations 
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committees I was introduced as a research student interesting in observing the 
negotiating process, which the local inhabitants knew themselves as unusual within 
mining communities in Ghana. They were also aware that my research could not 
influence the outcome of the negotiations for compensation and development goods. In 
fact because of the mining activities the BND and its inhabitants have encountered 
both professional and student researchers at some point in time. Thus, a local chief 
made the following comment when I went to explain my research and to seek his 
permission to stay in his town: 
I know what you want to do.....you want to write a book about us and we will 
help you by giving you all the information you want to help you do that so that 
what is happening here will be known..........some students have come from 
abroad and other local universities before you to do similar things.77 
Statements of this kind and the belief that my presence during meetings and in the 
communities will have no influence on the negotiations gave me confidence that what I 
observed was a reflection of the reality in the everyday lives of the people in the district. 
4.4.2 Exploring the research question in the study communities 
This section provides an explanation of how the specific methods were used to explore 
and analyse the research questions. The discussion also explains how interviewees 
were selected from the identified actors and institutions. 
Having made the choice to use semi-structured interviews and engage in local 
participant observation in the communities the next step was to identify the specific 
respondents. Following from the preliminary visit to the case study district and interview 
with public land sector agencies in the BND and at the regional level I had already 
identified traditional chiefs and these agencies as categories to pursue for further 
interviewing sessions. Thus, the chiefs and their Councils of Elders and the state 
institutions became the primary focus to start with.  
Engaging with traditional authorities and members of the local communities 
Contact with the traditional authorities was established during the preliminary visit to 
the district and I informed them about a follow up interview when I returned for the 
extensive stay for field work. The key interest in the interviews with the traditional 
authorities was to understand the political structure of the traditional authority at the 
local level and how it is exercised in practice over stool land. The aim was to 
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investigate about the historical position of the chief over these resources and how that 
has been affected by the mining acquisition. A semi-structured interview guide was 
prepared to facilitate the discussion in an informal setting. My understanding of the 
traditional structure and decision making process as well as the existence and role of 
other local institutions in the communities was key to unearthing how chiefly authority 
was being exercised. 
By interacting with and interviewing traditional authorities I gained insights into the local 
power structures in all four communities. There were groups and structures that were 
established under the traditional chief to facilitate decision making and the 
management of land.  
By asking the traditional authorities about how stool is managed and decisions about 
development are made led to the revelations about the existence of Plot Allocation 
Committees (PAC) in all the four communities. This provided further opportunity to 
investigate and to verify the responses from other sources about land and 
development. Interviewing the chiefs and their elders helped in identifying other 
relevant local actors and institution involved in stool land management (see Appendix 
B1-1 for interview guide).  
Two important opportunities helped in identifying potential respondents for interviews 
and group discussions. Firstly, by living amongst the community people it did not take 
long to know who the opinion leaders in the community were, and which groups and 
associations existed in the communities. An important observation that was made 
during the initial stage of my field work was that the negotiations committees were 
constituted by people who were respected in the communities (and therefore listened 
to by the local inhabitants) or belong to an established group such as the youth or 
women or famers association78. Knowledge of this helped to identify potential 
interviewees. As I will explain later in chapter 7 because of Newmont’s mining 
investment in the District a number of local groups that have emerged (or revived) and 
are actively involved in  development issues. These were mainly the youth and 
women’s associations in the mining affected communities. The responses from the 
leaders and selected members of these groups provided insights into decision making 
for planning development within the communities (see Appendices B1-2 and B1-3).   
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Secondly, attending the negotiations meetings as a passive observer provided another 
opportunity to establish how the representatives were selected, whose interest was 
expressed at the meetings and the authority of all the members. Permission to attend 
and  observe meetings at the plenary session of the negotiations facilitated further 
access to meetings at the sub-committee level where the actual negotiations took place 
(this is further explained in Chapter 7 and 8). This provided an additional opportunity to 
observe the dynamics of local power in action and also to identify key members of the 
committee for interviews. 
Interview with District level State institutions 
Officials of district level state institutions involved in the negotiations served as the 
source of another level of qualitative data. As a follow up to initial interviews with 
officials at the regional level of the OASL and the Lands Commission, which I had 
during the preliminary field visits, arrangements were made to interview officials at the 
district level. Table 1 shows the list of officials of state institutions that were interviewed 
(see Appendix A-2). 
Interview with the respective officials was to find out the interests of these public 
institutions and to investigate their legal position within the context of the local 
negotiations for compensation and provision of public goods at the BND. It was also to 
promote knowledge and understanding of their authority in decisions that are taken 
within the negotiations arenas. For example, the BNDA is by law the legal authority to 
initiate and plan development within the district. It was therefore of interest to find out 
what role it played in the negotiations between the local communities affected by 
mining and Newmont. 
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Table 1: List of officials of State institutions interviewed 
 Official's rank Institution/Department 
1 District Planning Officer Birim North District, New Abirem 
2 Head of Town and Country Planning TCPD, New Abirem 
3 Senior Stool Lands officer OASL, Accra 
4 Regional Stool Lands Officer OASL, Koforidua 
5 District Stool Lands Officer OASL, New Abirem 
6 Chief Executive Officer  Lands Commission, Accra 
7 Senior Lands Officer PVLMD (LC), Koforidua 
8 Lands Valuation Officer (BND) Lands Valuation Division (LC), Koforidua 
9 Assemblyman79 Ntronang (Ahenebrono) 
10 Assemblyman New Abirem 
11 Assemblywoman Adausena 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2010) 
Apart from interviewing the officials above I identified and selected researchers and 
experts to explore information on specific issues of land and chieftaincy in Ghana. 
Interviews with the following people were helpful in this regard (see Appendix A3). 
a. The President of the Ghana National House of Chiefs in Accra 
b. Three (3) lecturers who are experts on land and compensation issues: two from 
the Kwame Nkrumah University of science and Technology, Kumasi and one 
from the University of Ghana, Accra. 
c. One (1) freelance researcher on customary land tenure in Ghana. 
Interviewing Newmont Officials 
Mining investment in the BND led to the unusual establishment of committees to 
negotiate compensation payments for property and investment in public goods in 
mining affected communities. As far as development was concerned Newmont was an 
important collaborating institution in the BND. It was therefore important to find out the 
framework within which the Company operated and its role in the ongoing negotiations 
for compensation and provision of public goods. The Community Development 
Department was important in this regard since it was responsible for the Company’s 
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relationship with the mine affected communities in the District. Apart from interviewing 
the head of this unit the Company’s community relations officers located at information 
centres in New Abirem, Ntronang and Adausena served as conduits for community 
entry. These facilitated the location of interviewees and observations as well the survey 
that was undertaken (see appendix A-4 for list Newmont officials interviewed). 
The above process for collecting qualitative data generated an extensive wealth of 
information for the thesis. The various approaches and sources helped to clarify often 
contrasting responses gathered from the different sources. 
4.4.3 Survey of perceptions among local inhabitants 
A popular survey of local inhabitants was undertaken with a view of gaining insight into 
individual opinions and perceptions on specific themes of the research. This was done 
using structured questionnaire interviews. Data collected and analysed from the 
popular survey were necessary in the study to provide a picture of the general 
perceptions about chiefly authority, to what extent chiefs’ exercise of authority was 
legitimate and the level of trust that local inhabitants have in their chiefs and other local 
actors and institutions that facilitate the provision of public goods in the communities. 
A structured questionnaire (see appendix C) was designed for the survey after the sixth 
month of field work during which time I had engaged in participant observation and 
conducted interviews with different categories of people as explained above. The 
survey was delayed until this period so that detailed knowledge about the configuration 
and profile of political authorities within the communities was established before 
undertaking a survey of perceptions. Broadly the following were identified as the main 
differences among the inhabitants living in the communities; indigenes, migrants, 
farmers and non-farmers, and the youth.  This was helpful and facilitated a careful 
selection of respondents to ensure that the sample size reflected fairly a cross section 
of local inhabitants.  
As a result of the lack of reliable population data at the time of undertaking this study I 
had to rely partly on the electoral roll for registered voters80 for New Abirem, Adausena 
and Ntronang and a list of adults compiled independently by the Unit Committee 
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 This was provided by the District Electoral Commission Officer at the time of field work in 2010. 
76 
 
Chairman for Praso Kuma as the sample frame from which respondents were 
selected81.  
Table 2: Register of adult voters in the case study communities as at 2010 
Community Voter Population 
New Abirem 3,251 
Adausena 1,225 
Ntronang 1,803 
Praso Kuma 600 
Total 6,879 
Source: Birim North District Electoral Commission (2010) 
Over the years there had been the influx of migrants into the BND to engage in 
agriculture due to the availability of arable land for the cultivation of cash crops such as 
cocoa, oil palm and kola. Mining has also attracted an increased number of people, 
especially the youth. The local population in communities such as New Abirem, Afosu 
and Ntronang also comprise a broad categorisation of the inhabitants as farmers and 
migrants. Knowledge of these differences among the local inhabitants was made 
through observation and initial interaction with inhabitants and talking to officials of 
Newmont.  
However, without an up to date census data to show this I adopted the purposive 
approach of identifying and selecting where possible a balanced number of 
respondents to reflect the population in all the communities. Using the number of 
registered adult voters as a guide each community was assigned a maximum quota of 
potential interviewees. With three locally recruited research assistants the respondents 
were to be selected purposively by alternating between male and female adults in the 
selected houses who were available and willing to be interviewed.82 I realised that in 
each community there was a main road that divides it into approximately two equal 
halves. The interviewer at one side of the community selects randomly a house close 
to the end of the road. In this house a male or female adult is selected and the 
respondents status as to whether native or migrant is noted. The next house from 
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 Results of the national population census which had taken place earlier in the year 2010 had not been 
officially released. 
82
 I employed three data collection assistants to administer the questionnaires over the duration of two 
weeks. Two communities were covered in each week. The reason was to ensure that respondents did 
not pass on their responses to other potential respondents in the other communities. This was because I 
found out that information flow was fast amongst local inhabitants due to the sensitive nature of the 
negotiations and the regularity of meetings by the representatives from the communities. In each 
alternative house visited an adult present was interviewed 
 
77 
 
which a respondent is selected is determined by the interviewer by counting two 
houses from the present. In the selected house, assuming a native male was 
interviewed, in the next house the interviewer purposively aims for either a non-native 
male or female whose status once determined was varied again for the subsequent 
house. This was repeated until the quota was achieved for each community. This 
provided the basis for the selection of respondents without any bias between adult 
male and female. This constituted a non-probability approach to selecting the 
respondents although care was taken to ensure a fair and balanced representation of 
local inhabitants without necessarily dependent on a sampling frame and accuracy of 
selection [as it is a non-probability approach].   
A total of 301 structured questionnaires were administered in all the four communities 
of the district. Table 3 below shows the distribution of valid responses received from 
the four communities. The distribution reflects the size of the population and land area 
of the community. Analysis of the survey data showed that the proportion of male to 
female respondents was 54% to 46% respectively. This was as a result of the 
purposive sampling approach of alternating between male adults and females as 
respondents were being selected from one household to the other. 
In addition to the above different sources of data a review of existing literature provided 
an extensive wealth of secondary information. Information gathered from this source 
has been combined with the primary data and forms the basis for the analyses and 
interpretations of findings. Reviewing the literature provided historical accounts of 
chiefs’ role in national and local politics of development since colonial rule in Africa and 
in Ghana in particular. 
Table 3: Distribution of returned valid questionnaires by communities 
Community Frequency Valid Percent (%) 
New Abirem 102 34 
Ntronang 98 33 
Praso Kuma 59 19 
Adausena 42 14 
Total 301 100.0 
Source: survey data (2010) 
This was important for the study because to understand the present required 
knowledge of the past. It was also important to have a full grasp of understanding and 
knowledge about the nature and historical development of customary land tenure 
relevant to the case study communities.  Government documentation and statute laws 
that regulate land use and natural resource management were assembled and 
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examined in relation to the central theme of the study. This information was useful to 
the data collection process and facilitated an understanding of the legal framework 
within which the actors and institutions function in the case study district.  
The combined use of all methods above provided multiple sources of empirical data for 
the triangulation required to address the challenges of validity and reliability of findings 
and conclusions. 
5 Conclusion 
This research was undertaken as a case study and the approach used for the 
collection of data which have been analysed and discussed in this chapter. A set of 
four communities in the BND constituted a single case study for the research. I have 
explained why this approach was more suited to the research. Within the case study 
data were collected by using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.  
Data from interviews and observations were combined with survey data from popular 
perceptions and provided insight into the research questions. Analyses of these data 
were combined with information reviewed from existing literature based on which 
findings and conclusions were made. In the following four chapters I will discuss and 
analyse the data that was created with this research design and methods.  
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Chapter 5 
Stool Land Management and Provision of Public Goods: Local Actors and 
Institutions of Authority in the Birim North District 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter is about the different types of actors and institutions with authority and 
interests over land and natural resources that are in the four selected case 
communities in the Birim North District (BND). In the BND there are a multiplicity of 
institutions and actors who interact at various levels and in different capacities of 
development. Some of these institutions have evolved from the customs and traditions 
of the people, such as the institution of chieftaincy and the Council of Elders. Others 
are the creation of the state and operate within a bureaucratic legal framework. A third 
category are those individuals or groups of people who come together to pursue a 
common goal in the communities in which they live. Examples of these are the youth 
and women's’ associations. These may be described as associational organizations 
and are often recognized and respected by the local inhabitants.  
The discussions in this chapter are about established customary practices and laws on 
land and the interrelations amongst the identified actors and institutions, and how they 
are changing leading to contestations and contrasting claims to authority over stool 
land in the district. In essence the focus here is on the customary and legal positions of 
these institutions, what happens in practice and the realities observed. 
The chapter is subdivided in to the following sections: an introductory section which 
outlines what the chapter’s focus is about. This is followed up by analysis of each of the 
category of actors and institutions. The final section is a conclusion which draws out 
and put together the main strands of the findings and arguments of the chapter. 
5.1 Traditional institutions: authority and legitimacy of traditional chiefs in the 
Birim North District 
Traditional institutions have been described as ‘the forms of social and political 
authority which have their historical origin in the pre-colonial states and societies, and 
which were incorporated by British colonial rule’ into the Gold Coast, now Ghana 
(Crook and Addo-Fenning, 2005). These comprise the governance structures, systems 
and processes that communities have evolved historically. Traditional institutions are 
therefore of indigenous origin, which have gone through changes during and after 
colonial rule (Crook, 2005). It is within this context that this thesis refers to chieftaincy 
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and its council of elders recognized within a particular local society as traditional 
institutions. This section discusses these traditional institutions of authority with regards 
to the basis of their authority, and how that it is exercised in practice.  
5.1.1 Traditional chiefs and the institution of chieftaincy  
In Ghana, chieftaincy is an important political institution that is guaranteed by law 
83(discussed in chapter 3). Customary practices may differ widely amongst Ghanaian 
societies, but they all do recognize the leadership status of chiefs and acknowledge 
that chiefs may only be selected from particular families or group of people84. Among 
Akan speaking people the selection of chiefs is based on lineage system85 (Rattray, 
1929; Busia, 1951:1). Under this the matrilineal system of inheritance is of political 
significance because men are by custom identified with their maternal kinsmen. This 
determines a man’s right to inherit and become a chief or hold some other significant 
political position within a family (Busia, 1951). The determination of matrilineal linkages 
and traditional process of selecting chiefs are often found in historical accounts that 
may be linked to the time of first settlement and political organization of the society 
(Rattray, 1929; Field, 1948; Busia, 1951). However a chief is selected, the approval of 
the ordinary stool members appears to be important in the legitimization of the authority 
conferred. Generally, if there are any objections it would be made known at an earlier 
stage to the traditional authorities. Sometimes these objections are raised by other 
potential candidates who were not selected. Even though this may be considered an 
intra-royal matter it does involve the community people who may be in support of other 
potential royal(s). A rejection of the nominated chief by the community often results in 
conflicts and protracted litigations. This has become very widespread in Ghana in 
recent years86. 
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 Chieftaincy as a form of traditional rule by chiefs is guaranteed under the Article 270 of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana. A derivative of this is an enacted law, the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) which 
regulates activities of traditional chiefs in the country. Article 36(8) and 267(1), among others establish 
the position of chiefs as managers of stool land. 
84
 See section 3.1 for who a chief is as defined by Sections 57(1) and 58 of Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 
759).The following are categorised as chiefs in Ghana; the Asantehene and Paramount chiefs, Divisional 
and sub-divisional chiefs and Adikrofo (literally meaning owners [heads] of villages).  
85
 These are the patrilineal and matrilineal systems. Akan speaking people of Ghana practice the 
matrilineal family system. Thus, men are eligible to inherit through their mother’s family lineage. They 
do not inherit their father’s property but rather through their maternal uncles (i.e. male siblings of their 
mother). In chieftaincy matters, the queen mothers are by tradition those who nominate a candidate 
from within the royal family for the position of chief. She may nominate her own male children, if they 
are of sound and moral values. 
86
 In Accra the Ga Mantse (chief of the Ga People)  chieftaincy dispute can be cited as an example (see 
also page 44) 
81 
 
The way chiefs are elected into office in the case study district is similar to what 
pertains in other Akan-speaking societies in Ghana. The analysis in the next section 
focuses on the nature of the institution of chieftaincy in the selected communities of 
New Abirem, Adausena, Ntronang and Praso Kuma. This is examined to provide an 
understanding of the source and nature of political authority that is exercised by the 
chiefs and their specific role over stool land resources and development.87.  
Legitimacy of authority exercised by chiefs in case study communities 
All the chiefs in the study communities were installed in accordance with Akan 
customary practices through which they have acquired legitimate authority to rule. A 
legitimate chief does not only acquire authority to govern but is also expected to fulfil 
some obligations in the community. In accordance with Akan customary practices 
chiefs are selected from a particular group, i.e. the royal family, within the local society. 
These families often trace their lineage to first settlers who either discovered or 
conquered the lands on which they settled. Information gleaned from separate 
interviews provided an account of how chiefs are selected in these communities.88 
Chiefs are installed for life and so a new chief is only selected when the stool becomes 
vacant as a result of death, incapacity or destoolment.89  
When a stool become vacant as a result of one of the above causes, the Krontihene of 
the respective community initiates the process for the selection of a new chief. This is 
done by first informing the elders and queen mother and then rest of the royal family. 
The queen mother, the head of family and elders hold consultations and prepare for the 
selection of the new chief. During these consultations the queen mother by custom is 
asked to make a nomination of a potential candidate from amongst the eligible male 
royals and present the name to the elders. There is often intense lobbying amongst the 
eligible male candidates in other to secure the nomination of the queen mother to the 
elders. On an appointed day the queen mother presents the name of her preferred 
candidate with drinks to the elders. If her nominee is accepted the drink is taken and 
shared by all the elders as sign of their approval and commitment to support the queen 
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 Interview with the chief of New Abirem on 10/07/2010 and Krontihene of New Abirem on 03/09/2010, 
Gyasehene of Adausena on 11/07/2010 and a former Chief and Opanin Duah of Ntronang on 
25/08/2010, Chief of Praso Kuma on 29/09/2010, Group discussion with the Krontihene and elders of 
Praso Kuma on 29/09/2010. These accounts are also given by Field (1948:1-2), in an anthropological 
study of the area. 
88
 Interview with chief of New Abirem on 10/072010, Krontihene of New Abirem on 03/09/2010, 
Gyasehene of Adausena on 11/07/2010, the elders of Ntronang on 25/08/2010, Queen Mother of 
Ntronang on 02/10/2010 and Adontenhene of Afosu on 02/07/2010. 
89
 Removal from the stool  
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mother’s nominee. Next the head of family, who is an elder of the traditional council 
announces to the rest of the family and elders (traditional authorities) that a new chief 
has been selected. A delegation led by the Gyasehene is then sent with drinks to 
inform the Krontihene about the nominated person. Subsequently, the Omanhene is 
informed of the newly selected chief who would occupy the vacant stool.  The person 
who is chosen to become chief must not only be acceptable to the council of elders, but 
also the ordinary citizens often represented by the asafo90 group and nkwankwaa (the 
commoners). Approval by the community’s citizens ultimately legitimizes the authority 
to rule by the chiefs and lead the people and to exercise authority over their collective 
stool land resources in accordance with customary principles91. Apart from being a 
member of the royal family in the community there are other qualities that are 
considered in the selection and approval of a new chief. For instance, the person who 
qualified to become a chief should have acceptable moral values and not hold any bad 
record such as an ex-convict, theft, and rape.  
The duties and responsibilities that are expected of a chief range from the performance 
of traditional and customary functions of attendance at festivals, durbars, leading the 
people in times of war and external aggression, organizing communal labour to being 
initiators and lobbyists of developmental projects for their respective communities 
(Odotei and Awedoba, 2006)92. This latter responsibility which has long been 
established now seems to be considered a premium criterion in the selection of modern 
day (Dunn and Robertson, 1973; Odotei and Awedoba, 2006:527). In an interview with 
the chief of Praso Kuma he elaborated on the responsibilities and expectations of 
chiefs as follows: 
A chief is expected to perform so many roles, which may be traditional and 
cultural but in a modern society the people he rules over expect a lot from him. 
The traditional functions of a chief includes sitting in state during festivals, 
serves as the mouth piece of the people at traditional council meetings, 
ensures that peace and stability prevails in the town as well as settlement of 
disputes amongst the citizenry. A good chief is expected to see to the welfare 
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 These are traditional warrior groups in Akan culture. Traditionally the asafo companies’ role is 
defence of the Oman 
91
 Rattray, 1929: and Busia, 1951:11 have stated that ‘this is a privilege of the commoners who have to 
serve him’. This is because the Ashanti's(Akans generally) hold the belief that ‘ a royal does not install a 
chief’, it is the people who have that power even though in accordance with customary principles the 
process often starts with the nomination of eligible candidate by the queen mother (ohemaa). 
92
 Development is defined to include physical infrastructural, human and natural resources. Interview 
with Chief of New Abirem on 10/07/2010; Krontihene of New Abirem on 03/09/2010 and in group 
discussion with OPNA of New Abirem on 02/09/2010. This observation was also made by Dunn and 
Robertson (1973) in their study in Ahafo. Examples of chiefs performing this contemporary role in Ghana 
are the Kings of Ashanti and Akyem Abuakwa on education and environmental protection respectively. 
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of his people by ensuring development in the town. He must therefore have the 
capacity to lobby and attract government and non-state agencies for projects.93  
In addition to the above, in the BND  as in most parts of southern Ghana, chiefs’ control 
stool land thereby giving them significant influence and power over decision making 
with regards to its use and the potential to benefit from the wealth it creates (see details 
in Chapter 6). 
Traditional control mechanisms on chiefly authority: the Council of Elders  
The traditional process of nomination and approval of chiefs by the people serves as 
the source of legitimacy of the authority of the chief. But the authority is expected to be 
exercised within customarily defined and accepted principles and norms of the 
society94. The chief is a member of a family of which he is often not necessarily the 
head. Every royal family has an abusuapanyin95 and every stool has a traditional 
council of elders that is constituted by lineage heads, usually respected elderly men of 
the society and sub-chiefs of the stool, including the Gyasehene and queen mother96. 
Although the chief is the highest authority of the land, he is obliged to consult the 
Council of Elders on issues affecting the community (Rattray, 1929; Busia, 1951). 
Furthermore, Busia (1951) has stated that ‘the chief was bound by his oath to consult 
the elders on all matters and to obey their advice’.  Rattray (1929: 82) also asserts that 
a chief’s “failure to accept guidance and advice [from his Council of elders] was 
legitimate cause for destoolment”. It was therefore the responsibility of the Council to 
offer advice, guidance and to regulate the conduct of the chief during his tenure. To 
that extent, under Akan customary law the Council of Elders has the authority to call a 
chief to order if any allegation of misconduct against a chief is brought to its attention 
(Busia 1951:14).  
Notwithstanding the above, various comments made by a number of scholars who 
have studied how chiefs exercise over stool land, seem to suggest that in practice the 
Council of Elders has been ineffective in the way they serve to provide a customary 
check on the potential arbitrariness of chiefly authority. For instance, Kasanga 
(2001:31) who argues that customary institutions are more suitable for the 
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 Interview with Chief of Praso Kuma on 29/09/2010 
94
 Interview with Chief of New Abirem on 10/07/2010; interview with Krontihene of New Abirem on 
03/09/2010.; interview with  opinion leaders  at New Abirem on 02/09/2010 ; Interview with queen 
mother of Ntronang on 02/10/20102. 
95
 Head of family 
96
 Interviews with Gyasehene of Adausena on11/07/2010, queen mother of Ntronang on 02/10/2010 
and the Chief of Praso Kuma on.28/09/2010. 
96
 It has been suggested that some chiefs co-opt elders 
who constitute the council and for that matter they tend to be ineffective (Ubink, 2008:161). 
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management of stool land than the state institutions also recognizes the weaknesses in 
these institutions and therefore proposes that effective control mechanisms are put in 
place to avert potential arbitrariness and abuses by those in authority. Similarly, 
Ubink’s study of per-urban Kumasi provide another evidence of the existence of the 
ineffective uses of traditional control measures97 on the powers and authority exercised 
by chiefs over stool land transactions (Ubink,2008:161).  
There is an alternative claim that a more potent form of traditional control on chiefly 
authority is provided through the customary oath taken by chiefs when they are being 
installed. This was alluded to by some of the respondents interviewed; ‘A chief swears 
an oath to serve his people and commit to uphold the virtues of the customs and 
traditions of the people’.98 It was explained that any failure to abide by the oath could 
be a cause for the destoolment of a chief. This measure is one of the effective 
traditional measures that are used to prevent potential abuses of authority99.  
The above points out that there are forms of customary controls over the authority of 
chiefs. However they have not been effective in preventing the potential abuse of 
authority by chiefs. This is a reality that has been acknowledged by the National House 
of Chiefs (NHC), which has initiated steps to formally address this through state 
legislative enactments. As a result the NHC has developed a proposal for a code of 
ethics and a law to regulate the conduct of chiefs’100.According to the President of the 
NHC: 
A New Legislative Instrument on codes of conduct and rules of ethic for chiefs 
has been drafted by the NHC for consideration and adoption to regulate 
activities of chiefs. This would go a long way to facilitate chiefs’ command for 
the respect and authority that they deserve. It would also serve as a check on 
those chiefs who are likely to abuse their authority.  
The above gives the indication that although traditional chiefs are the recognized 
legitimate traditional leaders; questions have been asked about how some do exercise 
their authority in practice, especially over stool land. 
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 These are the Council of Elders and the threat of destoolment (removal) of chiefs 
98
 Meetings with the elders of the Chief of Ntronang on 25/08/2010, and the Queen Mother of Ntronang 
on 02/10/2010 
99
 Interview with the chief of New Abirem on 10/07/2010 and the President of the National House of 
Chiefs on 13/12/2010 
100
 Interview with the President of the House of Chiefs, Prof. Nabila on 13/12/2010. It was however not 
possible to cite a copy of the proposed document at the time of the interview  
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5.2 State Institutions of authority: local government, the administration of stool 
land and development 
Apart from the local government authority (District Assembly), there are other state 
institutions with offices in New Abirem, the district capital. Two of the divisions of the 
reconstituted Lands Commission, i.e. the Public and Vested Land Management 
Division and the Land Valuation Division do not have resident district offices at New 
Abirem. The schedule officers perform their statutory functions from the regional capital 
(Koforidua), which is about 130km away. The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
(OASL) is the only land sector agency with a decentralized district office. Other 
institutions at the district are the Ministry of Agriculture, Commission on Human Rights 
and Administrative Justices (CHRAJ), Department for Community Development and 
the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE).  
The Birim North District Assembly is the coordinating unit and forum for the integration 
of all public institutions in the district, although these state institutions maintain close 
ties with their individual offices at the regional and national levels. This section focuses 
on the BNDA, its sub-units and three land sector agencies at the district level. Analyses 
of the other state institutions mentioned above and their role which is of relevance to 
this study in the ongoing negotiations for land access in the BND will be discussed in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
5.2.1 Birim North District Assembly 
The Birim North District Assembly (BNDA) is the decentralised local government 
authority in the area and is under the Ministry of Local Government. It is the highest 
political, administrative, planning and rating authority in the area (ILGS, 2008:5)101. 
Under the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), every 
District Assembly (DA)102 is the statutory planning authority of their area. The mandate 
of the DA includes physical and economic planning. District Assemblies therefore 
perform functions such as; the formulation and preparation of the district development 
plans and budget; mobilization and allocation of resources for the provision of public 
goods and services, promotion and support of productive activities and social 
                                                          
101
 Institute of Local Government Studies,2008 
102
Often used in a generic term to include Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies. Under the Local 
Government Act,1993 (Act 462) the difference in these are in terms of population size (a local 
government unit with >250,000 people is designated Metropolitan authority, >95,000 and one town 
Assembly is a Municipal authority while a District Assembly has population between 75,000 and 95,000 
people (ILGS, 2008:4). 
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development, which are aimed at removing obstacles to initiative and development in 
the district (Act 462,section 10 and ILGS,2008:5). 
Thus, the BNDA has an overarching authority to ensure that they initiate and pursue 
projects that have the potential of impacting positively on the total development103 of 
the people living in the district. According to the District Planning Officer (DPO) of the 
BNDA there has been an effective collaboration amongst the three functional bodies of 
the Assembly, i.e. the District Chief Executive (DCE), the General Assembly and the 
supporting bureaucrats who perform general administrative functions. 
The head of the BNDA is a District Chief Executive officer (DCE) appointed by the 
President of the Republic of Ghana with the approval of two thirds of the members of 
the local Assembly. The position of the DCE, who is appointed by the President, is 
political. The DCE is therefore the political and administrative head of the BNDA and 
ensures that development is pursued within the general framework of government 
objectives and more generally that of the ruling political party. The General Assembly 
of the District is constituted by both elected and non-elected members with an elected 
Presiding Member (PM)104. Another characteristic feature of the membership of the 
Assembly is that is made up of both bureaucrats and non-bureaucratic officials. The 
bureaucrats include; the District Coordinating Director (DCD), District Officers for 
Planning, Budget, Finance, Environment, Health, Education, and Community 
Development. These officials are responsible for administration of the district to ensure 
its total development. The non-bureaucratic members of the Assembly comprise 70% 
elected representatives105 of the local people and 30% government appointees, who 
are appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities and 
interest groups in the District106. These representatives are responsible for the 
formulation of bye-laws for the BND. The 30% government appointees are made up of 
professionals (sometimes indigenes living outside of the District) in various fields of 
expertise, who are therefore expected to bring their knowledge to bear on the activities 
of the District Assembly.  
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 The District Planning Officer of BNDA defined this to include the provision of social infrastructure 
such as education, health and sanitation; productive infrastructure such as good roads, electricity, and 
potable water to help growth of economic activities and to attract potential investors into the district. 
Interview with DPO on 17/06/2010 
104
 At the time this fieldwork was conducted the PM of the Birim North District was a member of the 
opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) elected during the tenure of the NPP in 2008 
105
 Elected to serve a 4 year term, but may be re-elected. 
106
 The 1992 Constitution Article 242(d). This is the only provision where chiefs appear to have a formal 
role in local authority. Chiefs have however argued that this is an indirect role and therefore seek a 
more direct role as they had prior to independence. 
87 
 
The position of the Assembly Member is supposed to be non-partisan, but in reality this 
has been observed not to be the case. People get elected through their political 
affiliations, especially with the government in power, whereas those directly appointed 
by the President may have an inclination to the ideas of the government.  
Furthermore, because elections for Assembly Members is often held two years into the 
term of office of the  ruling party, most of the members who get elected into the 
Assembly often belonged to the government’s party. This, it was pointed out tends to 
affect the work of the Assembly107. The explanation was that some members lost their 
place at the Assembly because they belonged to opposition parties and, secondly 
decisions tend to be made in favour of party agendas108. However, my general 
observation from other jurisdictions in Ghana was that because of the party politics 
associated with District Assembly elections, political parties give financial support to 
their candidates and those who belong to the ruling party benefit more. Thus when the 
party loses an election and goes into opposition that support was either curtailed or 
reduced which then affects their candidate’s chances of getting re-elected. Given the 
nature of the functions that Assembly Members perform in their electoral areas they are 
not expected in practice to be partisan, but in a multi-party system, as practiced in 
Ghana, it is challenging for these members to remain as the law provides, non-partisan 
representatives. 
Sources of funding development projects in the Birim North District 109  
Until the introduction of the District Common Fund110 in 1992 the BNDA’s main source 
of funding for various projects, apart from the share of stool revenue (see section 
5.2.2), was through a number of sources such as: 
1. Internally Generated Funds (IGF) - mobilization of local revenue through e.g. 
tolls (market and lorry park), property rates for development 
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 Interviews with Assemblymen for Ntronang on.02/10/2010;New Abirem on 02/09/2010 and 
Assemblywoman for Adausena on.10/09/2010 
108
 Interview with the Assemblyman of New Abirem on 02/09/2010, Assemblywoman of Adausena on 
10/09/2010. and Assemblyman of Ntronang (Ahenebrono) on 02/10/2010 
109
 Details provided here are drawn from the interview with the District Planning Officer (DPO) of the 
BNDA at his office on 17/06/2010 where the examples stated here were read out to me from a 
document he had before him. 
110
 The fund is a Development Fund which enables the use of the nation’s wealth throughout Ghana to 
the benefit of all citizens. It is a minimum of 5% of the national revenue set aside to be shared among all 
District Assemblies in Ghana with a formula approved by Parliament. It is created under Article 252 of 
the 1992 Constitution of Ghana (http://www.commonfund.gov.gh/ [Accessed on 20/06/2011). 
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2. Central government subventions e.g. for the payment of salaries staff 
3. Development Partners/donors - for specific projects which  comes in the form of 
financial (grants) and technical support from international organizations, foreign 
embassies  and NGOs111,  
4. Support from the Constituency’s MP. This is the MPs Common Fund112. 
5. The beneficiary communities provide labour (skilled and unskilled) to support 
constriction projects. 
 
The BNDA periodically plans and implements it programmes under its District Medium 
Term Development Plan (DMTDP), which was drawn in line with the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS I and II)113. The plan seeks to mobilize local resources to 
reduce poverty and to ensure effective and efficient exploitation of the numerous 
potentials of the district.114 Using the DMTDP as a guide the district embarked on 
community needs assessment in 2007 to determine critical areas of intervention.  
Three key important needs of the local communities that were identified, especially in 
areas affected by mining operations, were inadequate educational facilities (class 
rooms and teachers quarters), improvement in health facilities (clinics and staff 
quarters) and agriculture development115. 
5.2.2 Is there a role for the Birim North District Assembly in Stool Land 
Management and Land Use Planning? 
Generally, DAs in Ghana are not involved in the direct administration of land, such as 
allocation and registration of stool lands, but they are responsible for planning land 
                                                          
111 The following are examples of projects that have been funded by external bodies: (1) potable water 
by Water Aid (2) water, sanitation and education by World Vision, (3) improvement in educational 
facilities, health, trade and support to local businesses by European Union’s Micro-Finance Projects 
Programmer and (4) since 2002 Newmont’s support in the delivery of development projects in the 
mining-affected communities (this will be discussed in chapter 7 and 8).The International Development 
Authority (IDA) through its Village Infrastructural Project in the district is engaged in a number of 
community development projects. 
112
 This has been renamed Constituency Development Fund. This is a fund that sets aside some part of 
the District’s share of the Common Fund for use by the MP(s) for local development initiatives. But there 
have been criticism about this fund as undermining the decentralization concept because it allows MPs 
to have access to funds which in most cases are used for party political gains rather than for local 
development in a non-partisan manner.  
113
 As at 2010 when this fieldwork was conducted the BNDA had in place a 2006-2009 District Medium 
Term Development Plan which had been reviewed based on an original one drawn up earlier for the 
period 2002-2005. 
114
 District Medium Term Development Plan 2006-2009 (BNDA,2006:1) 
115
 Interview with DPO on 17/06/2010 and 24/08/2010. 
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uses and the collection of property rates116. Officially the Town and Country 
Department (TCPD) of DAs are the legal institution mandated by law to plan land uses 
and to ensure that all developments on stool land conforms to the approved planning 
schemes. Thus before concurrence is given for the allocation of stool land by the Lands 
Commission the TCPD has to certify that the proposed use of the land which is the 
subject of allocation is compatible with the plan for the area where the land is situated.  
The zoning of stool land into building parcels by the TCPD requires collaboration with 
the land owners (including traditional chiefs). Ideally, where stool land is to be 
converted from agriculture to building plots the chiefs are expected to notify officials of 
the TCPD to zone up and parcel out plots for allocation to prospective developers. It is 
the TCPD which has the mandate to do that and actually prepare planning schemes. 
However, what has been observed is independent decision making by some chiefs 
over the conversion of farmlands to non farming uses.  These chiefs are allocating and 
selling land for the development of buildings. This has often led to a situation where 
development tends to precede the preparation of layouts by the TCPD. This situation 
has resulted in unauthorised developments117. Thus, development is commenced 
without official approval from the TCPD, in so far us the land is sold by the chief and 
there is no dispute over it.  A significant consequence of this is that people no longer 
seek to obtain an official site plan from the TCPD; they may only do this if they intend 
to undertake the registration of their land118. This situation is not only peculiar to the 
BND; it appears to be widespread all over Ghana, including the more urbanized areas 
such as Accra, Kumasi and Tema. The failure to have land properly registered not only 
affects development patterns of towns but also has implications for the potential 
revenue that may be generated through the payment of ground rent. 
Furthermore, the DA is also handicapped in planning for other land uses. For instance, 
with regards to granting of mining leases, the role of the BNDA has been described as 
a ‘rubber stamp’119. This is because the BNDA performs a limited role in the application 
and permits approval process for mineral prospecting or exploration.  The DPO 
explained that when the Minerals Commission (MC) receives an application for a 
licence by small scale (galamsey) or large scale mining entities, the BNDA is requested 
                                                          
116
 The Land Valuation Division prepares and advises the District Assembly on property rates categories 
117
 Because they lack planning and development permits. 
118
 This is rarely done unless the developer intends to use the property for mortgage or use the 
documentation in a court of law in Ghana. 
119
 That was the view of the DPO in an interview on 17/06/2010. 
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to conduct a search to find out whether the area being requested has been zoned for 
another use and the present use(s). 120 The BNDA would conduct searches through its 
plans, following which an advertisement is made about the proposed use. But this does 
not appear to have a strong bearing on the decision of the MC. It was explained that in 
reality the findings of the BNDA do not really matter so much for the granting of the 
licence121. Firstly, in most cases such permits would have already been given by the 
chief of the stool which has proprietary ownership of the area to the prospective 
investor. Secondly, the MC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) take major 
decisions of granting permits for mining activities and timber concessions from their 
national offices in Accra without due consideration for the outcome of the search 
conducted by the BNDA.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the BNDA’s, to some extent, is limited in its actual land 
management role in Ghana DAs receive 55% of the share of revenue that accrues from 
land and natural resources located within their geographical boundaries. This is a 
Constitutional provision122. The rationale for this is that DAs have the statutory 
institutions for ensuring overall development at the local level. However, because their 
share of 55% is greater that what chiefs receive (45%) this legal provision has strongly 
been criticised by traditional authorities in Ghana123. They have criticised the share of 
45% as inadequate for traditional authorities. Traditional authorities have also 
challenged the rationale behind tasking the OASL to perform an administrative 
function, which as the chiefs claim, they are capable of doing and in fact did so in the 
pre-colonial and colonial period124. Although, as discussed in chapter 3, chiefs’ 
authority to control land during the colonial period was curtailed under various 
legislations such as the Ashanti Stool Land Act 1958, the Akim Abuakwa (Stool 
Revenue) Act No.78 of 1958,the Stool Lands Control Act 1960 (Act 79) and the 
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123).  
In addition to the above, District Assemblies (DAs) themselves  face the challenge of 
how the share of 55% stool land revenue is utilised  as  there are no explicit policy 
                                                          
120
 The term is used in Ghana to describe small scale mining of mineral, such as gold and diamonds. It is 
mostly by unlicensed individuals and groups of young people. 
121
 Interview with DPO on 17/06/2010 
122
  The 1992 Constitution of Ghana Article 267 (6) 
123
 Twenty- five (25%) to the stool land area (local chief) and 20% to the traditional council (paramount 
chief). 
124
 Chiefs often cite the Asantehene’s land secretariat and the Akyem Abuakwa stool lands secretariats 
which were established by the respective stools to collect stool revenue during the colonial period as 
examples of the capacity that the traditional chiefs have in stool land mobilization. 
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guidelines on this. It is however expected that DAs would channel their share of stool 
land revenue into development projects. The situation with how stool land revenue is 
utilised in the absence of any clear guidelines was explored. The practice in the district 
was not different from what pertains in other areas of the country. The revenue was 
considered as part of income to the district and was used largely for recurrent 
expenditures. This had been the practice over a long time but the DPO pointed out that 
the regional office of the OASL has come up with some requirements to regulate how 
DAs in the Eastern region can access their share of the revenue. What he explained, 
and this was confirmed by the regional officer of the OASL, was that the OASL required 
the DAs to prepare a proposal in conjunction with the traditional authorities for the 
development of specific projects for which the revenue will be used. This proposal was 
then submitted with justification to the OASL. The idea was that this would be used by 
the OASL to monitor how revenue was utilised. But there appears to be no legal 
justification for compliance to this measure and it was not surprising therefore to find 
out that the BNDA had not been able to meet this requirement125.  
Apart from the above other sub-units within the Assembly perform important roles 
connected to stool land management. These include the elected Assembly and UC 
members in the respective communities. 
5.2.3 Assembly members 
The representatives to the Assembly are important political actors.  Assembly Members 
(AM) serve as  the link between  communities and the District Assembly and take part 
in educating the electorate on government policies, communal and development 
activities (Act 462; ILGS, 2008:19-20). Thus, AMs’ functions in the case study 
communities included:  
(1) To represent their electoral area at District Assembly meetings, 
(2) Undertake to identify and collate community members’ views about their 
needs and aspirations to the District Assembly. In the same way they convey 
government policies and directions back to the people, 
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 Although the DPO indicated that they had prepared a plan which was with the Budget office, I was 
not able to get a documented evidence of this. 
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(3) They work closely with the UC, chiefs and traditional council of elders on 
issues that would lead to development of the people126.  
Assembly Members therefore collaborate with chiefs and communities for the planning 
of development programmes. For instance, it was explained that before meetings AMs 
often met with the Unit Committee (UC) and the chief to discuss and find out what 
concerns are of priority to take up for consideration at the meetings and they provide 
feedback 127.  
Traditional chiefs do not involve AMs directly in the management of stool land. 
Notwithstanding this, AMs in the case study communities indicated that since ultimately 
they serve as conduits for development, for which stool land resources is expected to 
provide a source of revenue for funding projects they do participate in deliberations on 
land use, especially revenue,  for development projects. 
5.2.4 Unit Committees  
Apart from Assembly Members Unit Committees (UC) are also important local 
institutions, which by law are administrative units of DA in Ghana (as discussed in 
chapter 4).  
The current UCs evolved as part of the local government structure during the military 
rule of ex-President Rawlings under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
between 1981 and 1992. The current UC has its roots in the main revolutionary organs 
of the PNDC at the grassroots level then known as the Committee for the Defence of 
the Revolution (CDR), which attracted large numbers of the youth and unemployed 
(Ayee, 1994:136; Crook and Manor, 1998:233). The idea of local committees however 
is not new in Ghana’s historical development. Village and Town Development 
Committees (TDC) were established during the 1960s and 70s. These like the present 
UCs, were established as a formal part of the local government system, but were 
constituted by unelected nominees (loyalist) of traditional chiefs comprising elders, 
opinion and respected local leaders and the youth (Crook and Manor, 1998:233). The 
local chiefs therefore acted as heads of these committees (Robertson, 1971 in 
Richards and Kuper, 1971:136). Scholars such as Dunn and Robertson (1973) who 
have extensively studied the development of village and TDCs in the Ahafo region 
have argued ‘that they had a good record and performed creditably perhaps because 
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 Interview with Assembly woman for Adausena on 10/09/2010 and Assembly men for New Abirem 
and Ntronang (Ahenebrono) on 02/09/2020 and 02/10/2010 respectively 
127
 Interview with Assembly woman for Adausena on 10/09/2010 and Assembly men for New Abirem 
and Ntronang (Ahenebrono) on 02/09/2020 and 02/10/2010 respectively 
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the electoral principle was allowed to work with the grain of different local societies’ 
(Dunn and Robertson, 1973:12). However, the establishment of the UCs after 1991 
effectively replaced the village and TDCs (Dunn and Robertson, 1971; Crook and 
Manor, 1998). 
The UCs because of their original link to the revolution [PNDC] was made up of 
loyalties of the regime. They were therefore responsible to the District Assemblies for 
all government matters and to the CDR zonal Secretary for all other matters. The UCs 
therefore did not only represent popular participation of the people in local governance 
and development but also that of the revolution (Crook and Manor, 1998: 209).  
Since the first UC elections, which were held in 1988, there have been efforts to hold 
elections, for example in 2002, but not many people put themselves forward as 
candidates128. As a result the UCs lack the full complement of elected members. Out of 
about 16, 000 proposed UCs it is estimated that only about 8,000 are fully operational 
(Crawford, 2004). Perhaps the lack of interest was because they are not remunerated. 
They are supposed to provide voluntary services to communities. Crawford (2010) and 
Awortwi (2010a) have suggested that competitive election of local government is 
important for decentralised development. In Uganda where local government members 
are on full-time salaries there is competition and better performance for development 
(Awortwi, 2010 [a] and [b]). 
The history and composition of UCs made them generally hostile to chiefs (as 
discussed above). It was therefore of interest to find that in the BND UCs now seemed 
to cooperate with chiefs. Apart from their statutory functions UCs in the BND are 
performing other non-statutory roles. Analysis of interview data revealed that members 
of the UC constitute a core of the Plot [Land] Allocation Committees that facilitate 
allocation of stool land.129. The PACs were constituted by traditional chiefs, selected 
members of the traditional council of elders and members of the UC.  
Traditionally chiefs and their elders have always allocated land for prospective farmers 
and developers (this will be discussed in chapter 6). The chief would usually have his 
trusted elders to work with him in the allocation of land and they were accountable to 
him for all transactions. However, it was found that in all the 4 case study communities 
land allocations were made by a new form of allocation committee that combined the 
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 Earlier delays, until the 1990s, of the UC elections were caused by the debates about the 
incorporation of the populist institution into the system (Ayee,1992) 
129
 The UCs were dominated by the youth (estimated to be between the ages of 20-45 years). Perhaps 
this was so because of the history of the origin of UC (as discusses above) 
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traditional elders and the “democratically” elected UC members. The following were 
some of the responses that gave an indication of the general view of the role of UC 
members in land management. 
In this community the UC has a sub-committee called PAC. They allocate land 
on behalf of the chief and also account to him all transactions; 
Land is allocated by the chief and the land [plot] allocation committee, if it is a 
building plot. These people are committee [UC] members130.  
As noted above, the UC is not legally empowered to play a role in the management of 
land, however as can be gleaned from the statements above chiefs utilise members of 
the UCs to assist in land management. However, the observations made were that 
chiefs selected those who were more likely to serve their interests on the PAC.  The 
absence of competitive elections and the lack of remuneration as suggested by 
Awortwi (2010a) and Crawford (2010) above affected the performance of UCs. UC 
members have become vulnerable to manipulation by chiefs who now are able to co-
opt them into the PACs. It did not seem that there were effective measures in place on 
how the community members could hold the PACs accountable, given the fact that the 
members were in practice agents of the chief. However, the communities had the right 
to demand accountability from the chief whose ultimate responsibility it was to manage 
their collective resources. For instance, at Ntronang, the people failed to recognise the 
existence of any form of PAC formed by the chief without consulting the community 
(this will be discussed under Case 4 in section 6.3).  
5.2.4 Public land sector agencies in the Birim North District 
Public land sector agencies in Ghana have recently been integrated into an omnibus 
organization known as the Lands Commission (LC). This was done under Phase 1 of 
Governments Land Administration Project (LAP). The law that brought into effect this 
reconstituted organization is the Lands Commission Act 2008, (Act 767). Section 19 of 
Act 767 lists the following public land sector agencies as Divisions of the LC: Survey 
and Mapping; Land Registration; Land Valuation (LVD) and Public and Vested Lands 
Management (PVLMD). These institutions are tasked to perform the collective 
functions that are set out in section 5 of the Act to achieve the objective of securing 
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 Interview with the Assemblyman of New Abirem on 02/09/2010; Interview with Chief Farmer of 
Adausena on 09/07/2010,; interview with Krontihene of New Abirem, on 03/09/2010; interview with 
chief of Abirem on 10/07/2010; Group meeting with  elders of Praso Kuma on 29/09/2010; Interview 
with the elders of Ntronang on 25/08/2010; interview with the  Chairman of the PAC at Praso Kuma 
On23/09/2010 
95 
 
effective and efficient land administration in the country. In particular it states that the 
Commission shall: 
5(b) advise the government, local authorities and traditional authorities on the 
policy framework for the development of particular areas of the country to 
ensure the development of individual pieces of land is coordinated with the 
relevant development of the area concerned and  
5(c) formulate and submit to government recommendations on national policy 
with respect to land use suitability or capability131. 
It is important to note that when the LC was first set up in 1969 its main purpose was to 
be responsible for land and natural resources (forestry and minerals) in the country. 
Over time this mandate changed as the Minerals Commission (MC) was established to 
deal with minerals and the Forestry Commission (FC) to deal with forest timber. Prior to 
the enactment of Act 767 these institutions had existed as independent public 
institutions132.  
In addition to the performance of their statutory functions, the PVLMD and LVD are 
also engaged in other local activities with direct bearing on the general development of 
the BND. The PVLMD and LVD are the only two divisions of the LC involved in the 
negotiations for compensation in the BND, providing technical guidance to the 
negotiations (their specific role in this will be discussed in chapter 7 and 8). In the next 
section I examine the role of the PVLMD and LVD in stool land and natural resources 
management in the case study communities. 
5.2.5 Public and Vested Lands Management Division: Documentation of land 
transactions  
Section 23 of Act 767 spells out the functions of the PVLMD as follows: 
a) Facilitating the acquisition of land for Government 
b) Managing state acquired and vested lands in conformity with approved land use 
plan, and 
c) Other functions determined by the Commission. 
 
Thus, by law the PVLMD is mandated to perform administrative functions over lands 
and natural resources. These include granting concurrence and consent over stool land 
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 This function appears to be clearly differentiated from the functions of the TCPD, which is not a 
division under the Lands Commission, but with the responsibility for land use planning.  A Senior Lands 
Officer on the LAP argues that it is the PVLMD as a manager of public lands that initiates planning before 
the TCPD prepares a scheme for it. 
132
 These were the Survey Department, Land Title Registry, Land Valuation Board and Lands Commission 
respectively. 
96 
 
transactions and the registration of leases and concessions to timber and mining grants 
respectively.133  
Lands in the BND largely belong to stools. There are however, public lands which have 
been used to provide facilities for education, health, local government offices and 
housing for public officers of the state134. The management of stool lands involves the 
allocation and utilisation of rent and fees (e.g. drink money) is undertaken at the local 
level by the respective stool land owners135. The state’s public land sector agencies are 
not involved in the management aspect of stool land transactions, but are there to 
regulate and ensure that the transactions that are agreed and made between parties 
conform to the laws of the state.  For instance, it is the PVLMD that grants concurrence 
and consent to stool land transactions before registering the interest that are created 
under the transaction. The PVLMD therefore registers and keeps records of all leases, 
contracts and agreements created by the parties to a stool land transaction. Even 
though the PVLMD would not usually be party to the transactions it is the recognized 
institution that administers the transactions in accordance with statute law. The PVLMD 
does not have the power to compel registration, but for such a transaction to have a 
legal effective in court or be used as collateral for mortgage purposes, it had to have 
been registered. 
The process of registration involves checking the documentation to ensure that the 
allocation was made by the legally recognized stool land owner and that the intended 
use was permitted by the TCPD. 136The PVLMD only recognizes gazetted stool land 
owners and whose endorsements of land allocations are accepted as legitimate137. 
This is an administrative procedure that is implemented in Ghana, particularly where 
land is under the authority of stools and skins (including Tendemba). 
The lease documents incorporating the terms of the land transactions made between 
the chiefs and prospective users are often prepared by officials of the PVLMD for a fee. 
My enquiries revealed that this was not an official function of the PVLMD, but to 
facilitate the processing and registration of land transactions informal agreements have 
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 Interview with Senior Lands Officer on 19/07/2010. 
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 For public lands the PVLMD performs both management and administrative functions in the district. 
That is planning, allocation and registration. 
135
 The LC deal with the administration of stool lands (Interviews with CEO of the Lands Commission and 
Senior Lands Officer of PVLMD on 16/07/2010 and 14/01/2010 respectively).  
136
  (1) The 1992 Constitution Article 258(1) (b) ; (2) Land Registration Procedures at Lands Commission 
(Eastern Region)  in  brochure prepared by the PVLMD as an operational guide.(3) interview with Senior 
lands Officer on 19/07/2010  
137
 Interview with Senior Lands Officer on 19/07/2010  
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been made with local chiefs. This provides income for the PVLMD and because of that 
it seem to quicken the registration process. For instance, this kind of arrangement had 
been established between the chief of New Abirem and the PVLMD officials at its 
regional offices. The chief had been able develop ‘closer’ working relations with senior 
lands officers who are privately consulted for advice on land management issues138.  
Apart from that it also facilitates speedy delivery and processing of lands allocated by 
the chief, as the following interview extracts explain the reasons behind this:139 
(1) because the lease would have been prepared by an officer at the PVLMD all the 
necessary formal requirements would be addressed before it was passed for 
processing which therefore quickens the time for approval, 
(2) It facilitates quick responses to administrative queries with the registration process 
and  
(3) Ensures collaboration in with the local authorities in land use planning.  
However, this informal function and arrangement was recognized and accepted by the 
local inhabitants, which was evidenced by the regular use of the service by the people. 
Although lease documents could also be prepared by solicitors in the form of 
indentures before being sent to the PVLMD for registration, it seems those who employ 
the services of the officials at the PVLMD get the registration completed quicker. 
The collaboration between chiefs and the officials of the PVLMD was one that seemed 
to be working well although this had the potential implication of bolstering the power of 
chiefs over stool land transactions. This is because no transaction of stool land can be 
registered by the PVLMD unless the documents presented are endorsed by the 
respective chief of a stool land area. It is however important to note that this form of 
relationship, as described above, had minimized disputes over who had the legitimate 
authority to allocate stool lands. It avoided the situation where private individuals 
present documents that purported to make land allocation from areas that are known 
stool land areas with the intention of registering it as privately owned family lands140. 
Issues of such nature tend to delay land registration because an investigation would 
have to be conducted by the PVLMD.  
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 Interview with  Senior Lands Officer on 14/01/2010 and 19/07/2010 and NACh on 10/07/2010 
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 Ibid 
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 Interview with Senior Lands Officer of PVLMD on 19/07/2010, NACh 10/07/2010 and AGh on 
11/07/2010. 
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5.2.6 Land Valuation Division: Land and asset valuation 
Land Valuation Division (LVD) which is one of the public land sectors agencies 
integrated under Act 767 in 2008 performs the following functions:141 
 Determine and assess all matters of compensation for land compulsorily 
acquired by Government, or Public Corporation. 
 Assessment of stamp duty 
 Preparation of valuation list for property rating purposes for District 
Assemblies, 
 Advise the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands and the Forestry 
Commission on royalty payments  
 Monitor private valuation activities with a view to protecting national 
interest. 
 Valuation of interests in land for the administration of estate duty 
 Advise on mining issues as they relate to compensation. 
 Other functions determined by the LC 
The LVD has 6 district offices (out of 26) in the Eastern Region. These offices have 
oversight responsibilities in other districts where none exists. Thus, officials at the 
regional capital, Koforidua and Birim Central District Offices in Oda have oversight 
responsibility over the agencies activities at Birim North District.142. 
The core function of the LVD in the BND is to advise the local authority on property rate 
taxation through the preparation and maintenance of a valuation list for all fixed 
property.  However, because of the negotiations for mining the LVD was on the 
negotiations committee providing advice on the methods and approach to 
compensation assessment to ensure that those whose land resources were affected by 
the mining lease would get a fair and adequate compensation in accordance with law. 
5.2.7 Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands: Stool land management  
A third public land sector agency with presence in BND is the Office of the 
Administrator of Stool lands (OASL). The OASL has the constitutional mandate to 
collect, account and to disburse revenue, rents and royalties that accrue on stool lands 
into designated stool accounts which it is required by law to establish for each stool 
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 Section 22 of Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 767). The LVD was originally established in 1986 
under PNDC Law 42, (of 1982) as the Land Valuation Board (LVB). 
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 Interview with Valuation Officer 15/07/2011 
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area143. Apart from forest reserves, which are managed by the Forestry Commission, 
the OASL collects and keeps 10% of the land revenue as administrative charges 
before disbursing the remaining in accordance with the statutorily determined 
proportion of 55% to the District Assembly, 25% to the stool which owns the land and 
20% to the traditional council of the area. It is also to consult with stools and traditional 
authorities on the administration and development of stool lands144.  
At the BND, the OASL performs the following functions: collection of revenue 
(comprising ground rents, farm rents, royalties), opening of accounts for the different 
stools into which stool revenue is paid, providing periodic accounts of revenue 
collected to the stool land owners, educating and sensitizing the chiefs and traditional 
authorities in the area on how to sustainably manage their lands145. Other activities   
included facilitating the communities, through the chiefs to establish structures and 
procedures for the allocation of land (Plot Allocation Committees and recording of land 
transactions)146. In the absence of comprehensive data on land transactions made by 
land owners, the OASL depended on the chiefs (and land owners) to be able to identify 
all those who by law were expected to pay farm and ground rents for the use of land. 
Some chiefs who were supportive of the OASL provided some documentations of their 
land transaction and this had led to increased rent collection, especially with regards to 
farm rents147.  
Farm rents constituted the largest share of the rents collected by the District OASL. 
Thus, where chiefs had provided records of farm land allocations they have made to 
settler/migrants for farming the OASL had been able to follow up and collected annual 
rents from them. In some cases the settler (tenant) farmers themselves had come 
forward to make payments. According to the OASL the continuous payment of farm 
rent by a tenant farmer ensured the security of their interest and right to farm on the 
land148. This was because in times of dispute between farmers about the ownership of 
land the records in the office could be used as evidence. On average the amount of 
rent was Gh¢5.00/acre (as at August 2010). Another category of people who voluntarily 
pay up their rents were women who were married to indigenous men from the local 
communities. Some of them were given land by their husbands to farm and to secure 
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 The 1992 Constitution of Ghana Article 267(2) (a-c) 
144
 ibid 
145
 Interview with the District Officer OASL at New Abirem on 17/06/2010 
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their interest such women prepared site plans and registered it with the OASL for farm 
rent assessment and payment. This practice provides security against future forfeiture, 
if the husband were to pass away intestate. 
Challenges facing the OASL in the Birim North District 
Records are kept manually in registers at the District OASL office in New Abirem.  The 
office depends on out of date data that was compiled in the 1960’s149 and because of 
the lack of a system for updating it was difficult to keep track of recent transactions. 
Therefore they had to rely on chiefs because all stool land owners (i.e. chiefs) are 
supposed to know their boundaries; who their adjoining neighbours are and who they 
have allocated land150. The lack of an up to date register of land allocation in the district 
therefore affected the amount of rent collected and hence the share to the traditional 
authority (see Table 4). 
Another main challenge facing the OASL was dealing with the notion of called drink 
money (see section 6.1.2). This form of concealment of rent from the OASL by chiefs 
was widespread in Ghana because of the huge amounts demanded and collected by 
chiefs (and land owners). Emphasis was no longer placed on the payment of annual 
ground rents. Thus, chiefs would execute leases without inserting a rent clause in it or 
if they did it was understated and therefore attracted low ground rents. This was 
because they were more concerned with the present value of the lump sum (i.e. drink 
money) than small amounts of yearly payments of ground rent151. 
In addition to the above other logistic challenges that hindered the operations of the 
OASL in the BND included; .the lack of adequate transport for personnel to monitor 
land transactions and for collection of rents and, the lack of legislation to facilitate the 
prosecution rent defaulters. Some chiefs who were supportive of the work of the OASL 
took actions to collect back the lands from rent defaulters152. It seems that for now the 
OASL is powerless and without a legal basis for demanding accountability on how 
beneficiary institutions can utilise the revenues that they receive.  
Although some chiefs have always criticised why the rents and royalties from stool 
land, are collected by the OASL, which charges administrative fees for it, they have not 
been able to challenge this constitutional provision. Thus, for now the relationship 
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 Interview with the District Officer on 11/08/2010 
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 (2001) suggest this may be an authentic source of stool land boundary determination 
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 Phone conversation and email with Senior OASL officers (summary ) on 27/07/2011 
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 No evidence of this was provided by the District officer during the interview on.11/08/2010. 
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between OASL and chiefs, with regards to stool land revenue management, remains 
crucial. This is because until that is reviewed in the 1992 Constitution, chiefs and all 
those who act in a fiduciary capacity as managers of land might be held to account for 
all revenues that they receive from land by the OASL. 
5.3 Political Organizations: the Member of Parliament 
Birim North District has two constituencies and therefore has two Members of 
Parliament (MP); Abirem and Ofoase-Ayirebi constituencies. Both MPs belong to the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP), which is the main opposition party in Ghana (as at 2010). 
The people in these communities have a long historical association with the political 
tradition of the Danquah-Busia United Party of the 1960s. Thus, MPs of this political 
affiliation tend to always win elections in this area. The Abirem Constituency MP served 
as the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources when the NPP was in government (up 
to 2008). The case study area falls within the jurisdiction of this MP. 
Although MPs are legislators for the country, in Ghana they are perceived as people 
who initiate development projects in their respective constituencies (Lindberg, 2009). 
Thus all MPs are expected by the people who voted for them to be able to meet their 
developmental needs or else face potential rejection in subsequent elections (Hyden, 
2010; Lindberg, 2010). This perception appears to have been the result of MPs own 
activities when they make promises to the electorate during election campaigns leading 
to parliamentary elections. Thus it is often not surprising that when they fail to fulfil 
these promises people tend to vote them out. The perception was also reinforced when 
during the previous NPP regime the MPs were allowed to access part of the District 
Assembly Common Fund as MPs share of the fund to use to support projects of 
interest to them153.  
MPs have become directly involved in the provision of public goods. Sometimes this is 
done for political expediency, to show that their party care about the people. MPs are 
therefore aware of all development projects and activities that take place in the 
constituency. For instance, The Birim North constituency MP is an observer154 at the 
ongoing negotiations for land taking place in the mining affected communities. 
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 This was called MPs Common Fund but now under the NDC regime has been renamed Constituency 
Development Fund to be accessed by the MP for development projects. 
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 The MP does not usually attend these meetings in person but has a local representative to observe 
proceeds and provide feedback. 
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5.4 Associational Groups  
A fourth group of actors at the local level is constituted by loosely formed associational 
groups of local inhabitants. Notable ones are the youth and women groups. These 
groups have recent origins in the communities. They have only been established since 
the arrival of Newmont in 2005155. It appears that prior to the arrival of Newmont these 
groups were either non-existent or they were dormant156. The youth associations are 
characteristically non-partisan and embrace membership from all local residents (not 
necessarily ethnic).  They are however different from youth associations found in some 
other parts of Ghana in the sense that they are completely autonomous of each other 
in the district and do not have external branches in the urban towns (Lentz, 1995). 
Membership is made up of both educated and the non-educated people living in the 
communities. They all seem to have the goal of promoting development through 
representation in decision making and self help157. According to Lentz youth groups 
tend to act as ‘agents of mobilisation and catalysts of development’ (Lentz, 1995:396). 
As indicated above, mining investment in the district has had significant impact on the 
formation of youth and women’s groups. Youth and women’s groups were encouraged 
to emerge by the Newmont’s search for community representatives to negotiate with 
over the impact of its mining operations. The presence of Newmont seems to have now 
politicised the inhabitants through the creation of these associations. The leadership of 
these groups are now actively involved in decision making and have been selected as 
members of committees, particularly for the negotiations. The negotiations and the 
desire to be able to lobby for employment or receive some form of social or economic 
support from Newmont seem to have been the impetus underlying the formation of 
these groups158. With regards to arrangements for the negotiations in the District, 
Newmont proposed to have engagement with groups of local institutions such as 
traditional authorities (the chief and Council of Elders), the Assembly Members, and 
farmers associations. Thus, the youth living in the communities affected by mining 
formed associations in each of the communities so that they become eligible to 
participate in decision-making as a recognised body of local inhabitants. Thus, one of 
the key benefits of the mining investment in the District is that the youth associations 
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 Interviews with AWL on 10/09/2010 ,AYL on 09/09/2010 and NYL on 31/08/2010 
156
 I have not been able to verify the existence of any form of youth or women’s association in these 
communities prior to the recent ones 
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 Interview with AYL on 09/09/2010;NYL on 31/08/2010;NYG on 1/09/2010 and AfYL 01/07/2010 
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 Interview with AWL 10/09/2010. The leader traced the background of the formation of the 
association to a past General Manager of Newmont who encouraged the women to come together to 
facilitate their mobilisation for support to livelihood programmes. 
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have become a powerful political group and operate as the mouth piece of the ordinary 
citizens to ensure that they are able to hold effective negotiations for compensation, 
development projects and secure employment quotas from Newmont.  
5.4.1 The Divine Youth Association of Ntronang 
The Divine Youth Association of Ntronang159 was established in November, 2008.It is 
an association formed by both male and females between the ages of 18-45 (defined 
as the youth). Any person within the set age cohort who is permanently resident in the 
community is eligible in so far as such a prospective member shows interest and willing 
to support the objectives of the association. The group have the following objectives: to 
assist in activities that lead to the development of the community by providing mainly 
communal labour; and to serve as community advocacy group and pressure group 
(watch dog) that seeks transparency and accountability in resource management  
The Association has an Mmbrantehene160 (Youth Chief), who is an elderly member of 
the community. The chief of the town is not a member of the association but is well 
informed of their activities through the Mmbrantehene and the leadership of the group. 
To facilitate the administration of the Association, each member pays a monthly levy of 
50Ghp and a welfare levy of 50Ghp for supporting the recurrent expenditure of the 
association. This is however not sufficient to undertake any major activities, e.g. 
outreach programmes. A special contribution is collected whenever there is the need to 
engage in any such activity. Furthermore, the association relies on other sources of 
funding by making appeals to the District Assembly, the Member of Parliament or 
corporate bodies such as Newmont for financial support. The main resource 
contribution that the Association offers directly to the community is communal labour. 
The youth group has always participated effectively in communal labour. They mobilize 
people for communal labour on the days set aside which is usually Thursdays or 
whenever a special call is made for communal labour. Communal labour is required for 
cleaning of the community and support of construction projects (e.g. when a new 
footbridge that leads to the basic schools was under construction). The youth group 
has also supported the mobilization and collection of levies from the community 
members to support community projects, provided by the District Assembly, NGOs and 
Newmont. 
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 The President of this group is also a community representative at the Compensations Negotiations 
Committee (CNC), and serves on the Crops subcommittee. 
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 Rattray (1929) in Busia (1951:10) refers to this as the ‘Nkwankwaahene’, that is. leader of the 
‘commoners’ or those without elder status (or young men) 
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The role of the youth association in development 
Although it appears the youth association is accepted and acknowledged by the people 
of Ntronang, they are not involved with the allocation of stool land and in decisions with 
regards to how revenues received are utilised161. But they want to be involved or 
alternatively ensure that satisfactory accountability measures are put in place for the 
disclosure of the receipt and utilization of revenues from the collective resources.  
When asked whether the members of the association were not part of the Unit 
Committee (UC) or Plot Allocation Committee in the community, the youth leadership 
indicated they were not. This is because the UC was perceived as corrupt because in 
the past some of its members had been involved in malpractices with the chief162. This 
had given it a bad image and made it unpopular for which reason local inhabitants tend 
to shy away from joining it. Even though it is supposed to be an elected body the 
present UC is thought to be represented by people who have been selected by the 
chief and so work for him163. This was an issue that the youth association had problems 
with the chief. The youth group contend that the chief does not account for revenues 
that accrue on collective resources in the manner expected of him as a custodian. They 
cite examples of monies they know have been paid by Newmont to the chief which 
have not been disclosed to the community. Although the amount involved was not 
disclosed to me they claimed to have been were aware of it164. I realised that they had 
knowledge of this because the some of the youth members, e.g. the leader is a 
member of the CNC, where they interact with other representatives from other 
communities and information is shared. Some of those communities had their chiefs 
declare to their people that they had received some payment from Newmont.  
A further concern of the people was the apparent lack of transparency and 
accountability with regards to stool land allocation and resources used by the chief. 
Because of this individuals who hold customary freeholds on land also insist on selling 
land without the consent of the chief. There are therefore widespread unplanned 
developments in the town. Thus has affected the land use in the area. Transactions are 
done without the involvement of the TCPD, which would have prepared a planning 
scheme had the process been formalised through the chief as expected. The 
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 Interview with the Leader of the Association on 31/08/2010. 
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 This was confirmed in an interview with the Assemblyman on 02/10/2010 
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 But because it is not remunerated it has become more or less a voluntary service. People lack 
interest in it and so the chief is able to appoint his nominees who become members of the PAC work in 
ways that are favourable to him. 
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 This was conformed in separate interviews with the elders, queen mother, Assemblyman and key 
informants. 
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consequence of all this is that it has become difficult and challenging for the people to 
be actively involved in decision making for development of the community. People are 
no longer enthusiastic about attending local durbars where in the past collective 
decisions were taken165. 
5.4.2 The Adausena Youth Association  
The Adausena Youth Association was formed in 2007 when the youth in the 
community came together to deliberate on what they could do to help in the 
development of their town. This eventually led to the formation of the association and 
setting of objectives. Their objectives are; (a) to contribute in all ways that they can to 
promote development of the community; to promote educational development in the 
area; (b) to ensure that the traditional authorities, as well as all organizations with 
interests in the community, recognize the youth as partners in development and (c) to 
ensure that the youth are consulted and given a role in all development projects that 
take place in the area. 
The association is open to all people within the ages of 18 to 45 years who are 
residents of Adausena. It is a voluntary association of people who ascribe to the aims 
and objectives of the group. Registration and acceptance of the condition to pay the 
monthly levy of GH¢1.00 are the other requirements to become a member. The wife of 
the chief and an elder of the community 166 serve as patrons to this association. They 
provide advice and financial support to the association in most of the activities they 
undertake. 
The role of the youth in development 
As part of the group’s efforts at contributing to the development of the area they have 
undertaken the following list of activities since 2007. 
(a) Motivation and promotion of educational development among school going children 
in the community. They presented books and writing materials to students who 
successfully passed the Junior High School (JHS) examinations in 2008/09. The 
rationale was to motivate others to do better in the years ahead; 
(b) In furtherance to the objective of promoting education they often organised quiz 
contests  for the Junior High School (JHS)students and prizes are presented to 
deserving winners; 
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(c) have instituted skills training programmes to selected youths to equip them for 
potential jobs in their area of interest. This is supported by their patron (wife of the 
chief);  
(d) have collaborated with Olives (an NGO) working in the area organised a capacity 
building programme in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for 
interested youth. This was basically in Microsoft Office software and computer use. 
This was to equip them with skills that they may need for potential jobs with the mining 
Company; 
(d)  have provided the main source of communal labour for development projects and  
(e) has a nursery farm which produces seedlings, which are sold to local farmers. 
Proceeds from this constituted one of the main sources of income for the group’s 
activities. 
In addition to the above the youth association, in particular its leadership plays a key 
role in community development planning. According to the President of the group, 
planning of development projects in this community may first be initiated by the chief 
and his elders. This is then discussed with the Assembly woman and UC167. A 
community durbar is called during which everyone can make a contribution to the 
issues put across. The President describes the process as participatory because all 
those who attend are given the opportunity to speak freely to the issues, positively or 
negatively. At the end of it a consensus is reached on how to proceed168. The youth is 
often given specific responsibilities, often to lead in the provision of communal labour. 
In particular the youth were active in the planning and provision of potable water. The 
leadership of the association took part in the discussion with the chief and his council 
and the Unit Committee. 
The Youth Association also acts as a collective action group that works to ensure that 
the community’s stool land resources are exploited in a manner that is transparent and 
beneficial to the community. The youth often channel their grievances to the traditional 
authorities to demand accountability of the resources. The leader of the association 
elaborated on this as follows: 
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 Some of the youth members are on the Unit Committee, but they are elected to be there which is 
different from being voluntary members of the Youth Association. 
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 This claim was collaborated by interviews with NYL on 31/08/2010 and AUC on 10/09/2010 
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As a youth group who want to see the development of our town we can petition 
the elders of the town when we see that resources are utilised but not properly 
accounted for. Traditionally, we cannot just walk to the chief to demand 
accountability, but we do this through the council of elders who would then 
convey our grievance to the chief. If on the other hand it is with the way the UC 
[PAC] does the allocation we petition its chairman directly and request for public 
declaration of accounts. 
It was the view of the Youth Association that the community require to be made aware 
of how their resources and revenue are utilised. People should also be given the 
opportunity to seek clarification on collective resources of the community169. These 
views articulate the expectations of the local inhabitants in particular the youth of the 
community. 
5.4.3 The Great Women’s Association at Adausena 
The Great Women’s’ Association at Adausena was formed in May 2010. It has as its 
President a representative of the queen mother170. The formation of the association 
was motivated by support that women in the area had received from the General 
Manager171 of Newmont’s department for Environment and Social Responsibility (ESR) 
between 2009 and 2010.It was an objective of the General Manager to support and 
promote the development of women in the Company’s area of operation. This inspired 
the women in Adausena to come together to form the association in order to articulate 
their ideas for development and to seek support to undertake activities of interest to the 
community. 
All women in the community are free to become members in as much as they are 
prepared to take active part in the group’s activities which is aimed at community 
development. Membership of the group was estimated to be about 100 but about 80 
are the active members172. 
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 According to the leader of the group this is what transparency and accountability means to the 
people. Interview with Adausena Youth Leader on 09/09/2010. He explained further that there have 
been occasions where the traditional authority presented to the whole community at durbar revenue 
from stool land and what it has been used for. Opportunity is given for people to seek clarifications. 
Such is the kind of accountability processes expected of those in authority to control their resources.  
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 She is therefore closely linked to the chiefly elites. 
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 The General Manager at the time of the fieldwork was out of the country and could not be contacted 
for confirmation. 
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 Interview with AWL on 10/09/2010. Adults of 18 years and above, married or single are eligible to 
join the association. 
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The role of the women’s association in development 
The Women’s’ Association has the objective of promoting development in the 
community through women. It is the belief of the group that women are an essential 
part of family life and for that matter have a lot to offer in terms of contributions to the 
enhancement of community life. The leader of the association also elaborated on how 
their activities could support family life saying ‘we also want to ensure that women are 
able to support their spouses in all aspects to improve the lives of their families’. This 
was aimed at building the capacity of the women to engage in viable economic 
activities. These include training in how to set up small scale business and how to 
engage in alternative livelihoods programmes. 
Funding of the association is through monthly levies of Gh¢1.00 from each member. 
This was the regular source of income to the association. However, it was explained 
that this contribution was insufficient for their activities and so most of the time they 
have had to depend on external sources of funding for their activities. For instance, for 
training to build their capacity in small scale business management they had to seek 
funding from NGOs that operated in the District and were willing to support. This 
provided them with support for skills training in the preparation of a local type of soap 
using oil palm. The following are some activities that have been undertaken by the 
association since it was formed:  
(1) supported the youth in the provision of communal labour towards the construction of 
taps for the supply of potable water,  
(2) have mobilized, through collective action and lobbied for the development of a new 
market place in the area. They had to lobby the chief for the space and this has been 
allocated for development173,  
(3) have engaged in mediation and settlement of marital disputes between members 
and their spouses. This was to ensure that there was peace in every marriage for 
successful family development  
(4) have had training in business development and skills capacity development. These 
were facilitated by local NGOs (e.g. Olives) and 
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 This was probably because of the relationship the leader of the group had with the queen mother (as 
the queen mother’s representative). 
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(5) taken action to stop activities considered as detrimental to the educational 
development of children in the area. An example was collective action to stop a ‘video’ 
(cinema) operator in the area from showing movies during school hours. The women 
explained that this action was taken because the operations affected children’s 
attendance to school.  
Apart from engaging in activities that are aimed at their set objectives the women’s 
association in the community actively participates in decision making and planning of 
developmental projects. During a group discussion the women’s leader explained that: 
Women do participate in the discussion of projects in the community. The 
planning of projects is discussed at community durbars and every adult is 
allowed to express an opinion. My personal experience was at a meeting where 
we discussed the provision of potable water in the community. We made 
proposals on the type of tap we wanted to the NGO that was funding the project 
to install174. 
The group, however, pointed out that although the association is not directly involved in 
the management of stool land resources they were aware of the procedures and 
process involved in the management of the community’s collective resources.  It was 
further explained to me that:  
Farmland allocations are done by individual families through the heads. But for 
building plots it is the chief who does this. The chief is the custodian of our 
lands (according to our custom and national laws). So when land is ripe for 
conversion to non agricultural use the farmer (user) is informed and then the 
TCPD is asked to prepare a scheme for the area. 
The above shows the presence of local associations in the case study area. These 
associational institutions have undertaken activities that cut across what other 
institutions in the area are engaged in doing. It is important to note these institutions 
have interests in the way collective stool land resources are managed in the area. 
Whether directly or indirectly involved in how the community’s resources are managed 
there is evidence that they seek for transparency and accountability in the judicious use 
of the resources by the authorities which have the mandate to do so. 
5.5 Newmont Golden Ridge Limited: land access and mining investment   
Newmont Golden Ridge Limited, Akyem Project (NGRL) is a mining company with 
legal interest as a leaseholder, to exploit and invest in mining on stool land in the BND. 
As a result of this it was identified as important actor with regards to land relations and 
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development in the communities studied (this will be explained in chapters 7 and 8). 
Both NGRL and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited, Ahafo Mines (NGGL), are Ghanaian 
subsidiaries of Newmont Mining Corporation based in Denver, Colorado in the United 
States of America (USA). Whereas NGGL has been actively producing gold at its 
mines at Ahafo, in the Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana since 2006, NGRL has been 
exploring for gold and assessing development opportunities at Akyem, in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana since 1997175. In 1997, three companies, La Source SAS, Gencor, 
and Kenbert Mines undertaking mineral exploration in the Birim North District176 formed 
Golden Ridge Resources Limited. La Source subsequently acquired Gencor’s interest 
increasing its holding in the Company to 80 percent. In 1999, La Source transferred its 
share in the Company to Normandy Ghana Gold Limited. In 2002, Newmont acquired 
Normandy and an additional 5 percent of Kenbert Mines Limited shares to increase its 
holding in the Company to 85 percent. In late 2005 Newmont moved to 100% 
ownership when it acquired the remaining Kenbert shares. In 2008, the name of the 
company was changed to Newmont Golden Ridge Limited (NGRL). 
 
As a result of mineral exploration in the BND since 2002 and subsequent discovery of 
commercial quantities of gold reserves NGRL applied for a mining lease from the 
Government of Ghana177 to enable it operate a surface mine within the mining enclave 
of BND. The land which contains the minerals is stool land and is being used by the 
local communities within the district for agricultural purpose. Various interests and 
rights are held in the land which the mine project will affect when the mining lease is 
granted. 
In 2010 the Government of Ghana granted a 15 year lease to Newmont to operate a 
surface mine in the district. This followed the approval of the mine Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The process 
of assessing the impact of the mining on local community people and businesses 
included a public hearing attended by all the local chiefs and people from the 
communities within the districts that are anticipated to be directly affected by the mine 
project. These are called Project Affected Communities (PAC). Based on the plan and 
report that Newmont presented for the EIA the local communities showed support and 
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 Compensations Negotiations Framework, June 2008. 
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This was then known as the Birim District, until 2008 when the district was split into two; the Birim 
North and Central. 
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 In Ghana all mineral reserve found within the territorial boundaries of the country are held in trust by 
the President on behalf of the people of Ghana. Article 254 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana 
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were willing to make their land available for the Company to invest in its mine 
operations.  
Although the state granted Newmont a lease for the use of the land the Company 
required the permission of the people as well since they are the lawful users of the 
land. The Minerals and Mining law in Ghana requires that such lawful users and 
owners of land which is to be taken for mining be paid compensation (This is explained 
in detail in chapter 8)178. Generally, within mining communities in Ghana compensation 
payments for land has often negotiated between the mining right holder and the 
traditional authorities, represented by local chiefs. However, studies undertaken by 
various scholars have shown how problematic this has been and has often led to 
dispossession of land and property and conflicts within mining communities (Akabzaa, 
2000; Akabzaa et al 2007; Tsuma, 2010, Yankson, 2010, Ayelazuno, 2011). This has 
often delayed mining projects.  
It was to address this that compensation negotiation in the BND was therefore 
designed to include the local inhabitants whose land and property are directly affected 
by the mining lease. As a result of the mining lease Newmont has become an important 
institution (led by its key local actors the ERS officer and CDM) in the district with 
regards to stool and resource utilization179. Apart from the local citizens living within the 
mining area the other institutions and actors are the public land sector agencies and 
local government authority. Their functions and role have been explained above. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to outline and examine the role of actors and institutions in the BND 
and their role with regards to stool land management and development. I therefore 
examined both state and non-state institutions which were identified with these issues. 
The study found multiplicity of institutions and actors in the BND and examined they 
way they interacted at various levels and in different capacities over stool land 
resources and the implications for the kind of developmental outcomes that are 
produced in the area. These institutions and actors were categorised as: 
(1) those that have evolved from the customs and traditions of the people, e.g. 
chieftaincy and the council of elders; 
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(2) those individuals or groups of people who voluntarily forms of associations to 
pursue development objectives for their respective communities. These included youth 
and women’s groups, and  
(3) those that are established by the state and therefore operate within a bureaucratic 
legal framework, e.g. the local government authority, public land sector agencies, MPs, 
and the Unit Committees.  
The chapter showed that the institutions and actors at the district do interact in the 
performance of their duties in ways that have produced different kinds of outputs for the 
people. The following points are of particular importance:  
Firstly, each of the above institutions and actors are supposed to draw their authority 
and legitimacy from tradition and custom, the state legal framework or some form of 
recognition and acceptability by the local people in the way they operate in the District. 
In particular chiefs derive authority from traditions and were therefore expected to 
exercise it within established customary norms and practices of the society. Officials of 
state institutions operate within laws that establish these institutions but in practice 
these institutions often take into consideration the local circumstances in the 
performance of their duties. This had allowed the development of some form of 
informal relationships and deepened the formally required collaboration between chiefs 
and public sector land agencies in regards to stool lands and natural resources 
management.  The associational groups in the district were engaged in activities 
undertaken by traditional chiefs, state and private institutions. These groups are often 
community-based and are involved in various forms of local activities for development. 
There was evidence that they seek for the judicious management of stool land by the 
traditional authorities.  
Secondly, the institutions and actors were not mutually exclusive in the performance of 
their roles. They collaborated, complemented and competed, in some cases, with each 
other in the management of stool land resources and the provision of public goods, e.g. 
chiefs collaborated with public state land agencies in the management and 
administration of stool lands but appear to compete with the local government authority 
in land use planning. However, traditional chiefs, state institutions at the district level 
and other local actors and investors tend to complement each other in various ways 
that facilitate the provision of public goods. This analysis showed that in the BND the 
management of community land and the provision of public goods were guided by a 
complex mixture of cultural practices and norms of society as well as statutes of the 
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state. But these actors and institutions work with each other in different ways that have 
produced both positive and negative results for the communities.  
In addition to the above, it has been argued that public land sector agencies are 
mandated to be responsible for the administration of land while the respective stool 
land owners take decisions with regards to the management of stool lands. However, in 
practice there is no strict dichotomy of function. For instance, the PVLMD was involved 
in land management decision making at the local level by providing advice to chiefs 
and guidance in the preparation of leases which required the consent of chiefs to 
facilitate the registration process. The latter function bolstered claims made by chiefs to 
be the absolute owners of land without consideration of the interests of the customary 
freeholders. But this relationship appeared to have a positive aspect too. It was claimed 
by officials of the PVLMD that the preparation of leases by its officials facilitated speedy 
registration of land. It also ensured that only certified stool land owners were able to 
make allocations to prospective developers. 
Similarly, chiefs have assumed more power in land use planning. The District 
Assembly is the legal authority with powers for planning land uses within its jurisdiction. 
However, what was observed suggested that because chiefs are the custodians of land 
they tended to make decisions with regards to land conversions from farm lands to 
non-farm uses often ahead of the planning schemes prepared by the TCPD. Thus, 
people proceeded to develop their allocated land without the need to seek planning 
and building permits from the TCPD. Even though these decisions were made 
informally by chiefs, it was found that they were made in collaboration with some state 
officials.  On the one hand, this, in practice seemed to have taken away the 
bureaucracy involved in getting a planning scheme prepared, while on the other one 
can argue that only a few tend to benefit financially from these forms of collaborations.  
With regards to stool revenue, the OASL did not receive the expected cooperation from 
traditional chiefs over the collection and disbursement of stool land revenue. Some 
chiefs’ were able to collect what amounted to the actual market value of land from 
prospective developers without providing records to the OASL. It was also shown that 
there were no effective mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring that community 
members benefit from stool revenue that was paid to chiefs and the BNDA. Thus, 
accountability for revenue from royalties remains one of the challenges of holding 
chiefs responsible. In the BND where Newmont was making investment in mining there 
was the potential that stools would be receiving huge revenue from mineral royalties 
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but how would this affect the development of the local communities? In the next 
chapter I focus on the politics of managing stool revenue by chiefs.  
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Chapter 6 
Politics of Managing Stool Land and Revenue 
6.0 Introduction 
In Ghana chiefs are recognised as custodians of collective land and natural resources, 
and are expected to acts as managers of these resources for and on behalf of their 
communities180. Both customary and statute laws in Ghana prescribe how these 
resources are owned and controlled. Customary law in Ghana has established that 
land (including natural resources) is an intergenerational property that is managed by 
traditional authorities (Ollenu, 1962). However, as noted (in chapter 3) the politics of 
the colonial administration under indirect rule and the role that chiefs played affected 
the level of authority that chiefs had over stool land during colonisation and the period 
leading up to and after independence.  
Empirical data from the four selected communities in the Birim North District points to 
how contemporary traditional authorities have relied on their traditional authority, which 
appears to be largely reinterpreted and contested, to govern collective resources. Even 
though some of the land management practices of some chiefs may seem to contradict 
established customary principles in some communities, perceptions about how chiefs 
exercise authority over stool land are divided. The reason for this may be traced to the 
level of trust that local people have in the authority of the institution of chieftaincy. 
However, how that authority is exercised by individual chiefs is what raises contestable 
issues in the communities with regards to the management and utilisation of revenue 
that is derived from stool land. 
This chapter focuses on traditional chiefs and how revenue from stool land is managed. 
The chapter examines the following:  
(1) What constitutes stool land revenue?  
(2) An analysis of what type of structures, if any, are put in place to facilitate the 
management of collectively owned resources and how the anticipated revenues from 
these resources are mobilised and utilised, i.e. how do traditional authorities manage 
stool land resources in the case study district. This is an intricate question of 
determining whether or not the community derives benefit from these revenues.  
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(3) The analysis of the fluid nature of the politics surrounding the way these revenues 
are managed.  
6.1 What Constitutes Stool Land Revenue? 
Land, minerals and timber resources provide a means of generating revenue at the 
district level. Thus, ownership and control of these resources constitutes a means to 
wealth creation. What is significant under the land tenure regime of Ghana is the 
established and accepted fact that different interests and rights may subsist at the 
same time in any parcel of land and the ownership or control of it imposes some level 
of responsibility on those who legitimately control. Thus, in the Birim North district, 
where land is generally found to be stool land, chiefs are expected to exercise 
proprietary authority over land in accordance with the customary law of the people. The 
authority extends over the management of land resources, especially the revenue that 
is derived from it, on behalf of the citizenry who collectively own it.  
People’s interests in land, minerals and timber resources which are owned collectively 
and controlled by traditional authorities and the state are not in the physical resources 
per se but what these resources are able to produce and provide. Does the 
management of stool land bring about development to the people through, for instance, 
the provision of public goods? This is an issue of concern to the people and they are 
often interested in the revenues that these resources are able to generate and what 
these are used for. 
6.1.1 Types of stool land revenue: direct sources 
At the district level stool land resources generate different types of revenue. These are 
generated from direct and indirect sources. The direct forms of revenues are received 
from land transactions in the form of farm rents, ground rents, and drink money (a 
popular Ghanaian local term for a lump sum payment usually paid for acquiring an in 
interest in land). The indirect sources of revenue comprise those that are generated 
through activities which are not directly controlled by the traditional authorities, such as 
grant of mining leases and licences for timber concessions. These produce royalties 
and rents (This will be discussed in section 6.1.3). 
The BND is within the rural agricultural areas of Ghana. A lot of subsistence agricultural 
activities take place in the district. Land transactions mainly involve the payment of 
farm rents, which are mostly paid by non-natives who have migrated from areas 
outside of the district or from another stool area. These people are often referred to as 
tenant farmers. The tenant farmers derive their interest in land through native members 
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of the communities or from the respective chiefs. They are therefore required to pay 
rent for the use of the land. This may be seasonally or monthly, but the regularity of 
payment is usually agreed at the time of the transaction.  
On the other hand, ground rents are charged for the use of land for non-agricultural 
uses, e.g. building plots. An assessment of this is usually made by trained bureaucrats 
who work in public land sector agencies, in this case the Office OASL. Estimates of 
what is paid as ground rent for every parcel of land are determined by the plot size and 
the transaction fee for the land. The OASL is the designated public agency that collects 
this form of revenue for disbursement to beneficiary institutions. 
Furthermore, drink-money in Ghana constitutes one main source of revenue that 
accrues to local land transactions. It represents the payment of a one-off lump sum of 
money for the acquisition of stool land, usually for building purposes and cash crop 
farming (discussed in section 6.1.2 below).  
6.1.2 The Concept of ‘Drink Money’ Explained 
Insa ko ahenfia ensan emba181 
Historically, drink money used to be a sum of money paid (in lieu of the offer of drinks 
for the customary pouring of libation) for any grant of land, usually by the chief. The 
practice was common with allocation of land for farming to ‘strangers’182. This money 
used to be only of customary significance but over the years the value of land has 
become so commercialised that the amount paid as drink money can no longer be 
taken on the face value as a customary token.  In recent years drink money is now 
commonly associated with the lump sum payment made in exchange for land, usually 
for the development of buildings. It has been found that this money is equivalent to the 
actual economic value of the land in an open competitive market. But this is often 
treated by chiefs as a symbolic customary token sum which is not supposed to be 
accounted for by the traditional authorities. As a result it is even more difficult to find 
evidence of how much revenue is generated through the collection of this drink money 
by chiefs (Andreasen et al, 2011). However, it is common knowledge that when land is 
sold out for non-farm uses a lump sum payment of money is often made to the 
traditional authorities. This drink money constitutes a major source of revenue for 
stools but chiefs continue to argue that it represents only a symbolic customary token 
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for the grant of land. This is why it has become a contestable issue in local 
communities in Ghana.  
It is however important to note that traditional authorities often receive drink money  
land transactions that are to be used for non-farming purposes, unless land is given out 
as a gift, which is rarely the case in areas where land has commercial value. This 
distinction is important because data collected from the communities suggested that 
the allocation of land for farming is done differently from that for non-farming uses. In 
the former case chiefs are usually not involved, except where land is required for cash 
crop farming (cocoa and oil palm) by migrants and other large scale commercial 
farming. 
The origin of the customary practice of the payment of drink money for land is well 
captured in the Akan saying ‘insa ko ahenfie nsan emba’ (literally meaning drinks 
offered to the chief at his palace do not come out of it [palace])’ Because of the 
contentious nature of the drink money conundrum I explored whether the OASL is able 
to account for it since this is often collected directly by the chiefs. In response to this 
the Regional Officer of the OASL started by making reference to the above popular 
Akan adage  often quoted by traditional authorities in support of the non declaration of  
drink money to the public. The OASL officer elaborated that traditional authorities have 
often argued that they are unable to provide accounts of drink money collected to the 
OASL because it has never been a customary practice to do that183.  This is because 
the drink money is presented to the chief as a gesture of acknowledgement and 
appreciation for the allocation of land. Thus, the drink money they receive only 
represents the customary symbolic gesture of thanksgiving to signify that a transaction 
on land has taken place between the chief and prospective user of the land.  In a 
subsequent interview with the Gyasehene of Adausena, this argument was confirmed 
as the claim by the traditional authorities in the district184.  
Furthermore, drink money is usually presented to the chiefs in the presence of the stool 
elders, usually, the Plot Allocation Committee (PAC) members who serve as witnesses 
to the land transactions.185  Traditionally, if drink was offered it was normally shared 
among those present and the remainder kept by the chief at the palace for his personal 
use and to entertain guests. It is an unusual practice for the drink (now money) to be 
declared to the rest of the community. Although in reality what is now offered as drink 
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money has risen to assume the real market value of the land, the notion behind this 
traditional practice has not changed and appear to remain largely unchallenged by the 
members of land owing communities. Thus some traditional authorities do still advance 
the argument that the practice of non-disclosure of drink money is still relevant as it is 
in line with the customs and tradition of the people. Chiefs therefore continue to receive 
and control huge amounts of revenue generated by stool lands.  This revenue 
constitutes community revenue in as much as it is generated from the allocation of 
stool land for various uses.  
It seems to be the case that the management of the drink money and generally all 
revenue from stool land, depends largely on the performance of individual chiefs. For 
instance, the Krontihene of New Abirem explained that usually ‘the proceeds [ drink 
money] from land sale is usually split between what goes to the stool for its 
maintenance and the rest into the community treasury to support development projects 
in the community186’. In line with this the chief of Adausena argues that:  
The rents and royalties received are from their own land which they can collect 
and manage so why would the state impose an institution [ the OASL] on them 
to do that and then charge a fee for it?187.  
The above points to the challenges and  unresolved issues on how to deal with drink 
money, and all other forms of stool land received by traditional authorities. Not  much is 
being done by members of the stool land owing communities to formally challenge the 
claim and control over stool land by traditional authorities188.  
Thus, revenue from stool land, including drink money, still remains a contentious and 
complicated issue and there seem to be challenges hinging on how to make chiefs 
account for it189. In fact chiefs have argued out and continue to rely on the claim that 
custom forbids the sale of land because of the belief that it is an intergenerational 
property (Ollenu, 1962). Traditional authorities in the BND have argued that stool lands 
are not sold outright190 (although this is contrary to what has been the practice as noted 
by scholars such as Hill, 1963 and Field, 1948 as discussed in chapter 3). Chiefs’ only 
give out leases, which the leaseholder is only required to present drinks for the 
performance of libation as a show of appreciation to the traditional authorities.   
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Historically, at the village level in the Akyem Kotoku area where these communities are 
located, when there were land transactions for farming or for any grant that did not 
attract substantial monetary exchange the chief was not informed. However, for every 
sale of land one-third was expected to be paid by the asasewura (land owner) to the 
chief (Field, 1948).  The origin of this arrangement remains unclear, but chiefs in these 
communities often refer to statutory law which recognises chiefs as the heads of stool 
land community and therefore are expected to endorse any allocation of land from that 
stool. However, it may be that the origin of  is rooted in the implementation of an 
administrative practice by public state land agencies, which required chiefs to endorse 
land transactions because of their legal position as managers of stool land (see chapter 
5). This has now given chiefs the authority to claim cash sums of money, which remain 
unaccounted and pocketed as private income. There seem to be no justification for this 
practice, albeit it constitutes a reinterpretation of customary law especially by urban 
based chiefs who control stool lands. 
Data on how much is paid for land shows that this depends on a number of factors (1) 
the use, usually building plots and large acquisitions of land for commercial agriculture 
tend to attract higher payments of drink money; and (2) the location of the land. Cash 
payments representing  drink money were found to range from about Gh¢1,000 to over 
Gh¢1,500 in the towns depending on these two factors191. These payments are usually 
collected directly by the traditional authorities (usually through an allocation committee) 
and are distinct from what may be collected and disbursed as stool land revenue by the 
OASL. The above analysis raises a number of issues with implications for benefits that 
communities might derive from stool land. 
The above suggests that while chieftaincy may rely on customary traditions (that the 
stool is sacrosanct and cannot be questioned) to avoid accounting for their stewardship 
over stool land revenue, they do in reality exploit the economic benefits of customary 
land. This in essence defeats the fundamental principle that underlies customary land 
holding (Kasanga, 2001; Ubink, 2007; Ubink, 2008). This is because of the nature of 
authority chiefs are expected to exercise over stool lands. The position of chiefs enjoins 
them to treat revenue from stool land  as community revenue. However, this has 
always not been the case. The failure of traditional authorities to be transparent and 
accountable over stool land transactions, as expected, to their constituents about this 
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potential huge source of revenue tends to question the legitimacy of their authority to 
manage stool land resources in the way that has been observed. As will be shown 
below (section 6.3) some chiefs tend to rely on close allies within the community 
through whom they exercise their authority to allocate and collect this form of revenue 
which creates a clientelistic relationship whereby only a few people benefit from the 
communal resource. These are people who are usually drawn into land management 
committees that are locally referred to as Plot Allocation Committees (PAC)192. 
Under different tenure agreements customary freeholders may grant use rights to non-
natives or other natives who require land for farming in these communities. In the BND 
the prevalent customary arrangements under which land may be accessed for farming 
are through share cropping, leasehold or hiring of land. The outright sale of land to 
prospective farmers is no longer encouraged as it is said to be against the tenets of 
customary land ownership in the district. Also, unless land is required in large 
quantities for commercial agriculture, chiefs are not usually involved in farm land 
transactions in the district. However, since traditional authorities’ claim to  be the 
legitimate authority to decide when land can be  converted to  non-farm use (which  
seems to be it widely acknowledged and practised in the district, as in other parts of 
Ghana), they are  able to control revenue that this produces. This practice remains 
largely unchallenged. 
In addition to the above it is also important to note that chiefs’ command over all forms 
of direct forms of revenue from stool land has been facilitated by administrative 
procedures of public land sector agencies and the collaboration that chiefs have been 
able to develop with these institutions (see chapter 5). The implications are that: 
(1) No customary freeholder193 can make an allocation of land which would be 
recognized by the state, without the concurrence of the local chief, 
(2) The reason that only the chief is recognized as the legal authority to make 
allocation of land which is accepted for registration serves to take away any legal right 
in land transactions from customary freeholders to the chief, who by implication has the 
right to receive the revenue that accrues on land. It also provides an opportunity for the 
chiefs to collect drink money from the prospective buyer of the land. Sometimes this 
becomes an extra cost to the buyer because the customary freeholder may have sold 
the land to the buyer without the involvement of the chief;  
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(3) The consequent effect on registration of stool land is that it lessens the customary 
freehold to leasehold with a maximum tenure of 99 years for building plots and 50 
years if it is for agricultural purpose. This is because the Constitution of Ghana only 
allows for the creation of a maximum of 99 years lease. Customary freeholders have a 
perpetual interest in land and registration of this in accordance with the current legal 
provisions would truncate their interest to a maximum of 99 years. This appears to 
suggest that transactions with non-natives of an area are likely to attract more 
registrations than with natives194.  
In addition to the above forms direct revenue managed by controlled by chiefs in the 
BND, minerals and forest products in the form of gold and timber respectively also 
generate indirect sources of revenue mainly in the form of royalties. 
6.1.3 Types of Stool Land Revenue: Indirect Sources 
The main types of indirect sources of stool land revenue are rents and royalties. 
Royalties constitute payments made for the ongoing use and exploitation of natural 
resources195. It represents a proportion of the value realised from the exploitation of the 
resources by a licensed individual or company to the state from which the stool 
receives a share. It is important to note that apart from transactions that involve the 
allocation of land for various uses, traditional authorities and individual citizens are not 
directly involved in the mobilisation of revenues that legally accrue on natural resources 
(e.g. minerals -- gold, diamond and timber). Minerals and timber create royalties which 
are usually paid directly to the Government Revenue Authority196 (GRA). A proportion 
of the royalties (80%) is retained by the state and the remaining 20% divided equally 
and paid to the OASL and into the Mining Development Fund. The 10% share received 
by the OASL constitutes revenue that is disbursed in a pre-determined formula to the 
stool from which the rents and royalties were collected, the traditional council of the 
paramountcy and the District Assembly197. 
The OASL as mandated by law disburses stool land revenue into the respective stool 
land accounts. These stool accounts controlled by the chiefs who are expected to 
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manage revenue paid into it for and on behalf of their constituents198. Unlike the drink 
money is possible to ascertain how much revenue is mobilised through royalties 
because that is received by the OASL before it is apportioned to the respective stools. 
Revenue data extracted from the ledgers of regional and district offices of the OASL 
showing revenue from royalties and rents over the period 2005-2010 (6 years) for the 
four communities in the case study district are presented in Table 4. The data do not 
include the ‘drink money’ that is directly collected by chiefs and which the OASL lacks 
the legal authority to demand that it is accounted for by the chiefs.199  
It can also be reckoned from Table 4 that over the 6 years period the BNDA received a 
total of Gh¢11, 623, representing approximately 55% of royalties and rents collected in 
the area. Over the same period the OASL made payments of Gh¢ 726, Gh¢345 and 
Gh¢ 265 to the stool land accounts of Abirem, Ntronang and Adausena respectively.200 
These payments represented 25% of the share of revenue collected by the OASL from 
the respective stool lands. It is imperative to note that the BNDA, like all other District 
Assemblies in Ghana, receive a greater share of revenue (more than the stools and 
traditional authorities) from stool lands and natural resources but the beneficiary 
communities appear not to be well informed about what the funds are used for201. As a 
result concerns have been raised by the community people (including the chiefs) about 
the lack of accountability and transparency over how the BNDA uses its share of 
revenue from stool lands. 
A critical look at the data presented in Table 4 suggests that royalties and other forms 
of revenue that are officially paid into stool land accounts are relatively inadequate for 
the communities . However, this is potentially likely to increase given that the mining of 
gold is soon to commence and for which Newmont will be paying increased royalties to 
the state, part of which will be disbursed to the stools. The low royalty payments have 
been noted and that seems to have generated discussions on the need for the state to 
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give more to the mining communities. The President of the Ghana Chamber of Mines 
(GCM) has argued that mining communities need to receive more royalty payments 
from the state than the current situation, but the government seems to have a different 
view and has counter argued that the issue is not about the quantum of royalty but how 
it t is used202: 
While the Chamber [of Mines] contends that the royalties are woefully 
inadequate, the Ministry [of Lands and Natural Resources] believes that the 
amount of royalties paid is not the issue but how judiciously [transparency of 
disbursement] it is used for the benefit of the mining communities.  
It is the contention of the GCM that the State only pays a ‘minute fraction’ of what the 
mining companies in the country pay to the state. The GCM therefore proposed that 
the government should consider an upward review of the amount of royalties paid to 
the mining communities from 5.5% to 30% of what is paid to the State, over a specific 
period of time. It also added that such payments should be tied to the development of 
specific infrastructural projects in the beneficiary communities. The State however is 
concerned with issues of how transparent and accountable traditional authorities are 
even with the current quantum of royalty payments.  
Table 4: Disbursement of stool land revenue by the OASL to case study 
communities from 2005 - 2010 
Stool Name Year 
2005 
Year 2006 Year 
2007 
Year 
2008 
Year  
2009 
Year  
2010 
TOTAL 
(Gh¢203) 
Abirem 39.56 60.84 45.17 231.21 212.21 137.49 726.59 
Ntronang  14.29 9.45 - 111.60 27.90 182.25 345.49 
Adausena 16.91 - 13.77 20.77 166.56 47.95 265.96 
Praso kuma204 - - - - - - - 
        
Traditional Council  211.56 214.08 336.14 1,363.72 1,393.91 1,764.43 5,283.84 
BNDA 651.02 1,020.38 1,493.57 3,106.88 2,504.77 2,846.37 11,622.99 
Source: Extracted from the OASL Stool Land Revenue Ledgers, Koforidua (2011 
Citizens of the communities appear to acquiesce in the failures of their traditional 
leaders to account for their stewardship as may be expected under customary and 
statute law. To this extent increments in royalty payments and the determination of how 
much revenue is created through direct land transactions by traditional authorities may 
further enrich chiefs. The apparent lack of formalised structures in local land 
management practices may be a contributory factor to this difficulty. To understand 
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how chiefs are able to manage collective resources it is imperative to analyse the 
actual practices of land management in the selected communities. 
6.3 Local land management practices: structures and implications for local 
communities 
Chiefs appear to have limited role in local farm land transactions (see section 6.1.2). 
What is still debatable is the extent to which chiefs may exercise authority over land 
transactions for non-farming purposes. Ongoing mining investment in the district has 
opened up opportunities for non-farming uses of land and encouraged the re-parcelling 
of farm lands for urbanised uses. These issues are examined within the context of how 
traditional authorities have adapted to these changes in order to control and exercise 
authority over collective stool land resources; what structures and procedures have 
they adopted to facilitate the mobilisation and control of land revenues? The analysis in 
this section also examines the outcomes of the land management practices and their 
implications for the community inhabitants. 
There seem to be established generally a locally held view that chiefs do not directly 
get involved in farm land transactions. Land transactions for farming purposes usually 
are made between the indigenes of a stool (with a customary freehold interest in land, 
locally referred to as asasewura205) and prospective tenant farmers who are mostly 
non-indigenes (usually referred to as strangers or migrants). A contractual agreement 
for the land may be agreed for seasonal or long term use of the land. During these 
transactions customary rites are performed: this involves the customary pouring of 
libation with drinks provided by the prospective farmer. A formal agreement is usually 
made between the parties at which time they decide on whether to share the produce 
(harvest) of the land or of the land itself after a few years of cultivation of the crop. This 
is generally common for cash crop land transactions. These forms of sharing 
arrangements are locally known in Ghana as abunu or abusa respectively.  
Abunu refers to the agreement to share equally, while in the case of abusa the sharing 
is done in three equal parts. An abunu transaction allows the stranger farmer to 
cultivate crops, usually cash crops, at his own expense on land that is provided by the 
land owner. For cash crops, such as cocoa or oil palm, after a few years of cultivation 
(range from about 5-10 years) when the crop begins to bear fruits the land is shared 
into two parts. One part goes to the land owner and the other half to the farmer, who 
then acquires an interest in the land for the life expectancy of the respective crop. In 
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the case of an abusa contract, the agreement is made for sharing of the crop yield in 
three equal parts. Two parts are given to the farmer, if he provided the inputs and 
labour to cultivate the crops, while the land owner takes one part. These two local 
farming practices have evolved over the years as part of the customary practices of 
people who leave in farming communities. These arrangements are found in the 
Wassa area in the western cocoa producing region of Ghana and among oil palm 
farmers in the Eastern region (Hill, 1963; Berry, 1993, 1997, 2001; Amanor, 1999, 
2001; Boni, 2005; 2008). Generally, the role of traditional chiefs is often limited to 
witnessing the transaction and the performance of the customary pouring of libation, 
which is used to close out land transactions.  
On the other hand chiefs have a direct significant role in the allocation of land for all 
other purposes, apart from land for subsistence farming, as discussed above. How 
urban (non-farm) land transactions are made and the management of revenue from 
these are now examined in each of the four communities. The specific role that chiefs' 
performed is examined with a focus on the kind of structures established by the 
traditional authority for the mobilisation and utilisation of stool land revenue.  
Case 1: New Abirem 
Thirty years ago when I first came here to start a cocoa farm in this town 
[Abirem] it was very small but had plenty fertile agricultural land. I contacted a 
land owner and we had an abunu contract. Today I have my own farm land and 
house. Now people have to go to the chief to get land for building, which they 
pay a lot of money. This is even getting worse now because of Newmont 
coming here to mine gold206. 
In this town if you want a plot of land to build on you have to go to the chief. 
This is because it has been our practice that we recognize the chief as the 
grantor of the land. The chief is the custodian and leader of the community. 
When land is ripe for conversion the chief consults with the Town Planning 
[officials] through his Plot Allocation Committee (PAC) to prepare a scheme for 
the area207 
The above provides perspectives of two key informants on who control land in New 
Abirem. It also suggests that this may be as a result of an accepted practice of the 
people which has allowed the chief to manage their collective resources on their behalf. 
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As noted in Chapter 3, New Abirem is the capital town of the BND. There are therefore 
increasing commercial activities and development taking place. This has been 
compounded by the discovery of gold, which is the subject of land acquisition in the 
district. These activities have further increased the demand for land for non farming 
activities. Land values are therefore on the ascendency providing lucrative incentives 
for the conversion of land from farming to building plots. Land transactions for building 
purposes attract the direct payment of drink money to the chief, as explained above, 
and periodic ground rents which are supposed to be regularly assessed and collected 
by the OASL. 
A PAC is in charge of the allocation of land in the New Abirem stool land area. This 
according to the chief is to provide transparency in the way the stool’s lands and 
revenue are managed208. However, how the existence of a PAC could guarantee 
accountability in collective resources management was subjected to further 
interrogation. The PAC is made up of the chief’s selected representatives, comprising 
sub-chiefs209 and selected elders of the traditional council and members of the Unit 
Committee (UC). The PAC is responsible for the actual allocation of land and collection 
of fees and drink money on behalf of the chief. The sub-chiefs (under the divisional 
stool) control the stool lands that fall within their area of jurisdiction but the authority to 
do so is delegated by their chief at New Abirem. The PAC and the sub-chiefs are 
accountable to the chief who controls their activities.  
Essentially, the main function of the PAC is the allocation of land as directed by the 
chief. The traditional authorities of the town explained that the authority to convert any 
land from agricultural use is the prerogative of the Chief210. But the chief cannot do this 
alone by himself. To facilitate this, the chief established a PAC (with the Adontenhene 
of the town as its leader) and entrusted it with the authority to act on his behalf.  The 
composition of the members of the PAC, as above raises issues of accountability to the 
people. For instance, the sub-chiefs and Council of Elders are part of the traditional 
authorities and more likely to be close allies with the head chief at New Abirem. The 
UC members who serve on the PAC seem to have been personally selected by the 
chief. Although, originally UC is a democratically elected body, as noted in Chapter 4 
and 5, membership to serve on it has been non competitive since the inception of the 
local government and decentralisation concept in Ghana. Thus, one can generally 
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argue that even the membership of the UC itself has been influenced by the authority 
of local chiefs. Thus, the PAC is in practice directly accountable to the chief. 
Decisions with regards to a change of land use usually start with consultations between 
the PAC and respective sub-chiefs of the sections of the town where the conversion is 
being contemplated to meet the demand for land for urbanised uses. However, the 
procedure for undertaking urban land conversions has raised a number of issues and 
contestations with implications for  the customary tenure system. Firstly, the 
consultations appear not to involve the customary freeholders who according to 
customary211 law have established perpetual rights to the use of the land (Woodman, 
1996). Secondly, there seems to be a claim that suggests that the customary 
freeholder’s interest in land is only limited to farming. The traditional authorities have 
argued that stool lands in the area belong to the chief but indigenous members of the 
stool political community have the right to use the land for farming purposes only. This 
right does not include the right to sell with the intention of changing the use of the land 
from farming to a different use, e.g. as a building plot. The latter decision is considered 
the prerogative of the chief. This claim appears to blur the distinction between what 
constitutes collective stool land as established under the principles of customary law as 
practiced in the law courts of Ghana and what constitutes lands that belong to the royal 
family of which a chief is a member. Similar findings have also been made in studies 
conducted in the peri-urban areas of Kumasi (Andreasen et al, 2011; Ubink, 2007). 
The above claim to authority to make decisions with respect to the conversion of farm 
lands into building plots is perceived differently by different people in the communities 
and thus makes it a contentious issue. Chiefs and their council of elders constitute 
main proponents of the argument that chiefs have the authority to decide when farm 
lands are to be changed into building plots. This view is sometimes  supported by 
members of the community with close ties to the traditional authority. Thus, at New 
Abirem the members of the PAC , which is led by the Adontenhene, and sub-chiefs 
often support the exercise of authority by the chief over the conversion into building 
plots. Opposing views to this have been expressed by the elected Assemblyman and 
the youth of the town212. However, there are also those local inhabitants who seem to 
acknowledge the chiefs claim as a local practice, which no one seemed to challenge. 
How this came about no one seems have a clear idea. Thus, while some may counter 
the claim made by traditional authorities and their allies there are others living in the 
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community who appear to support the notion that chiefs have the right to make such 
important land use decisions. For instance, when asked who controls and allocates 
land for development in the town, some indigenes said that:  
Who allocates land depends on the use to which one wants the land for. Farm 
land allocations are made by the individual land owner (i.e. the customary 
freeholder), but for building plots it has been a practice in this town that we 
recognise the chief as the one to make such grants. The chief has selected 
some people to do this on his behalf and they work with the Unit Committee213. 
Land administration procedures and practices for the registration of land titles might 
partly account for and reinforced chiefs’ claim to exercise of authority over land 
allocation (as was discussed under section 5.2.5).  As noted the administrative practice 
is  based on the established notion of  chiefs being custodian of stool lands214. It is  not 
supposed to be an attempt at reinterpreting customary law. Ollennu (1962:127) has 
stated that: 
By customary law, no valid alienation of a stool or family land can be, made 
except by the occupant of the stool, acting with the consent and concurrence of 
the principal member of the family 
Perhaps the above and the Constitutional provisions that establish stool land a 
community property to be managed by traditional chiefs underpin the administrative 
procedure implemented by the PVLMD.215 The commercialisation of land, which 
creates wealth, has also contributed to chiefs’ claim for authority to make decisions 
about land conversions. This is because authority to make the resulting allocations 
goes with the right to command the revenue from the collection of drink money and 
other rents.  
Land Conversion Process 
Although traditional authorities initiate decisions for changes on stool land use (through 
the PAC) they do not engage in the direct preparation of planning schemes. That 
authority remains a statutory function performed by the TCPD and is recognised and 
respected by the traditional authorities. New Abirem stool lands have been surveyed 
and planning schemes prepared for allocation. The TCPD do this for a fee which is 
agreed between the chief and the officials. The conventional practice has been that the 
planning scheme is prepared based on the arrangement that  some of the plots are 
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either taken by the TCPD in lieu of payment for costs of surveying and preparation of 
planning schemes or  the plots are sold out to pay for the service charges (Andreasen 
et al, 2011). 
The land allocation process starts with an application for land to the chief through the 
PAC. The PAC allocates a vacant plot of land to a prospect buyer who pays the drink 
money plus an allocation fee (i.e. an administrative charge to the PAC)216. This is then 
recorded and the purchaser receives an allocation note as proof of the transaction. The 
allocation note is a valid document that is held by the purchaser of the land and forms 
part of the documentation that is required for the registration of title to  the land. The 
amount paid as drink money for a plot of land in New Abirem ranged from about 
Gh¢200 to 1,500217.Part of the drink money was supposed to be used in the payment 
of compensation to the customary freeholder and the stranger farmer (if any) for the 
loss of the land and crops. Where there are no crops on the land at the time the land 
use change was made then compensation is only made for the bare land. 
Before a chief makes decisions for change of use the customary freeholders (who 
usually farm on the land or may have rented it out to migrant farmers) are usually 
informed. The need for land use changes has sometimes resulted from the expansion 
of the town accompanied by increased  demand for the provision of residential housing 
and commercial buildings. A customary freeholder whose land is affected by such 
decisions is expected to be fully compensated for the loss of his crops and land. 
Compensation arrangements for these vary from locality to locality. As indicated above 
the acceptability and the basis for it is not very clear, as it appears to defy extant 
customary law principles, which states that218:  
Chiefs are customarily and constitutionally obliged to administer land in the 
interest of and for the development of the whole community. Stool lands are 
communal properties. As long as there is vacant land each member of the 
community has the right to farm and build on part of it, which gives the member 
a usufructuary title to the land. The usufructuary interest is heritable and is 
extinguished only through, abandonment, forfeiture or with the consent and 
concurrence of the interest holder219. The usufructuary cannot be deprived of 
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any of the rights constituting the interest. Not even the chief can lay adverse 
claim (Ubink , 2008:4).220 
No one is also able to explain the basis for the determination of the quantum of land 
given back to the customary freeholder whose land is taken and parcelled into building 
plots. At New Abirem the generally acceptable practice was that the customary 
freeholder gets a 25% share of building plots that are parcelled from the converted 
land. For instance, if the farm land being converted produces 12 plots after the TCPD 
prepares a standard layout from it then 3 plots are given to the customary freeholder, 
which he independently decides what to do with it. If he chooses to build on it has to 
meet the planning standards set for the zone. Otherwise the person was free to sell out 
the plots given as compensation and move out to a different location to lease land for 
building and farming221. 
Although some people talk about the existence of a PAC, which is usually constituted 
by the chief and operates under his direction and authority, others have explained that 
plot allocations are actually made alone by the Adontenhene of the town222. There are 
divergent views on the existence and awareness of any group of people working as the 
PAC223. It was in fact  difficult to identify the members of the PAC. Questions about who 
does land allocations in the town were often made in reference to the Adontehene of 
the town. He appears to be the one everyone knows does allocations of land together 
with some staff of the TCPD224. The Krontihene of the town claims that the PAC 
provides periodic reports and accounts to the chiefs who sometimes may authorise it to 
be presented to the community during special community durbars225. However, since 
there were no available records of such public disclosures it tends to give credence to 
the view that only the traditional authorities manage and have access to the resources 
and revenue from the community’s stool land.  
Provision of Public Goods  
At the district level people depend a lot on land for their sustenance through 
subsistence farming. As a result people are more particular in how stool land is utilised 
as a resource for community development.  Local people expect to derive collective 
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benefits from the way these resources are controlled by traditional leaders. How this is 
done affects people’s perception of how good or bad a leader may be. 
One of the ways of ensuring that the community is made aware of how collective 
resources are managed may be to set up an institutional structure that sets out the 
functions and authority, especially who it is accountable to. In a community where the 
main economic resource, land, is communally owned it is imperative that the authority 
and people selected to facilitate the management of the resource act within the 
customary principles of collective ownership at all times. One way of achieving this 
might be to ensure that there is transparency in the selection of the PAC and the 
requirement for periodic public declaration of how revenue is generated and utilised. 
Local inhabitants often want to know what their leaders are doing with the community’s 
resources. This is something that appears to elude the local people at New Abirem.  
Questions about how much revenue is derived from land transactions do not often yield 
specific responses from the traditional authority. For instance, even though the chief 
and some of his elders at different times claimed that when the PAC allocates land they 
provide accounts of this before a decision of how the revenue is used is made they 
could not provide specific documentations on what items of expenditure were actually 
implemented. But according to the Krontihene of New Abirem, ‘the revenue that was 
mobilised from stool land resources was partly  used for the maintenance of the stool 
and to support development projects in the community’226. It was not possible, however 
to verify any specific items except for the construction of a community durbar grounds 
(located on the compound of the chief’s palace) which some community members 
acknowledged was the initiative of the chief. In addition the chief indicated that the 
community through its leadership often initiated the provision of projects for some of 
the needs of the community227. The allocation of land free of charge to the BNDA to 
facilitate the construction of a market for the town was given as one of the contributions 
of the traditional authority to local development228. Other examples of frequently 
undertaken projects were given as renovation of school buildings and provision of 
potable water. The community has also benefitted from the support of individuals and 
institutions, in particular Newmont and the District Assembly. These have supported, 
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through various collaborations, new school buildings, and a computer training centre 
for the community (see chapter 7 and 8). 
The traditional chiefs in the communities affected by mining activities do receive some 
periodic cash sums of money from Newmont. This is to help support the chiefs in the 
company’s area of operations to meet contingency expenses. However, the New 
Abirem chief set aside part of this as funds for development, although  it was  meant for 
his private use.229. The chief’s declaration of direct cash rewards from Newmont to the 
community has been perceived by some people as the qualities of good leadership, 
even though they appear not to be very satisfied with the lack of openness in the way 
stool revenue, generally is used230. People seem to accept the way the local chief goes 
about stool land transactions; how authority is exercised over land use changes, land 
allocation and the composition of the PAC set up to facilitate stool land management. 
These have not been openly challenged and it remains as an established practice in 
the community. 
The above continue to be the status quo especially with urbanised land use. However, 
land acquisitions by Newmont seem to have triggered concerns about the effects on 
peoples’ land rights, which were likely to be lost and so have led to agitations for the 
expected compensation payments to be made directly to the individual usufructuary 
holders. This constitutes a departure from what used to be the case when compulsory 
acquisitions were made with regards to stool lands (see Chapter 7). 
Case 2: Adausena 
Land is allocated by the chief. For farming purposes it is by the individual land 
owners but with the knowledge of the chief farmer, but for building plots the Plot 
Allocation Committee do this under the direction of the chief’231. 
Traditional authorities in Adausena are directly responsible for the allocation of land for 
all non–farm uses. The Gyasehene who has been acting as the substantive chief232 
made the claim that this is because chiefs are custodians of stool land. They have the 
authority to take decisions that will ensure that land is available as building plots for 
development. The subjects of the stool have a usufructuary right only, which can be 
used perpetually for farming. As a result when the land over which a usufructuary right 
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is exercised is required for a non-farming use, ownership to it reverts to the chief. This, 
the Gyasehene claimed is because the land becomes communal land once more and 
is not limited to the exclusive use of that subject only. For this reason the chief 
becomes the legitimate authority, in his position as custodian, to allocate land and or  
to endorse it for registration purposes233. This has been the argument often made by 
some chiefs but it does not appear to be disputed by the local people, especially in an 
area like  Adausena, which is yet to experience intense increases in land values as 
exists in Accra and Kumasi. It is when values in land begun to appreciate in value that 
this claim by chiefs becomes questionable, but often only by those who are willing to 
litigate in the court of law and are prepared to live with the stigma of being labelled by 
their local compatriots as litigants. 
In Adausena building plots are also allocated by the chief through his authorised 
agency the local PAC. Here the PAC is also made up of selected representatives of the 
traditional authority and members of the UC who have been put together by the 
chief234.  Because of the involvement of the UC in the PAC, some local inhabitants view 
the PAC as a sub unit of the UC235. There is therefore some ambiguity when people 
talk about the ‘committee’ in the town. This is usually in reference to either the UC or 
the PAC. To the ordinary local inhabitant the two committees were  the same.  
The core function of the PAC is mainly for the allocation of building plots. Similar to 
New Abirem, decisions with regards to the conversion of land into parcels for building 
are made by the chief and the PAC. This is followed up by the PAC liaising with the 
TCPD to prepare a planning scheme for the area236. They collaborate with and assist 
the TCPD to identify, survey and parcel out the lands for allocation. Land values in this 
community ranged from Gh¢35 to Gh¢150 per plot237 from 2007 to 2008, but rose up to 
about Gh¢ 500 per plot by the middle of 2010. This rapid increase in land values was 
attributed to the expansion of Newmont project activities in the district, which had 
attracted a potential labour force to the area. It was also because they had commenced 
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the process for negotiations of compensation payments for lands that might be affected 
by mining activities238. 
In Adausena (as was the case in the other communities) there is the locally made 
arrangement  that whenever farm lands are converted to allow for urbanised uses, an 
indigene whose land is affected is fully compensated for loss of land and property. The 
existing arrangement is that 1/3 of the number of plots created from the land, after it 
has been surveyed and parcelled into plots, is given to the customary freeholder as a 
form of compensation. The rest are then leased out by the chief, who charges and 
collects drink money and allocation fees. An allocation note is usually given to the 
allottee239 to signify that the transaction is completed. The note often contains a clause 
to the developer to start construction within a year or else the chief has the right to re-
enter the land and take possession of the plot for reallocation. The notion is to prevent 
speculators from keeping undeveloped land for future resale to reap income that arises 
from increasing land values. All these transactions are expected to be documented by 
the PAC and reported to the chief and the community240.  
How the allocations fees and drink money are managed has always been debatable. 
According to the PAC when land is allocated the revenue that this creates is 
documented and periodically accounted for to the chief and his elders. A detailed 
account is presented to the whole community at the end of every 4 years when the 
term of office of the committee expires241. The PAC usually keeps the fees collected, 
but this is after it has been presented to the chief and he has taken a certain 
percentage for the maintenance of the stool242. What is left is kept in a community fund 
lodged at a community bank. The PAC has a treasurer who manages the account on 
behalf of the community243. 
Another direct source of revenue to the local chief is derived through companies that 
have been granted Timber Concessions. The Gyasehene indicated that the local chief 
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does not have a right to grant concessions. He showed knowledge of this by making 
reference to Ghana’s statutory laws which give that power to the Forestry Commission. 
However, a person given a concession licence is obliged to appear before the local 
chief to present it to the traditional authority the right given to commence business. And 
during this procedure, customary drink money is offered to the chief. How the 
community benefits from such concession holders is that the chief would normally 
request the investor to support the development of some projects in the community. 
This is because the operation of the business is expected to have some impact on the 
local people. While some of them make some periodic payments of money to the chief 
to support or meet the cost of ongoing projects, other license holders may opt to 
undertake the projects  by themselves. By this gesture some developments projects 
have been supported by timber concessioners, e.g. construction of public toilet 
facilities. According to the Gyasehene the investors sometimes consider this as part of 
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  
Provision of Public Goods  
Development of communities in the BND is the responsibility of the local authority. 
However, data collected suggests that communities in the district, especially those 
impacted by mining, have received support in the provision of public goods from 
Newmont (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8). Some individual and 
institutions, apart from Newmont, have also been able to provide resources or 
undertaken specific projects in the Adausena (see below). This seems to suggest that 
although the community’s stool land generates revenue the inhabitants had to rely on 
the support from external bodies to be able to provide public goods and services. It was 
therefore of interest to find out what happened to revenues that were directly received 
by traditional authorities through land transactions and the stool land accounts 
operated by the OASL. 
To help explore how public goods are provided I first asked for what are considered 
public goods to the community. The responses I collated generated a list of what might 
constitute public goods. This list includes potable water, improved educational, health 
and sanitation facilities. The chief of the town, who resides abroad, claims to have 
provided some public toilet facilities from his own personal resources. He had also 
received financial support from international networks that included a Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) in the Netherlands and Big STEP a local NGO for 
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the development of school facilities in the town244. Hometown Associations245 in Accra, 
Kumasi and abroad have made monetary contributions to support some development 
projects and annual festivals.  Assistance from Newmont and a local benefactor helped 
in the establishment of an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) centre for 
the community (36 computers donated by the benevolent person and building and 
furniture by Newmont). Furthermore, Newmont had also supported the community in 
the provision of potable water (4 boreholes), the rehabilitation of a school and 
construction of an information centre, to liaise between the Company and the 
community.  
In addition to the above the BNDA and the MP for the constituency have all contributed 
in various ways towards school development projects in the area. The  BNDA provided 
a 6 unit class room block, office and toilet for the community, while the MP  also 
contributed to some projects by providing Gh¢10 million, 16 packets of roofing sheets 
and 300 bags of cement246. The chief elaborating on why the community had to seek 
support from elsewhere for local projects: 
Community revenue mobilization was very low and so we have to rely on 
investors and funds that come from the state. But the delivery of funds from the 
state is saddled with bureaucratic and corrupt officials247. 
No project was labelled as having been provided with resources from stool land 
transactions. This raises the question on what happens to revenue derived from these 
collective resources which are either directly or indirectly received by traditional 
authorities. Although as Table 4 shows very little is officially received from the OASL as 
stool revenue.  
Case 3: Ntronang 
Even I as a queen mother do not know what happens to moneys that are 
generated from our own resource. ...Everywhere in the town it is clear that 
people are not happy and do not trust the chief on how he handles revenue 
from community resources248. 
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The above sums up the thoughts and feelings of some people at Ntronang about the 
way traditional authority is exercised over collective resources. The control and 
management of stool land resources at Ntronang adds a different dimension to what 
happens in the other selected communities of the District. There is a legitimately 
installed chief who has the authority to control and manage the community’s collective 
resources. However, as I will show, how this is done appears not to be popularly 
supported by the local inhabitants. 
In an interview with the traditional authorities at Ntronang, they explained that there are 
four main sources of revenue and financial support to undertake development projects 
in the community. These are royalty payments and revenue from the stools resources, 
community levy, and support from government through the District Assembly and 
collaborative partnerships with local investors, e.g. Newmont249. These constitute the 
community’s main source of development projects. 
The chief of Ntronang directly controls stool land resources. Planning the use and 
mobilisation of revenue from the land and natural resources of the stool is one of the 
responsibilities expected from the traditional authority250. Chiefs may perform this duty 
through intermediaries which may include elders of the traditional council and 
representatives of the people.  Although the traditional authority claims to have control 
over all the lands and the recognised authority to allocate land for non farming uses, 
information from other interview sources contradicted this.  Some community members 
have refused to accept this claim and challenged the authority of the chief to undertake 
the conversion of land held under customary freehold without consultations with the 
usufructs. This has often resulted in conflicts as a result of which  community members 
tend to engage in direct land transactions without regard to the chief’s endorsement to 
validate the transactions and adherence to official land use schemes for the area251.  
Responses to the question on who controls and manages land in the community 
yielded divergent views. As in the case of New Abirem and Adausena, opinions differ 
over the way land transactions for urbanised uses are conducted. Different categories 
of people interviewed at the community provided different insights into how this is done. 
On the one hand, the traditional authority presents the view that the chief is the 
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custodian of stool lands in the area and every subject has the right to use land only as 
a usufructuary, in accordance with the customary practice of the people252. As in all 
stool land communities in the district, this is explained to mean that the decision to 
convert from farm land to building plots is the prerogative of the traditional authority. 
The chief does not take decisions on land use independently but does so with his PAC, 
which is constituted by people who have been carefully selected by the chief to 
facilitate the management and allocation of the stools land. 253 The queen mother of the 
community pointed out that the PAC operate under the directives of the chief and so 
are not accountable to the community with regards to management of the stool’s lands 
and other resources . 
Contrary to the above, the views expressed by other community members (especially 
the youth) suggest that there is no such recognised body referred to as a PAC. This 
group argue that land allocations are done by the chief with the assistance of a few of 
his cronies to support him and they take directives from him. The Assemblyman of the 
town, in an attempt to clarify the apparent conflicting situation about the existence of a 
land management body elaborated that prior to the reign of the current chief there was 
a PAC but it was dissolved following the installation of the chief. Attempts to revive the 
PAC failed as the idea did not receive the needed attention by the traditional 
authorities. The chief prefers to deal directly with land transactions with assistance from 
people who have some personal close ties with him  to help him to do as he wanted.   
The above suggests that the chief does not appear to be in actual control of all the 
stool lands. It would seem that some natives (with customary freehold in land) are 
actively allocating land without informing the chief254. These natives grant leases to 
prospective developers without recourse to the chief. This enabled them to receive and 
hold onto direct cash payment [drink money] for the land. Those who engage in this 
made the argument that their customary right in the land cannot be wished away by 
anyone, including the chief255. These transactions are not only limited to building plots 
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 Interview with selected traditional elders of Ntronang on 25/08/2010. During the interview the 
elders could not provide the names of the members of the PAC, but two of them said they were 
members. 
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 During the interview the elders could not provide the names of the members of the PAC, except to 
say that they are part of it and it exists. 
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 Interview with the youth leader on 31/08/2010, Assemblyman on 02/10/2010 and traditional elders 
on 25/08/2010 
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 Since this is established by customary law and administered in the law courts. 
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but also affects land given out to people to invest in galamsey in the area.256 Revenues 
that accrue from these allocations go directly into the pockets of individuals. 
Community members expressed dissatisfaction with the way revenues of the stool are 
managed. For instance, it was alleged by some community members that fees paid by 
a mobile company MTN for space to erect a communication mast were not accounted 
for257. Furthermore, the people also complained of failure by the chief to declare to the 
public periodic payments which had been received from Newmont258.  Statements such 
as ‘we hear and see improvements in their lifestyles when these monies are paid to 
them’ were very common in the community259.  This was in reference to the purchase 
of a new cross country vehicle by the chief after the community had information that 
Newmont had paid some monies to the chiefs. The community had expected that the 
chief would declare this and use (some) it to support development projects in the 
community260. 
Provision of Public Goods 
The people living in the community are aware that the traditional authority is in receipt 
of revenue from managing collective stool land resources. However, there was no 
official record of projects provided with this for the community. The list of community 
needs included; school facilities, market and a lorry station. All these have been 
provided with financial support from the District Assembly and institutions such as 
                                                          
256
 Interview with informant (N1) 20/05/2010; NYL  on 31/08/2010 ,Assemblyman on 02/10/2010 and 
queen mother on 02/10/2010 
257
 Ibid 
258
 According to the CDM of Newmont this was supposed to be money to be used by the traditional 
authority. Other chiefs often declared and shared this with their community. This was used as a basis of 
distinction between two chiefs. The sharing gesture by the New Abirem chief was commended by his 
people and viewed as a good chief, while the contrary was said about the chief of Ntronang who it was 
alleged had received two payment instalments and kept both to himself.  No share went to his elders 
and the queen mother until they confronted him. One of the payments was estimated be Gh¢12, 000 
out of which the chief offered about Gh¢2, 000 to the community. This was after the queen mother and 
Elders had demanded a share be made to them. According to the Assemblyman the people of Ntronang 
took this matter up to the paramount chief when a second amount of about Gh¢22, 000 received by the 
chief was alleged to have been used for his personal improvements. He bought a new vehicle without 
giving anything to the community. Subsequently, the queen mother from of the traditional area 
declared that all future direct cash payment made by Newmont to traditional authority at Ntronang was 
to be shared in three parts one each to the chief, community and elders of the traditional council. 
259
 Interview with NYL on 31/08/2010, Key informants N1 and N2. 
260
 It appears this monies paid by Newmont were for the personal use of the chief, but the community 
expected the chief to make it public. Some community members claimed the company was by this 
gesture influencing the chiefs so that they are not able to resist the investment in mining. This was 
refuted by the CDM of the Company( Interview on 17/09/2010) 
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Newmont and NGOs261. For instance, there was ongoing support to redevelop the 
Roman Catholic school. This was supported under a tripartite arrangement with the 
District Assembly and Newmont262. An NGO is providing a new school block and the 
MP is also sponsoring the construction of 6 unit classroom block for the Presbyterian 
school. The District Assembly was in the process of renovating the market in the area 
to improve on facilities. Without these forms of support the community might  not be 
able to provide the public goods identified. It may be argued that local government 
authorities have the responsibility for the development of communities within their 
areas of jurisdiction, but they are also  faced with inadequate resources. Development 
is therefore facilitated if communities are able to raise finances, which might then  be 
supplemented by the DAs . In addition to this the arrival of Newmont seems to have 
improved the provision of public goods in the mining affected communities.   
Although the traditional authorities have not been able to use revenues for the 
provision of public goods as expected they do provide leadership in mobilising the local 
community as a result of the respect for tradition and custom. It was observed that in 
spite of all the difficulties and the seeming lack of trust in the chief, the authority of  
chieftaincy institution to control stool land resources was not in dispute (see Table 6 
and Table 7). However, the problem seems to be with the performance of the individual 
chief of the respective community. In particular  how the chief exercised  authority over 
stool land  resources and  revenue. 
Case 4: Praso Kuma 
The PAC allocates and keeps record of transactions and revenues that accrue 
on land... We have used this to support the construction of clinic, electrification 
project and school building.263 
Praso Kuma does not have ongoing mining activities (as explained in chapter 4). Thus 
land transactions for the development of building constitute one of the main sources of 
stool land revenue in Praso Kuma. There lack of mining and timber activities over the 
community’s stool land area  had affected the potential for the area to generate 
revenue to be managed by the OASL. There was therefore no record of stool land 
accounts (as shown on Table 4)264. This therefore suggests that no royalty payments 
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 Interview with Assemblyman on 02/10/2010 and queen mother on 02/10/2010 
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 Details of this in Chapter 8 
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 Secretary to the PAC ( Interview on 24/09/2010) 
264
 Interview with the Regional and District level officers on 14/01/2010 and 11/08/2010 respectively 
confirmed this. 
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are made to the Praso Kuma stool. Land transactions to meet emerging demand for 
building and cash crop farming remain the only sources of revenue and opportunities to 
realise benefits from stool land. However, these constitute direct forms of stool land 
received by the chief ( examined in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). 
How the chief mobilises and uses the direct sources of stool land revenue has 
implications for the development of the town. The PAC now collects and controls 
revenue from the stool’s resources. As in the other communities the PAC is made up of 
representatives of the traditional authority and the UC. There are 6 members in all with 
half of them being members of the town’s UC. They are empowered by the chief to 
allocate and receive fees (including drink money) for the allocation of building plots. 
What was different though about the PAC in this town was that it collects and manages 
the use of all land revenue (see below). The PAC is also, expected to make public 
information about their activities to the community, usually during annual festivals265. As 
a result of this there were no problems and conflicts over the way the chief exercises 
authority over land use changes and transactions. It might also be that because the 
community is rural with no significant demand and need for rapid land use changes as 
occurs in New Abirem and Ntronang. There is still evidence of an abundance of fertile 
agricultural land, which perhaps might help in explaining why decisions to convert farm 
lands that are in proximity to the emerging urbanised area are not strongly opposed.  
This is because those local inhabitants affected by any land conversion decision and 
given compensation for their land and are able to find alternative farm lands. 
The PAC was empowered to do all allocations on behalf of the chief. Usually for 
residential and commercial use building plots the chief is not directly involved in the 
transaction. This is done by the PAC, who record and inform the chief of the 
transaction. However, for land transactions required for large scale commercial use the 
chief does the allocation together with the PAC266. This includes the allocation of prime 
land along the only main road through the town centre. Although because of its rural 
setting, compared to the other three case study communities, the value of building plots 
is relatively much lower. As of 2010 a plot of building land, which was measured in 
relation to the size of the chiefs place  attracted a price that ranged from Gh¢200 to 
Gh¢1, 200 depending on the location in the community and whether the purchaser was 
a native or non-native. This constitutes stool land revenue that records should have 
                                                          
265
 Interview with the Chief on 28/09/2010 ,Secretary to the PAC on  24/09/2010 and the Unit 
Committee Chairman on 23/09/2010 
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 Interview with (secretary to the PAC) on 24/09/2010 
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been made available to the OASL, but as explained above this is claimed as drink 
money.  A native usually pays less for a similar size of building plot than a non-native. It 
was explained that the difference was because the native was bound to be involved in 
the performance of community services which is not the same with a non-native267.  
An interesting finding that was made in Praso Kuma was that plot sizes were  not 
professionally surveyed and marked. The PAC uses the external dimension of the 
chief’s palace as a local standard for measuring plot sizes. There is no planning 
scheme for the community because it is expensive to hire the services of a professional 
surveyor, which will increase the cost of the transaction and affect the returns from the 
sale of the land. It is to minimise this cost while ensuring that some level of standard is 
maintained that the chief has allowed the PAC to use the area covered by the palace 
as the unit for measuring plot sizes268.In all land allocations  the PAC keeps a record of  
the nature of the transaction and revenue in their registry269.  
Provision of Public Goods 
Apart from revenue set aside for maintaining the stool (a very common claim made by 
chiefs), the rest is put into a community treasury to be used for development. According 
to the Chairman of the UC because the community depends largely on its own revenue 
it took it over 10 years to be able to complete a health facility in the town270. Generally 
revenue generation capacity is very low from the community since there is no large 
scale commercial exploitation of natural resources in the area. As a way of boosting the 
level of revenue generation capacity in the community from local resources in the area, 
the chief and the people established a community oil palm farm in 1992. This is 
supported through communal labour. The community makes use of proceeds from the 
community farm to undertake its projects. This constituted a significant source of 
revenue that was used to start the construction of the health post for the community. 
The analyses above generally suggests that local community members did not trust 
,and in some cases strongly opposed the way chiefs managed stool land and the 
revenue it produces. The prevalence of these issues in the communities seemed to 
have affected popular views about chiefly responsibility over stool land.   
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 Interview with the Chief of Praso Kuma on 28/09/2010 and the PAC on 24/09/2010 
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 Field note (September, 2010).  However, neither the Secretary to the PAC who made me aware of 
this record keeping nor the chief provided evidence to support the claim. 
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 The community health post (clinic was officially opened in September, 2010). 
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6.4 Popular perceptions of traditional authority and land 
The extent to which chiefs exercise control over land transactions and decisions about 
land uses have implications for the perception of their subordinate citizens. Under 
customary law chiefs have rights and responsibilities over stool land which is 
recognised by all community members. However, these seem to be changing as the 
examination of people’s views from the survey data will show. 
A popular survey of 301 respondents was conducted to find out about the perception of 
local inhabitants on issues regarding access to and management of stool land and the 
extent to which these affect the security of interests in land. The analyses of the data 
were conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).  
First, I analysed which authority  had the responsibility to manage and control access 
to land and natural resources. The responsible authority refers to the legal right to deal 
with land and natural resources. The result of the analysis is presented in Table 5. The 
Table shows that 44% of the total number of respondents acknowledged that both 
chiefs and the government271 were responsible for the management of stool land and 
natural resources. This is because of the awareness that apart from stool land under 
the management of chiefs the state own lands in the local communities, which are for 
public uses such as schools and housing for state institutions.  
In addition to the above, 39% of respondents were of the view that it was the chief only 
who had the responsibility to manage these resources. Other authorities who were 
mentioned as having the responsibility to manage land were the paramount chief (3%) 
and family heads (2%). Thus, the popular view was that the paramount chief and the 
heads of families were not expected to be solely responsible for the management of 
stool land at the local level. This is important to note as the stool members will not hold 
anyone accountable for revenue from stool land other than their own local chief. It also 
shows why chiefs and the state’s land sectors agencies are the focus of contact in 
everyday land transactions in these communities. However, a breakdown of the results 
by communities shows some difference in Praso Kuma, where 49% of respondents 
acknowledged that the chief had the authority over stool land. 
Although chiefs legitimate responsibility to manage stool land is acknowledged by local 
inhabitants as shown by the results in Table 5, how they exercise authority in practice 
is often contested, especially with regards to urban land. Awareness of the problematic 
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 The local inhabitants use the Akan word ‘aban’ which literary translates as government. In actual fact 
they are referring to the State (and its relevant agencies) 
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nature of chief’s authority over stool land led to a further investigation on whether or not 
stool members might prefer an alternative authority to manage stool land.  
Table 5: Responsibility to manage land and natural resources 
Authority Percentage (%) 
,n=301 
Chief and Government 44 
Chief Only 39 
Government 11 
Paramount Chief (Omanhene) 3 
Family Head 2 
Total 99* 
Source:  Survey data (2010) 
*1% of the respondents did not know who was actually responsible for managing land 
in the communities. 
Based on the interviews and group discussions undertaken earlier during the fieldwork 
four main institutions were identified as those that the community inhabitants might 
interact more frequently with in land transactions. Respondents were therefore asked 
which of the four institutions they would prefer to manage their land and natural 
resources. The result of this analysis is presented in Table 6. The Table shows that 
overall chiefs are the most preferred authority (42%) to manage stool land natural 
resources. However, an aggregation of the responses on the other three institutions, 
which are all agencies of the state, raises questions about how popular traditional 
chiefs are in regards to the way they exercise their authority over stool land. A case 
can be made that local inhabitants were more likely to consider an alternative institution 
other than the customary institution of chieftaincy. 
Table 6: Who would you prefer to manage land and natural resources? 
Authority Percent 
(%) 
Chief 42 
Lands Commission 38 
Town and Country Planning Department 10 
OASL 10 
Total 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
This result shows that generally community members have more preference for chiefs 
to exercise authority over stool land and natural resources compared to other 
institutions at the community level. However, analysis of the results according to 
communities shows that generally the chief of Ntronang does not enjoy as much 
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support from his people as the other three chiefs in New Abirem, Adausena and Praso 
Kuma. Although other institutions may be preferred the largest single group of local 
inhabitants in New Abirem (49%), Praso Kuma (61%) and Adausena (43%) prefer the 
chief to manage stool lands in contrasts to Ntronang where the Lands Commission  is 
rather the most preferred institutions (42%) compared to 24% by the chief. This is 
shown in Table 7. This supports the findings from analysis of interview data about 
Ntronang where there is a low level of trust in the chief with regards to the 
management of stool land (see Case 3). Again these results shows that only in Praso 
Kuma is the majority of community members in favour of the local chief, elsewhere 
there is the preference for other institutions.  
Results of the analyses give indication of some preference for traditional chiefs to 
manage stool land. It was therefore imperative to find out how secured local 
inhabitants, both indigenes and non indigenes, felt about the rights and interests they 
held in land; whether it was threatened in anyway by the actions of chiefs and under 
what circumstances land may be taken away. In Table 8 the results show that 77% of 
the respondents in all the communities perceived the chief as the one who could take 
back land from them. 
Table 7 who would you prefer to manage land and natural resources? results by 
communities 
Authority Community 
 New 
Abirem (%) 
Ntronang 
(%) 
Praso 
Kuma (%) 
Adausena 
(%) 
Chief 49 24 61 43 
Lands 
Commission 
39 42 27 38 
TCPD 12 12 3 12 
Stool Lands 
(OASL) 
- 22 9 7 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
A number of reasons were given to explain why the chief might exercise his authority to 
take back land which is being used. Of the 77% of respondents who stated that the 
chief had the authority to take back land from them 49% gave the reason as "because 
the chief has the customary authority to control and manage stool lands", while 46% 
said "because the chief has the right to take stool land when it is required for 
development (building purpose) other than farm use" and 5% indicated that ‘the chief 
has the Constitutional right to take back land’ in apparent reference to Article 36(8) of 
the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which recognises chiefs as managers of stool land in a 
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fiduciary capacity. The first two explanations provide support to the way chiefs in all the 
communities are able to decide land use changes which is affects the customary 
freehold often held by indigenes. 
Table 8: Who has the authority to take away land from you? 
Authority Percent (%), n =301 
Chief 77 
Individual land owners 7 
Government 6 
Family Head 1 
All the above 9 
Total 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
In addition to the study also investigated how indigenous inhabitants and migrants 
accessed land for the various uses and how the allocation of land was made. Analysis 
of interview data suggested that there were divergent opinions in some of the 
communities on how building plots are allocated. Except Ntronang all the other 
communities seemed to suggest the existence of a PAC, although the composition and 
how it functions remained unclear to some respondents. This provided the impetus to 
find out through the survey how people actually accessed land in the communities. 
Respondents were therefore asked which authority allocated land, as well as the 
procedure. The responses for these questions were important for two reasons. 
Firstly, this was to establish whether or not there was a land management structure for 
the allocation of building plots, and secondly the level of awareness of this structure 
amongst the local inhabitants. The results presented in Table 9 shows that 76% 
indicated there was a plot allocation committee, while 24% responded negatively to an 
awareness of any such committee in the community.  
Table 9: Is there a committee for the allocation of land (plots) in this community? 
Response Percentage (%), n=301 
Yes 76 
No 24 
Total 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
A furthermore analysis of the results show how divided opinions are about how 
members of the committee were constituted. The result of this analysis is presented in 
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Table 10, which shows that of those who responded yes to the existence of a PAC, 
39% responded that its members where elected by the inhabitants of the respective 
communities, while 33% indicated that PAC members are usually appointed by the 
chiefs. The highest level of perception about the election of PAC members might be 
due to the reason, explained earlier that they were often constituted by selected UC 
members who were perceived as democratically elected. 
Table 10: How do people get to serve on the plot allocation committee? 
Response Percentage (%) 
By popular election  39 
Appointed by chief 33 
Do not know   4 
  
Total 76* 
*24 % represent those who responded No to the existence of PAC 
Source: Survey data (2010)  
Further observations that are made from the survey data are: Firstly, the data showed 
that the largest group of respondents who indicated the absence of PAC were from 
Ntronang. This provides support to interview data (in Case 3 analysed above) about 
Ntronang which questions the existence of a formal and acceptable land allocation 
committee. Secondly, although the popular views from all the communities seem to 
suggest that traditional chiefs have an important role and responsibility over stool land 
this study could not identify a properly constituted land management structure under 
the authority of local chiefs272. However, in specific cases the results show that Praso 
Kuma, which is primarily a rural community with relatively less active land transactions 
that there is strong support for the chief’s authority over land. On the other hand, in 
Ntronang the popular view is that stool land is managed under the personal direction of 
the chief as private property, which completely defeats the customary principle of land 
tenure. 
Additionally, the analysis might also be interpreted to lend support to findings about the 
different ways in which chiefs exercise their authority over stool land in areas where 
there is growing commercialisation of land thereby encouraging land conversions, 
especially in areas where land markets are non-existent or operate at a minimal level. 
New Abirem and Ntronang are two towns where increasing urbanised activities are 
relatively taking place. This has the potential to create increased revenue from 
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collective resources. In addition to that there is also increased revenue to be derived 
from royalties for gold and timber activities. The citizens were therefore aware of these 
transactions and revenue and expect that traditional authorities are accountable in the 
way they manage community resources. On the other hand Praso Kuma is more rural, 
compared to the other case study communities, with no immediate prospects of 
deriving additional revenue from minerals and timber or land transactions. The stool 
does not presently generate sufficient revenue from royalties and ground rents. This is 
due to  lack of a viable land market as a result of the town’s rural configuration as well 
as the lack of commercial exploitation of any form of natural resources from the stool 
land. It also implies that relative to the other three communities, there is less 
expectation of the local inhabitants from their chief in regards to stool revenue 
mobilisation. With only a limited source of revenue it is difficult to conclude whether not 
he might be more transparent and accountable compared to other chiefs. It is therefore 
reasonable to understand why the majority of the community inhabitants prefer the 
chief to manage and exercise authority over land as shown in Table 7. 
6.5 Implications of how stool land is managed in study communities 
An examination of the way authority is exercised over land and the impact of mining in 
the communities’ points to a number of implications. The analyses of the land 
management practices in the four communities’ points to the following issues:  
Reinterpretations of traditional authority over stool land 
The practice whereby chiefs claim to have authority to decide when land use is to be 
changed from farm land to building plots is widespread in the BND. The general notion 
that for building plots, the allocation of land is only valid if made between the chief and 
the prospective developer has a number of implications on the security of customary 
freeholders. 
Firstly, there appears to be no customary basis for the argument that when the need 
arises for land at the fringes of the town to be converted from farm land into building 
plots, the ownership in land reverts to the chief. This constitutes reinterpretation of the 
customary law, insofar as it undermines the rights of customary holders (Ubink, 2006; 
Andreasen et al, 2011). Chiefs are expected to exercise authority over stool land only 
in their capacity as ‘trustees’. This principle is one that has been well established under 
customary law in Ghana (Woodman, 1996; Crook, 1987). Chiefs are not the absolute 
owners of stool lands under Akan concept of customary land tenure (Ollenu, 1962). 
Thus, chiefs and their families cannot be the original owners of land owned by their 
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respective communities.  However, the findings about chiefs making important 
decisions about land use changes are not isolated as similar findings from studies 
conducted in peri-urban Ghana have been made by Ubink( 2008) and Andreasen et al( 
2011). 
Secondly, the community as a whole loses its source of revenue which could be used 
for development. Since chiefs allocate land under customary principles without making 
public the drink money they collect it is difficult to hold them accountable for such 
transaction. Some of the challenges to this practice,  as the evidence from Ntronang 
pointed  out, are that people have resorted to selling lands on their won  and keeping 
the proceeds before the chief does so. In addition to that there is always the potential 
for double sale of land, since these transactions are not  coordinated in a way that 
would  ensure that plots allocated are properly recorded. 
Thirdly, where there is ambiguity over who controls and exercises authority over land it 
can lead to illegal activities taking place on land such as galamsey, which only benefit a 
few who directly allocate their lands for this mining activity273. This leads to the loss of 
revenue that could have been better mobilized for collection by the community for 
development.  
Lack of capacity to manage stool land resources 
The inability for traditional authorities to put in place acceptable land management 
structures that can manage stool land in ways that that are transparent and 
accountable contributes to the non-disclosure of stool revenue. What has been noted 
from above is that in all the communities’ there are loosely formed or as in some cases 
non-existent, structures for managing stool lands, and poor records keeping on land 
transactions. The evidence points out that at all times chiefs control land revenue. They 
are able to do this through local institutions that appear to serve only the interest of the 
chiefs.  
The use of PACs in all the communities serves as a facade in customary land 
management. The presence of the PAC seems to portray that stool land is managed in 
a participatory and accountable way. But as the analysis above has shown in practice  
these are often filled with members of the local elite and loyalists of the chief. This 
raises concerns about how transparent and accountable these local institutions might 
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be and whether or not they can facilitate local communities to generate revenue that 
can be used for  development. While in smaller towns such as Praso Kuma and 
Adausena chiefs have personalised the authority to make allocations, this was not, for 
now, a big issue. What is observed in Ntronang is as a result of the lack of openness 
and accountability by the chief.  
Effect on the level of trust for traditional authority 
A summary of responses received on who may be described as a good chief in the 
communities showed that for a chief to be described as good and effective he must be 
seen by his people to have the following characteristics274: 
1) must have respect for his elders and people; 
2) regularly hold consultation with his people and allow them to participate in the 
affairs of the community. 
3) must be seen to be transparent and accountable with the resources of the 
community. A chief was expected to show openness in the way local resources 
are managed. 
4) must have the capacity to lobby and attract investment and development to the 
area. 
5)  respect the customs of the community 
What was generally common in all the communities was that local chiefs who were 
trustworthy and transparent were respected by their people. Although some people in 
New Abirem expressed dissatisfaction with the way stool land is managed through the 
PACs, they respected the chief and were willing to support him at all times. This was 
because he had in some cases made known to the community how he had used direct 
cash payments he had received from Newmont and other institutions to support local 
development projects. Similarly, the chief of Praso Kuma is lauded by his people for 
allowing the PAC to collect and manage local resources without direct interference. But 
observations at Ntronang showed the contrary where the people, in particular the youth 
openly opposed him and refused to take part in communal labour. This under a 
respected chief would attract traditional sanctions. 
According to the queen mother of the Ntronang specific charges of mistrust have been 
levelled against the chief in regards to money paid by Newmont (as discussed under 
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Case 3). Serious allegations of mistrust against a chief could  result in destoolment and 
the queen mother plays an important role.  Where she is unhappy about a chief it can 
have significant consequences for the authority of the chief. 
Inability to meet the challenges of provision of public goods 
The way chiefs have managed revenue and in some cases taken it as personal income 
tends to affect and weaken their ability to mobilise local revenue to be used for the 
provision of developmental public goods. As a result they have had to rely on external 
support most of the  times to be able to invest in development projects. But this 
appears to be one role they have played well in their communities. 
Chiefs have facilitated and attracted other institutions to support their communities. 
They have the capacity to mobilise their people, especially if they are trusted and 
respected such as the chiefs of New Abirem , Adausena and Praso Kuma.  For 
instance, the chief of Adausena was able to attract both local and international 
organisations to support the community in the provision of public goods. This makes up 
for the failures of the traditional authority to provide some of these. No one seems to 
question how chiefs use the share of revenues they receive from the OASL account. 
Often the conflict with chiefs has been about the sale of land. The failure of chiefs to 
draw in all sources of revenue has led to a slow pace of development in these 
communities. This poses serious challenges to development in local communities. 
These conditions and practices drawn from above are not limited to this district but are 
major land issues in Ghana. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on the types of revenue and what structures have been 
established for managing stool land resources in four selected communities in the Birim 
North District. The question that was posed is how stool land and the revenue that it 
generates are managed. This served as a basis to discuss how accountable these 
structures are and who benefits in the process. The discussion centred on the role of 
traditional chiefs and their relationship with other locally established actors and 
institutions as well as the state institutions at the district level. Chiefs make various 
arguments to claim control over collective stool land resources. Analyses and 
examination of the four case study communities’ in the BND provide evidence of  the 
dynamic and fluid nature of stool land management and the implications and outcomes 
for development in the communities. 
153 
 
Traditional chiefs in Ghana have a legitimate authority, both customary and legal, to 
manage the collective stool land resources of their communities. These resources 
provide a potential source of revenue to be used for development for the beneficiary 
communities. It may also provide a means to personal wealth and political authority. 
However, the management of these resources is not only a traditional or legal matter, 
but entail the engagement of different local actors and institutions with different political 
authority and interests. Central to this are the interests and political authority of the 
traditional chiefs. How they exercise their customary authority over the management of 
stool land resources and how they engage with the other institutions affects their 
authority and opportunity to control the benefits that are derived. 
Chiefs have argued that the citizens have an unchallenged customary right to the use 
of land for farming but they do not have the authority to transfer or engage in land 
conversions for a different use. Customary freeholders are not entitled to change the 
use of the land with the intention of selling the interests in absolute terms. The chiefs 
contend that the authority to do this is within the remit of their authority under both 
customary and statute law. This is prevalent where there are urban influences 
associated with the commercialization of land and the rapid development of land 
markets. As a result the struggles to control stool land resources continue to take place 
as this is considered to be the basis of wealth and political power (Owusu, 1970). The 
right to determine land use also defines who has the right to allocate it for other uses. 
Although these claims appear to be generally acceptable and practised in the 
communities it does have implications for customary law as established and practised 
in the Ghanaian courts (Woodman, 1996). There were some indications in Ntronang 
that local inhabitants have exercised the right as customary freeholders to allocate land 
for other uses. But this appears to be peculiar to this community because of the 
personal attributes of the local chief. They found that stool land was managed as 
private property to seek personal wealth. Although it may be argued that this is also 
observed in other localities in Ghana, it is not the norm for local inhabitants to strongly 
oppose their chiefs as the situation in Ntronang might suggest (Ubink, 2008). 
Challenges to chiefs’ land management practices are seldom pursued by local 
residents.  
The chapter also examined popular views about chief’s authority over stool land and its 
implications on the local community. The conclusion that may be drawn from the 
analyses of how traditional chiefs exercise authority over stool lands is that people 
recognise that chiefs are not the only authority to manage land. Only in one community 
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did a majority give preference to the chief to manage land, and that was a community 
where there is no mining investment and low land transaction activities.   
155 
 
Chapter 7 
Land Access and Compensation Negotiations in the Birim North District 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter is the first part of the unusual system of negotiations observed in the Birim 
North District (BND). Large land acquisitions required for mining investment in the 
district opened up more challenges to  debates about  the exercise of chiefly authority 
and its implications for the members of stool land communities. Chiefs continue to 
control stool land that is required for development. However, because of the problems 
about how they exercise authority over land, which have been discussed in the 
previous chapters, a new system for negotiating compensation for land affected by 
mining lease was developed in the BND. The new system included elected 
representatives drawn from all the mining-affected communities in the District.  
This chapter presents empirical evidence from the analysis of the background and 
development of the system of negotiating compensation as a result of the release of 
stool land required for mining investment. Specifically, the compensation system 
involved traditional chiefs, locally elected representatives of groups of local inhabitants, 
officials of Newmont, public land sector agencies and the BNDA. The analysis will 
focus on the role of traditional chiefs within the negotiation process and questions its 
implications for the authority of chiefs to act as trustees of stool land.  I will precede the 
analysis by examining the legal framework for mining in Ghana. This chapter aims to 
draw out the implications of the negotiations system for the authority exercised by  
traditional chiefs in the BND.  
7.1 Land acquisition and compensation: negotiating access to land for mining 
In Ghana, all natural resources that are found on and under the land are held in trust by 
the President for and on behalf of the citizens of the country275. Permission to have 
access to land for mining investment may be legally granted through a lease by the 
state. The state has the authority to do this under the power of compulsory acquisition, 
which usually entails compensation payments for those whose land may be affected by 
the extent of the lease276. The alternative is for compensation payments to be 
negotiated under a private treaty agreement between a prospective investor and the 
land owners. In line with this latter option Newmont undertook to negotiate access to 
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land required for its mining operations in the BND  directly with the individuals whose 
lands may be affected by its project. The negotiation of compensation in the manner 
pursued by Newmont as observed in the BND is different from the usual statutory 
procedure of land acquisition within other mining communities in Ghana. 
 
It is common practice in Ghana for negotiations to be done with traditional authorities in 
respective communities where collective stool land is required for investment. This is 
so because, as noted earlier, traditional chiefs are expected to act as trustees of stool 
land. But while individuals and families have usufructuary titles in land, chiefs may 
negotiate to maximize their personal benefits without considering other interests held in 
land. As a result sometimes mining companies have been accused of taking land which 
constitutes a major source of livelihoods for local people in their areas of operation 
without compensation payments or adequate provisions for alternative means of 
sustenance. This seems to compound the already problematic nature of chiefs’ 
management of land (as discussed in chapter 6). 
 
Although the inhabitants living in the mining affected communities in the BND appeared 
willing to allow access onto their land for mining they wanted compensation to be 
negotiated directly with them (rather than through their local chiefs) for the loss of their 
property rights and assets277. This was to ensure that they did not end up being 
dispossessed of their land and property as studies in other mining communities in 
Ghana have shown (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Tsuma, 2010; Ayelazuno, 
2011).  
 
However, if Newmont were to engage in negotiations individually with the mining-
affected persons it could potentially have taken a very long time to accomplish and may 
not therefore have met the statutory requirement for prompt compensation payment278 
(this will be discussed in section 7.1.1). Delayed compensation payment also had the 
potential to raise anxiety in the communities. Thus, according to the Community 
Development Manager of the Company: 
To avert potential delays assessing individual compensations and anxiety 
Newmont decided to deal with the affected persons, mostly farmers, as a group. 
But there were many affected people, over 1000 people so the Company 
proposed the formation of a committee of representatives to negotiate  on 
behalf of all the mining affected people279.  
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However, the negotiations were expected to be conducted in a way that met the criteria 
provided by the statutory laws for compensation in Ghana280. This necessitated the 
involvement of officials of the public land sector agencies that regulate land 
administration, the local government authority of the District, other state institutions and 
political authorities at the local level. These institutions provided technical advice and 
guidance in the negotiations process (to be discussed in section 7.3). The idea for a 
collective process to negotiate compensation as  proposed by Newmont led  to the 
establishment of two committees for compensation and for the provision of public 
goods (the latter committee will be discussed in the next chapter). The proposition 
made by Newmont was accepted by the people living in the mining-affected 
communities (and their chiefs) as a process to facilitate land access and 
compensation281 to advert potential issues of dispossession of property. 
 
My aim in this chapter therefore is to analyse this unusual system of negotiations and 
its implications for the authority that chiefs exercise over stool land and their 
communities. However, this is preceded in the next section by examining the legal 
framework that regulates compensation payments for mining in Ghana.  
7.1.1 Legal provisions regulating access to land for mining 
Current laws governing mining activities in the country are the Mineral and Mining Act, 
2006 (Act 703) and the 1992 Constitution. Under Act 703 before the holder of the 
mineral right undertakes any activity or operation they must obtain the necessary 
approval and permits required from the Forestry Commission and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for the protection of natural resources, public health and the 
environment. The EPA Act, 1994 (Act 490) empowers the EPA to ensure compliance 
with the environment assessment regulations and to prescribe standards and 
guidelines relating to the pollution of air, water, land and other forms of environmental 
pollution. The Environmental Assessment Regulation, 1999 (LI 1652) lists, among 
others, mining extraction and processing as activities that require a mandatory  
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).Thus, before mining activities take place, the 
holder of a mineral right (the mining company) must carry out an EIA and submit a 
report to EPA for approval. These measures are intended to mitigate the adverse 
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20/05/2010 
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effects of mining on the environment, sources of livelihood and the people within the 
operational area of mining activities. The Act also provides that mineral rights are 
owned by the state. Section (1) of the Mineral and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703)282 states; 
Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon land in Ghana, rivers, 
streams, water-courses throughout the country, the exclusive economic zone 
and area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the 
Republic and is vested in the President in trust for the people of Ghana. 
Both the 1992 Constitution and the Act 703 give the ownership of any mineral found 
within the territorial jurisdiction of Ghana to the state. Thus, the ownership of mineral 
resources is vested in the President in trust for the citizens of the Republic of Ghana. 
The state is therefore legally the authority to grant rights to mining companies in the 
form of licensed concessions and leases (permits). 
Furthermore, surface rights to land are both publicly and privately owned Ghana. 
These surface rights include farming rights, right to build, right to possess and 
enjoyment of economic trees both natural and artificial, right to alienate etc. These 
surface rights can be derived from allodial interests, usufructuary  or customary 
freehold interest, leasehold interest and all other forms of lesser interest such as abusa 
and abunu known under land tenure arrangements in Ghana. Significantly, the 
ownership of any of the stated interests does not include the right to minerals found on 
or beneath it except where the state is the owner or vested with such interest. The 
President can under appropriate legislation, such as Lands Commission Act, 2008 (Act 
767) compulsorily acquire any land for mineral exploitation. Land compulsorily acquired 
by the state under this power becomes state land. 
With regards to arrangements for compensation payments when land is taken the state 
recognises that although mining provides significant socio-economic benefits to the 
local communities it also can lead to significant negative impacts on the local 
communities. It has been noted that mining activities can lead to the relocation and in 
some cases resettlement of local communities and the destruction of farms and 
property. Thus local inhabitants, often farmers, may be forced out of their homes and 
sources of livelihood. In accordance with provisions contained in the 1992 Constitution, 
compensation for expropriated land must be “prompt, fair and adequate”.283 These 
provisions are also expected to be met under Act 703, which specifically instructs that 
where any land is compulsory acquired for mining purpose, the owner or lawful 
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occupier must be compensated by the holder of the mineral right. Section 73 (1) of Act 
703 states that: 
The owner or lawful occupier of any land subject to a mineral right is entitled to 
and may claim from the holder of the mineral right compensation for the 
disturbance of the rights of the owner or occupier, in accordance with section 
74. 
The principles of compensation for mining affected properties are set out under section 
74 (1). The Act provides that compensation to which an owner or lawful occupier may 
be entitled to include: 
(a) deprivation of the use or a particular use of the natural surface of the land or part of 
the land,  
(b) loss of or damage to immovable properties, 
(c) in the case of land under cultivation, loss of earnings or sustenance suffered by the 
owner or lawful occupier, having due regard to the nature of their interest in the land 
and  
(d) loss of expected income, depending on the nature of crops on the land and their life 
expectancy”. 
The law has also made provision that the amount of compensation payable under the 
Act 703 shall be determined by agreement between the parties, which is the holder of 
mineral right and the affected owners. Because of the customary position of chiefs' with 
regards to stool land negotiations for land compensation  are usually between chiefs, 
who are expected to act in their legal capacity as custodians, and mining companies in 
Ghana. However, what seemed to be the  norm was not the case observed in the BND. 
7.2 Framework for compensation negotiations in the Birim North District 
Negotiations for access to land and property for compensation in the Birim North 
District can be traced back to the year 2002 when Newmont started undertaking 
mineral exploration activities in the district. Newmont’s mining project at Akyem has 
been designed as a surface mine and involves excavation of open pits. The life span of 
the mine was expected to be 15 years. A Mining Lease was granted by the 
Government of Ghana in January 2010284. It was estimated that the mine project would 
require the acquisition of about 1,907 hectares of land used by farmers in the area for 
cultivation of food and cash crops or is covered by forests with valuable timber species. 
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The development of the Project would also result in the physical displacement of about 
1,331 persons living in communities and settlements within the Mining Area in the 
district285. The mining affected people were  required to be resettled and compensated 
in accordance with Ghana’s current legislative requirements and in conformity with best 
practices set by the International Finance Corporation (IFC)286 and World Bank 
operational policies for land acquisition287. The mine project affected four (4) main stool 
land areas hosting about eight (8) communities and a number of hamlets and 
farmsteads. The affected communities comprise; Adausena, Hweakwae, Mamanso, 
Afosu, Abirem (Old and New), Ntronang and Yayaaso, and some 5 hamlets and 
farmsteads. Land and property in these designated areas which are affected by the 
mine operations are expected to be compensated, as discussed above. Newmont was 
committed and determined to pay compensation in accordance with this through 
negotiations by private treaty with the project affected communities, taking into account 
the relevant national statutory requirements and the social safe guard policies of the 
IFC and World Bank. 
 
Compensation payments for crops destroyed through prospecting and exploration of 
mineral activities had been ongoing in the BND  before the arrival of Newmont288. But 
this was usually on a small scale compared to the acquisition after  Newmont was 
granted mining lease. There was therefore no formal forum for negotiating 
compensation payments until 2002, when a committee was first established to 
negotiate compensation rates. This was officially inaugurated in 2002 by the Regional 
Minister of the Eastern Region of Ghana289. At the time it was called the Crop Rates 
Review Committee (CRRC) because only crops that had been affected by the 
Company’s mining exploration were entitled to compensation. However, this was 
subsequently changed to the Compensations Negotiations Committee (CNC) in 2008 
in anticipation of the  mining lease granted by the State290. The change of name also 
reflected the new scope of the Committee’s work. The granting of the mining lease 
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gave Newmont the legal interest in the land for a 15 year period291. By this the 
Company was obliged to assess and pay compensation for all the items stipulated in 
the Mining law (Act 703). The fulfilment of this statutory requirement gave the Company 
the right to enter and clear the land area, which was being used as farmlands and 
dwelling places for the local community. 
 
The CNC was a new concept to be developed and so its establishment in 2008 was 
preceded by a lot of consultations with the communities (see section 6.2.1). 
Consultations were held between Newmont and a broad category of people in the local 
communities which included traditional chiefs, farmers, youth and women’s groups. 
This was first started as a process to create awareness among the local community on 
the implications and potentials of the mining operations in the district and to help 
develop the framework for the new system of negotiations292. The consultations led to 
the establishment of working groups based on specific themes of compensation 
derived from Act 703. The working groups were constituted by representatives from the 
mining-affected communities and included traditional authorities, public land sector 
agencies and district level officials of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) of 
the state. The Terms of Reference (ToR) and objectives of the working groups were 
that they were to explore and collect information about local knowledge and practices 
that would serve as the framework for the negotiation293. This was done to facilitate the 
work of the CNC and to speed up the period of land and asset negotiations. 
7.2.1 Developing the negotiations framework: the Working Groups 
The establishment of the working groups was based on mutual agreement. This was in 
recognition of the fact that the communities and Newmont were to foster common 
understanding and knowledge of a number of issues concerning the provisions in 
section 74 of Act 703 and generally about compensation for land in Ghana. It was also 
to help manage community expectations about the mining investment in the District. 
Accordingly four groups were established and given a ToR to perform specific tasks. 
The Working Groups adopted participatory and consultative approaches to collect 
information that was considered relevant to the establishment of the Compensation 
Negotiations Committee (CNC). The participation of the communities was considered 
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paramount in the process. With the help of consultants hired by Newmont to assist the 
community representatives, data was collected through the use of interview guides and 
focus group discussions in the communities. Each group held a series of meetings over 
a period of four weeks before delivering its report. The groups were for land, 
immovable property, crops and speculative activities. 
 
First, a Land Working Group (LWG) was constituted to solicit and collate information on 
local land practices and expectations. This was to facilitate the negotiations for 
entitlements for deprivation of the right to use the natural surface of the land by land 
owners and users. This information was used during the negotiations after the CNC 
was formed (this will be discussed in section 7.3). The specific issues the LWG were 
asked to report on included294: 
(1) to solicit and collate community views on the various uses of land and the 
changes that have occurred over the years, 
(2)  to determine who may be eligible to receive land compensation and the 
different rights in land that have evolved in the local community,  and 
(3)  to solicit community views and propose to the CNC what the community 
perceives as fair, adequate and reasonable compensation for the different 
interests in land.  
Representatives from the communities were selected at public gatherings in each 
mining-affected community. Two representatives who had served  previously on the 
CRRC were elected to be on the LWG. Each of the four main stools in these 
communities was represented by one traditional authority. Newmont was represented 
by one of its own staff and a specialist consultant on land issues295, and one official 
each from the Lands Commission296, Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ) and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)297. 
Second, an Immovable Property Compensation Working Group (IPC) was formed and 
tasked to solicit the views of the local community on what their expectations were in 
regards to the compensation for their loss of property and resettlement expectations of 
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those who would be moved from the mine area. Specifically, the IPC working group 
was to 298:  
(1) collect data on local housing types and facilities and propose to the CNC what may 
be acceptable by the community,  
(2) make recommendations on who can represent the community at the CNC and how 
they were to be selected and  
(3) propose criteria on how to determine who was eligible for compensation of lost 
property in the local communities.  
 
The IPC was formed by five local representatives who had experience of negotiations 
having served on the CRRC; two people represented Newmont299, one representative 
each from the TCPD, LVD300, CHRAJ and NCCE. 
 
Third, a Crops Working Group (CWG) was constituted to collect and collate local 
information for the negotiations for crops301. This was to provide knowledge on local 
crops and farming practices to help in the assessment and determination of acceptable 
compensation rates for crops. This required knowledge of both local and standard 
agricultural practices in the District.  
 
The CWG comprised five local representatives who had been involved with 
negotiations under the CRRC. Newmont was represented by two officials with expert 
knowledge in agricultural practices. There were one official each from the District 
Agriculture Department, the LVD and CHRAJ. 
 
The fourth working group was on “speculative activities”. This group was mainly tasked 
to make proposals on how to tackle challenges of people who were interested in 
undertaking farming or the construction of buildings in the area in anticipation of 
claiming higher rates of compensation. It had been observed that both local members 
of the communities and other people from outside were encroaching on the designated 
mining lease area; developing farms and putting up buildings and other structures. This 
was done in anticipation that when the Company’s application for a mining lease was 
eventually granted they would be able to attract higher compensation claims for the 
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property which they had on the land. This was described as speculative activities by 
Newmont.  
 
Speculative activities take place in other mining communities in Ghana and were being 
introduced in the BND at the time. However, Newmont, without mining lease could not 
have prevented this from happening. The types of farms and buildings that were 
established were not the usual practice of farming or building houses in the area. It was 
only done for the purpose of attracting compensation because experiences from other 
mining communities showed that compensation paid for these facilities in a mining 
lease area were often higher than the actual cost of the property.  Although Newmont 
had no legal basis to prevent this from happening, there were some of the community 
members who disapproved of this practice. There was therefore a mutual agreement 
that measures be taken to curtail these ‘speculative activities’. This desire for the local 
community to stop this was because they did not want Newmont to be deterred from 
pursuing its investment in the district. The speculative activities could add extra cost to 
the Company’s cost for compensation and also could potentially affect the negotiations 
process302.  
 
The speculative activities working group was made up of a selected group of people 
drawn from the other three. The group only worked after the other three groups above 
had completed and submitted their reports and recommendations. 
 
The findings and recommendations by all the working groups led to a realisation that 
there was a need to develop the capacity of the local inhabitants to be able to 
effectively engage Newmont in the compensations negotiations. Proposals on this were 
accepted by Newmont because throughout these preparatory process officials of the 
Company and the state became aware that the representatives of the local 
communities and the traditional authorities lacked knowledge and capacity to engage in 
negotiations with Newmont. As a result of the recommendations a series of workshops 
and seminars were planned ahead of the start of the actual negotiations. 
Recommendations were also made for visits to other mining communities to interact 
and learn from the experiences of the local communities about the benefits and 
impacts of mining on their livelihoods.   
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7.2.2 Building the capacity of local inhabitants to negotiate compensation  
A number of activities were held at different stages before and after the CNC was 
established for the negotiations. These included: 
(1) Annual workshops on the Minerals and Mining Law and local farming practices. 
These were to help new members elected to understand (as much as possible) 
the legal provisions affecting compensations and of their obligations  under the 
law, 
(2) Workshops to educate members on the principles and assessment of 
compensation and issues of property valuation relating to the various items 
outlined in Act 703.  Both workshops under (1) and (2) were facilitated by a 
legal expert on mining law and a team of professional property Valuers 
respectively303 .  
(3) In 2007 similar thematic workshops on agricultural practices were organised for 
the CRRC members. This was facilitated by the District head of the Department 
of Agriculture, experts from the Cocoa Research Institute and the Ghana Oil 
Palm Development Company. The workshops helped to clarify and 
standardised farming practices for mainly cash crops grown in the area, which 
include cocoa, kola, oil palm and citrus. Knowledge from this was used as the 
basis for developing categories of crops during the negotiations (see section 
7.3.1). 
(4) In 2008 training on Mutual Gains Approach to negotiations was organized for all 
the members of the four working groups. This training was conducted by an 
expert in negotiations brought in from the United States of America (USA). This 
training had the purpose of educating the community representatives about the 
concept of negotiations. The underlying principle of the Mutual Gains Approach 
(MGA) was that in negotiations there were no winners and losers. The MGA  is 
win-win process where compromises were expected to be made by the 
negotiating parties at all times and at all stages of the process in order to arrive 
at an agreement. 
(5) In 2008, a one-day seminar on the types of interest in land recognised under 
customary and statutory law was facilitated by the OASL  in New Abirem. This 
took place during one of the monthly scheduled meetings of the CNC. It 
provided an opportunity for the community representatives and traditional 
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authorities to be reminded of the state’s position and recognition of interests 
that are recorded in the area and which are by law entitled to compensation. A 
legal expert on customary law was invited to facilitate the meeting and to clarify 
issues which were raised by the representatives.304 
(6) A visit to Kumasi (Ghana’s second largest city) was organised for one of the 
sub-committees of the CNC on Immovable Property305. The aim was to help its 
members gain knowledge and insight about how bill of quantities for buildings 
are prepared and the methods of assessing the value of properties. A two-day 
workshop was facilitated by lecturers of the University306. On their return the 
participants reported to the CNC their appreciation and understanding of the 
valuation principles and how that was going to be useful.307   
In 2008 another group of CNC representatives were taken to Ahafo mines, where the 
company was already operating. The members were taken round Newmont’s 
operations, the resettlement villages, new schools constructed for the communities and 
other development projects provided by the Company.308 It must be stated that all the 
above activities were financed by Newmont.  The aim of the Company was to ensure 
that community representatives were well informed and educated about negotiating  
compensation for land and property.309.  In the next section I focus on examining the 
CNC, which is the forum for negotiations.  
7.3 The Compensations Negotiations Committee 
The CNC is a forum that serves as the arena where the mining-affected communities in 
the district and Newmont interact to determine all aspects of compensation resulting 
from its mine operations. The main function of the CNC is to deliberate on and 
negotiate on land, crops, immovable property (assets) and resettlement issues on 
behalf of the people and communities that are directly impacted by the mining 
operations. The aim was to achieve what was considered fair and adequate 
                                                          
304
 Same as for points (1) and (2) above 
305
 This will be discussed in section 6.3 
306
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST). The Community Valuer who was also 
a member of staff of the University took a lead role to get his colleague lecturers to facilitate the 
workshop.  
307
 Although considering the level of education of some of the community representatives' one could 
reasonably assume that some of them could not have fully understood what exactly these principles 
meant. However, it was important to let them appreciate that the fact that the valuation for buildings 
was based on some well established principles. This at least was what Newmont expected to achieve 
(Field notes, 2010) 
308
 Minutes of CNC Meeting number 233 on 08-06-2010 
309
 Interview with CDM on 17/09/2010 
167 
 
compensation by both the mining affected communities and Newmont. It is for this 
reason that the communities and Newmont agreed for the representation of state 
institutions with responsibilities over land issues to serve on the CNC. These 
institutions mainly operated as umpires in the arena for negotiations. 
 
In the next section the structure, process of the negotiations and the specific roles of 
the various categories of community representatives, Newmont and the state 
institutions will be examined. The analysis focuses on how in the BND land and 
property in which there exist different types of interests were negotiated for mining, how 
this addressed the potential loss of property and livelihood of the local people living in a 
mining district and the implications for chiefly authority over land. 
7.3.1 Structure and composition of the CNC 
The CNC was constituted by a representative body of 50 people who were nominated 
and approved by popular acclamation to represent their respective communities310. 
Each of the communities within a stool area selected representatives through election 
or by consensus or popular acclamation. A quota system, reflecting the variations in 
the population of affected people in the communities was used to determine how many 
representatives were nominated. The population of the mining-affected people living in 
the communities was established by an enumeration survey conducted by Newmont. 
This was used to allocate quotas to the communities. The elected representatives were 
validated by the communities before they were registered as CNC members. The 
validation process involved the signing of the results of the election or acclamation by 
community members at public durbars. Newmont supported the system of selecting 
representatives by the communities for the participatory approach adopted.311  
 
The composition of community representatives that were elected to serve on the CNC 
in 2008312 is presented on Table 11. One additional representative is nominated by 
each of the four chiefs to represent the traditional authority. Those usually nominated to 
represent the chief were either sub-chiefs or elders of the traditional council of the stool 
they represented. The large number of representatives comprising 50 people makes 
                                                          
310
 A total of about 8 communities are directly affected by the mining operations. Some stool lands in 
these areas are required for the mining activities 
311
 The process of selecting community representatives was facilitated by officers of Newmont’s 
Community Relations Department at the District. 
312
 Every year of negotiations a new CNC is formed 
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the CNC an unusual form of negotiation arrangement. However, the CNC works in 
smaller groups designated as sub-committees (this will be discussed in section 7.3.3). 
 
It is important to note that the community representatives are all locally resident, but 
are not necessarily indigenes of the communities. Some of them were  farmers, 
teachers, retired and serving civil and public servants, traders and business men and 
women313 who have lived in the community and are engaged in subsistent farming with 
established permanent homes. In addition to the local communities in the BND  
representatives from the four neighbouring district in the north, east, south and west of 
the Birim North district are included in the CNC. This was because Newmont 
undertaking mineral exploration the adjoining districts of BND 314. 
 
Newmont’s negotiations team comprised a team leader, who is assisted by a group of 
selected senior and junior officers of the company315. They were supported by a group 
of expert contractors to advice on different aspects of compensation316.  
 
In addition to all the above, there were also a group of representatives from selected 
state institutions usually made up of district level officials. They were included to 
provide technical guidance and expertise and to ensure that the negotiations were 
conducted within the legal framework of the country and that the outcomes were fair, 
adequate and acceptable to the people. These institutional representatives comprised 
officials from the LVD and the PVLMD of the Lands Commission; the OASL; Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (MoFA); CHRAJ, NCCE and the Community Development and 
Social Welfare Department (CDSWD). 
 
 
 
                                                          
313
 As at 2010 the CNC comprised the fifty (50) community representatives, made up of  46 
representatives from the 8 communities  (including traditional authorities)that are physically or 
economically impacted  and 4 representatives from the adjoining Districts to Birim North where 
Newmont is undertaking further exploration activities. These Districts are Kwahu West Municipality, 
Kwahu South District, Kwaebibrim District and Asante Akyem South District. 
314
 The 4 members from these districts did not have voting rights when decisions were put to vote at the 
CNC. Effectively they were observers. 
315
 At the time of data collection in 2010 the Community Development Manager was the negotiations 
team leader for Newmont. 
316
 These are a team of consultants hired by Newmont to provide professional advice on some specific 
technical aspects of the issues relating to the land access process. 
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Table 11: Number of CNC representatives from mining-affected communities in 
the Birim North District 
Community/Hamlet  No. of Representatives Traditional 
Authority 
Total 
Representation 
Hweakwae 6 1 7 
Bernard Amoah
317
* 1  1 
Mamanso 3 1 4 
Yaw Tano 2  2 
New Abirem 5 1 6 
Old Abirem 1  1 
Adausena 6 1 7 
E K Marfo* 1  1 
Yayaaso 4 1 5 
Ayensu Ziga* 1  1 
Ntronang 3 1 4 
Afosu 5 1 6 
Ajenua* 1  1 
Adjoining Districts  4  4 
TOTALS 43 7 50 
Source: Akyem Project: Compensation Negotiations Framework (2008: 17) 
 
Another category of people on the CNC were those designated as observers. These 
were the political and administrative officials of  state institutions. They included the MP 
of the Abirem constituency, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, an official of 
the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI)318 and the District Chief Executive of the 
BND  and representatives of the four adjourning districts319. 
 
There was also Community Valuer, who together with his team provided independent 
professional and technical guidance to the community members during negotiations320. 
The reason for the community having this form of professional guidance was due to the 
fact that most of the local representatives did not have the requisite technical 
understanding and skills for property negotiation. According to officials from Newmont, 
the Company took the view that it would be unfair to negotiate with people who were 
technically disadvantaged on the issues of compensation and negotiations (as was 
                                                          
317
 Those marked [* ] represents hamlets and farmsteads within the mining-affected communities  
318
 Included probably for security reasons; to understand what goes in the CNC and its possible 
implications for agitations  in the communities, as it is common to have local disturbances in mining 
communities in Ghana 
319
 Field notes (September 2010). I noted that in all the meetings these people were always represented 
by nominated officials, who I presumed reported back on the proceedings of the negotiations. 
320
 A Team of professional Valuers from the Land Economy Department of the Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology (KNUST). 
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discussed in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2).321 As a result Newmont recommended to the 
community to seek a professional Valuer to guide them in the negotiations, but whose 
fees were paid by the Company.322. This gesture might seem to suggest that Newmont 
had some advantage in dealing with the Community Valuer. But the observations I 
made at the negotiations at both the CNC plenary and subcommittee level, showed 
that the community representatives were those who took final decisions and not the 
Valuer. However, the team of Valuers ensured that they always provided advice on 
rates for compensation from a professional point of view for consideration by the 
Community representatives (details of this will be discussed in section 7.3.2). I also 
observed that it was difficult for Newmont to object to the services being provided by 
the Valuer without the approval of the community people323. This level of power that the 
community had over the services of the Valuer was important in the negotiation 
process. It was the reason why the rates finally agreed were acceptable to the local 
people as a true representation of their efforts at negotiating what was considered a fair 
and adequate compensation for their property. 
 
The negotiations were facilitated by an external person designated by the title of 
Moderator. He chairs all CNC meetings and is assisted by 2 Co-Moderators who were 
appointed by the CNC mainly to facilitate negotiations at the Sub-committee level324. In 
the following section I examine how compensation payments were actually determined 
and how the CNC was able to fulfil its mandate on behalf of the local people. The 
analysis also examines the role of traditional authorities in the negotiations process.  
                                                          
321
 interview with CDM on 17/09/2010 and JA (phone 04/10/2011) 
322
 Respondents on this issue were unanimous. They explained that the land and property to be 
negotiated on is theirs and if Newmont wants to take it away from them it was right that they do so 
properly so that they are not cheated. Since that will attract some costs which they are not prepared it 
was the responsibility to take up the fees of the Community Valuer. Interview with NAKh on 03/09/201, 
OPNA on 02/09/2010, AFAh on 02/07/2010 and HCF on 02/07/2010 
323
 Telephone interview with J A, a member of the Community Valuer’s team from the KNUST 
(October,2011) 
324
 The Moderator was a retired professional teacher who had formerly been the Personnel Officer for 
the Birim North District Ghana Education Service. Apart from the CNC he was also chairman of the 
Water and Sanitation Board. One of the Co-moderators was a professional teacher who retired as a 
Circuit Supervisor for the Birim North District Ghana Education Service. The other worked at a FM radio 
station in a nearby town. The Moderator and the 2 Co-moderators were recruited through a selection 
process jointly organized by both the community and Newmont. They are paid an honorarium by 
Newmont. 
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7.3.2 The negotiations agreements: who decides and assesses the 
compensation? 
As I explained in the introduction to this chapter the negotiation for compensation 
observed in the Birim North District is an unusual practice compared to other mining 
communities in Ghana. Usually traditional authorities, community members, officials of 
state institutions and mining companies do not all engage in the negotiations for 
compensation when land is being acquired for mining. Therefore the system adopted in 
the BND was one that effectively allowed the active participation of the individuals 
whose interests in land and property are directly affected in the determination of 
compensation payments. Notwithstanding this new arrangement chiefs are still being 
perceived as the authority to managed stool land (see Table 6 and Table 7). 
Meetings and negotiations at the CNC took place in a two tier forum. There was a 
plenary of all the representatives of the CNC and four sub-committees. These were 
Sub-committees for Land, Crops, Immovable Property and Resettlement. Each 
member of the CNC served on at least one of these Sub-committees, except for the 
category of people described as observers. The mandate of the CNC was to negotiate 
compensation rates for and on behalf of the affected people for crops, lost or destroyed 
structures, deprivation of the use of land and resettlement325. 
 
The negotiations were conducted through a formalised process in the form of meetings. 
Prior to each meeting an agenda was set by the Moderator and circulated with minutes 
of the previous meeting to all the members. The BND offered the use of its Assembly 
Hall for all CNC meetings. A secretariat under the control of the Moderators was 
responsible for recording minutes of proceedings and preparation of all other 
documentation produced by the CNC. Staff and logistics of the secretariat were 
provided by Newmont.  The official language used during meetings was Twi (that is the 
local language of the communities, even though recordings of the proceedings are 
made in English). Thus, the Moderator and Co-Moderators were expected to be fluent 
not only English but in Twi as well. However, in the case of the MDAs, who were non-
native Twi speakers they were allowed to speak English but this had to be translated 
into Twi for the other members by the Moderator326.  
 
                                                          
325
 These are the legal requirements stipulated in Section 74 of Act 703. 
326
Although I noted that almost all of them have had at least some minimum level of formal education in 
English (field notes July-October, 2010). 
172 
 
The role of the external Moderator was to facilitate and ensure that the negotiations 
were impartial. The Moderator was to ensure that all the representatives were given 
opportunities to contribute to the process by preventing any particular individual or 
groups of people from dominating the negotiations. The authority exercised by the 
Moderator was established in rules and regulations that govern the CNC327. These 
rules were jointly prepared by the negotiating parties, that is, the communities’ 
representatives and Newmont under the guidance of officials from state institutions. 
The rules and regulations recognised the fact that the CNC was made up of different 
actors and institutions who had different levels of authority. Therefore to facilitate 
orderliness in the proceedings the rules provide that all members, regardless of status 
in the communities were to abide by the orders of the Moderator.  Thus, it established 
the Moderator as the highest authority during meetings. This authority extends over 
that of traditional authorities (usually represented by sub-chiefs or elders) and officials 
of both Newmont and state agencies who were members of the CNC were also 
subjected to the authority of the Moderator and co-Moderators. 
 
Schedule of Meetings and Procedures 
Meetings of the CNC were usually held once in a fortnight. However, this depended on 
the level of progress made by the sub-committees or when there was an emergency 
issue to address such as when a group of people decide to resist the takeover of 
community lands for mining. Sub-committees were expected to regularly report to the 
CNC about the progress of negotiations but in practice this was only done after 
substantial milestones had been achieved during the negotiations. 
 
It had been agreed with Newmont that on CNC meeting days the Company provides 
transport (a number of buses) to go to designated points in each of the participating 
communities to convey all the CNC members to the meeting and to return them 
afterwards.  The poor state of the transport network system in the district partly 
explains the need for this. On arrival members were expected to formally register their 
attendance at the meeting. This registration was done outside of the entrance to the 
Assembly hall where the meeting took place. The registration entailed writing of name 
and signing or thumb printing, for those who were illiterate. This list was compiled and 
later used for the payment of allowances to the representatives after each meeting328.  
                                                          
327
 CNC: Rules, Regulations and Procedures, 2008 
 
328
 Snacks and lunch are also provided to all the members at all CNC and Subcommittee meetings 
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Because transport was provided meetings were usually on schedule and lasted for 
about 2 to 21/2 half hours329.  
 
Meetings were held in a rectangular shaped room with two main entry and exit double 
doors at the frontage side of the building. The room was spacious enough and well 
ventilated to comfortably accommodate all the members of the CNC.330Observations of 
the negotiations at the CNC showed that formal meeting procedures were followed. 
Before the Moderator calls for the start of the meeting he would usually ask whether all 
the vehicles sent to convey the community representatives had arrived.  I realised that 
the members, having become acquainted with each other, know which community 
members were not available.  It was a convention that at least each community had at 
least one member present before meetings were started. The formal process of the 
meeting commenced once the Moderator was satisfied with the attendance and that 
every community and Newmont was represented. However, this was not the case with 
the officials from the state institutions. Meetings could go ahead even if none of them 
were present, although a few were always in time for the start of meetings.  
 
At the start of every meeting the minutes of the previous meeting was read out in Twi 
by the Moderator, for comments and objections. Once this had been accepted the 
agenda for the day’s meeting was read out again by the Moderator, for consideration. It 
is important to note that the minutes of the previous meeting were usually distributed to 
all the members at least 2 to 3 days before any scheduled meeting day. The reason 
was that it allowed the members’ time to read it and have discussions with their 
communities before the meeting. It was also because some of the members only have 
basic level of formal education and so they sought assistance from someone (children 
or friends) to read it with them. 
 
The CNC might have been structured in a way to ensure equal opportunities for the 
participation of all its members during deliberations at the meetings. However, the 
sitting arrangement seemed to allow the traditional authorities better opportunity at 
drawing the attention of the Moderator, compared to the rest of the community 
representatives331. On the other hand the arrangement enhanced the view of the 
                                                          
329
 Usually from 10 am to 12.30pm. 
330
 I had the permission to attend and observe 4 CNC meetings and subcommittee meetings during the 
2010 negotiations period. 
331
 The following is description of the sitting room and how that makes it a complex negotiations 
process: Within the meeting room the members from the same communities or similar institutions sit 
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Moderator thereby facilitating easy notification by anyone who raised a hand to draw 
his attention to be given the opportunity to speak, as was the convention used at the 
meetings. Perhaps sitting arrangement for CNC meetings were done in the manner 
described because of the number of people involved in the negotiations. Although this 
arrangement had the potential to inhibit discussions, it did not seem to have affected 
the final decisions of the negotiations process. Perhaps it was because the actual 
negotiations were done in smaller groups within sub-committees of the CNC (this will 
be discussed in the next section). 
It is imperative to point out that it is at the plenary session of the CNC that final 
decisions are made with regards to compensation. Meeting agendas332 are first tabled 
at the plenary and where necessary they were sent to the sub-committee for detailed 
deliberations. In one of the meetings I observed the specific issues that were discussed 
were; (1) to receive feedback on the progress of negotiations from the sub-committees 
for crop and land compensation; and (2) for the Immovable Property sub-committee to 
make a presentation of its findings after an educational tour and workshop on how 
building costs are estimated both for construction and for sale.333 The sub-committees 
discuss issues referred to them for consideration and then make proposals and 
recommendations to the plenary for approval or for further deliberations.  Each member 
of the plenary is also a member of at least one of the four sub-committees. The 
Moderator and Co-Moderators each chaired one of the sub-committees as 
Facilitators.334  
                                                                                                                                                                          
together. The idea is to facilitate easy and fast consultation amongst members from the same 
community or institution. Towards the north end of the hall, i.e. on the right side when one entered the 
hall through the main door was a large table with two arm-chairs behind it. This was where the 
Moderator and Co-Moderator sit during meetings. Behind this was a wall on which was hung a medium 
size clock. On the right side of the table towards the far end of the room was a wall in front of which 
stood another long table with 3 chairs around it. This was where the recorders of the meetings sat and 
took minutes of the proceedings. Directly facing the Moderator’s table was a set of meticulously 
arranged polished wooden arm-chairs. The chairs were arranged in four rows and about 9 to 11 rows 
back towards the back wall. To the extreme right and on the front row was where the Community 
Valuer’s team usually sat. Behind the Community Valuers sat officials representing the BNDA and MDAs. 
The remaining seats were usually occupied by some of the community representatives. The two middle 
rows of chairs were occupied by the community representatives.  On the two rows sat the 
representatives of the traditional authorities (or chiefs when they do attend the CNC meetings). The 
fourth row to the extreme left of the Moderator left was usually occupied by Newmont's negotiations 
team. A set of loud speakers connected to a number of codeless microphones is always available to aid 
communication in the room. 
332
  including motions are set by both Newmont and the Community representatives 
333
 This was after they returned from College of Architecture and Planning of KNUST, Kumasi 
334
 The CNC Moderator and co-Moderators are referred to as Facilitators at the Subcommittees. 
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7.3.3 Negotiations at the Sub-committee level 
Actual haggling or negotiation over rates to be paid as compensation takes place at the 
sub-committee level. Members of sub-committees sat around a negotiation table 
together with the facilitators. The Community representatives sat to one side of the 
Facilitator while the Newmont team sat at the other end. The MDAs usually sat with the 
community representatives, either by them around the table or behind. It was 
significant to note that no distinction was made between where the traditional 
authorities and the ordinary members of the community sat around the table. 
Notwithstanding their traditional status, the traditional authorities acknowledged the fact 
that they and the other members of the community had equal opportunities to 
contribute to the deliberations and that every member’s word counts in that respect. 
This was unusual in the sense that traditionally, at the community level, when decisions 
were being made traditional authorities (chiefs) often had the final word.  
 
Preparations of sub-committee for negotiations 
It is at this subcommittee level that specific issues of compensation are discussed and 
recommendations made for adoption by the CNC. To be able to arrive at what is fair 
and adequate compensation some local data is collected and analysed as the basis for 
the negotiations.  
 
A lot of preparatory work was undertaken by the sub-committees. This involved 
professional valuation experts collecting market data for crops and land which were 
then used for valuation.335  For instance, the Community Valuer also prepared a 
valuation report on the rates for land, crops and immovable property and advised the 
community on what rates to negotiate. The Community Valuer usually met with the 
communities before, during and after each meeting. Newmont also had a professional 
Valuer who prepared valuation estimates of the stated assets and advised the 
negotiating team accordingly. These independent valuations only served as guide to 
the actual rates (prices) that were agreed. It should be noted that the rates agreed for 
compensation were negotiated every year, since market data tend to vary periodically.  
 
Fieldwork to collect data for this research between May and December 2010 took place 
at the time when the CNC was in the process of negotiating for crops and land. This 
provided an opportunity for me, with the permission of the members, to attend and 
observe proceedings at the plenary and the subcommittee. I attended a series of 
                                                          
335
 The estimation of property values using standard methods of assessments 
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negotiations for the land and crops Sub-committees and had the opportunity to observe 
at first hand the intricacies of how compensation was determined and the role played 
by traditional authorities at this level. Insight gained from observing these two sub-
committees are examined below 
 
Crop Sub-committee structure and procedures for negotiations 
The Crops sub-committee was made up of twelve community representatives 
(including 5 of the traditional authorities336), the Community Valuer, two Newmont 
officials assisted by two valuation consultants and two officials from public institutions, 
the MDAs337 . During the 2010 negotiations period the sub-committee held a series of 
20 meetings before completing the negotiations on tree crops as well as food crops 
grown in the area.338 As part of the preparatory process each negotiating party, i.e. the 
Communities and Newmont had to prepare their independent valuation of crops to 
serve as a guide on the potential value of each crop. It was in this regard that the 
Community Valuer’s role was essential to the community. The team of Valuers working 
for the community had to collect market data, as well as information, relating to local 
agricultural practices for crops; the inputs used and how long it took to mature for 
harvest and the anticipated yield. This was taken into account in the valuation process. 
The analysis of this sort of data required expert knowledge and skill, which was beyond 
the expertise of members of the communities. This was the reason for which Newmont 
agreed to pay the fees for a Community Valuer and other support provided (as was 
discussed in section 7.2.1).  
 
The Community Valuer was therefore obliged to meet with the community 
representatives alone before every negotiations session. During these meetings the 
team presented to the representatives their estimated valuation for the crops. They 
would then together develop a strategy of how to negotiate for higher values at the 
negotiations table. In practice the actual valuation figure only served as the minimum 
value to negotiate. The Newmont team also went through a similar process with their 
valuation consultants.339 
 
                                                          
336
 Represent the four stools in the mine area and one traditional leader representing the hamlets and 
farmsteads  
337
 Officials from the LVD and the Ministry of Agriculture at the District 
338
 These cash crops were referred to as the ‘Big four’ by the local people because of their commercial 
value and the anticipated worth of compensation. 
339
 Interview with CDM on 17/09/2010 and JA on 4/10/2011 
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In all a total of about eighty (80) crops identified in the area was the subject of 
compensation negotiations during the period. These crops were divided mainly into 
cash and food crops. Examples of the cash crops included cocoa, oil palm, citrus, kola, 
plantain and teak, while the food crops included tomatoes, cassava, carrots and 
pepper. The first 2 to 3 meetings were used to categorise the crops; first into cash 
crops and those that constituted food crops. The second stage was used to decide the 
level of maturity for each crop. Three stages of plant growth were agreed to be used 
and these were the seedling (young), medium and matured plants. For instance a 
seedling was defined as a plant from the nursery to the transplanting stage, while a 
matured plant was one that had flowered already and about to bear fruits or harvested. 
In between the two was classified as medium. These decisions for the categorisation 
and classification as above were based on a combination of the standard commercial 
agricultural practices, local subsistence practices and negotiations.340 The process of 
agreeing to this first phase of negotiations involved an interactive process of haggling. 
For instance, while Newmont proposed four classifications for the crops, the community 
people objected to it and only agreed to the three classifications The official from the 
Department of Agriculture only provided professional advice on what the standard 
criteria were but there was no obligation on any of the two parties to accept what these 
were but to haggle over it. 
 
The classification and categorisation were important aspects of the negotiations 
because they determined how each crop was worth. The process involved a 
compilation of a list of all the crops known to be cultivated in the area, including wild 
plants on their farms and plots of land. Some of the crops included on the list were not 
known by some of the community people, yet others who thought such plants were 
found in the district argued for their inclusion. Once the classification and categorisation 
was completed the Valuers advising both community and Newmont were tasked to 
prepare a valuation of all the locally known crops and plants. At this stage of the 
process it became a professional issue but the community people worked closely with 
the Community Valuer. After completing the valuation for all the crops the Valuer had to 
arrange a meeting of the CNC and present the estimated values for each crop. The 
Sub-committee was then required by the CNC to commence the negotiations.  
 
At the next stage of negotiations the sub-committee had to agree on which of the 
categories to begin with. It was agreed that they start with the food crops since it was 
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 What the local people referred to as the ‘Akyem standard’ 
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anticipated that cash crops negotiations will take some time because it involved the 
crops that served as the main source of livelihood for the people and so expectations 
were high for higher compensation pay outs.  
 
At another meeting the negotiations started with the Facilitator calling out from the list 
one crop after the other. Newmont was usually invited first to make an offer, although 
occasionally a member from the community side proposed their asking price. Despite 
the fact that the each party had relied on scientific market data to arrive at their actual 
estimate of value for each crop the initial offers, whether made by Newmont or the 
community, were often arbitrary. This I realised later was part of the strategy developed 
by the two parties to get a better deal. Records of the actual estimated values from 
both parties revealed that the prices that were agreed during the 2010 negotiations for 
all the crops were in fact higher than what they had as the true valuation estimates341. 
 
The negotiations process was often fluid and sensitive activity. The community people 
sometimes tend to get emotional about losing their property which had the potential 
effect of changing their livelihoods. As indicated in Chapter 4 the majority of people 
living in the area are engaged in some form of agricultural activity. Land is therefore a 
very important resource of income. They were therefore negotiating to give away their 
main source of livelihood and family property. It was observed that occasionally some 
of the youth, in particular, tended to disagree with the elderly community 
representatives on proposed prices to be paid for some crops. This occurred in 
particular during the negotiations for the cash crops. For instance, whereas Newmont 
proposed to offer the following prices per acre for the different categories of cocoa 
Gh¢5,899 (matured); Gh¢3,442 (medium) and Gh¢756 (seedling) the community asked 
for Gh¢ 8,290; Gh¢6, 380 and Gh¢3,810 for the respective categories. However, the 
final agreed negotiated prices for compensation payment were Gh¢7,132 (Matured), 
Gh¢5,400 (medium) and Gh¢1,350 (seedling). This was after two meetings of 
negotiations during which the youth among the community representatives had 
rejected a number of offers made by Newmont.  
 
Traditional authorities and elderly members of the Sub-committee did intervene at 
various stages during the negotiations and pleaded with the youthful members to 
accept the prices offered to let the compensation proceed in order to finish off in good 
time. It is important to note that these pleas were often accepted out of respect for local 
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 I obtained the valuation figures from both the Community Valuer and Newmont. 
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leaders when made by traditional authorities. For instance, during one of such 
stalemates the Krontihene of New Abirem, being a traditional authority and with the 
respect that the people had for such authority, he was able to talk to the other 
members at some point during the negotiations to accept the prices offered to allow the 
subcommittee to make progress with the negotiations. Such pleas for compromises are 
not listened to if they were made by non-traditional authorities in the group. When such 
deadlocks occur the meeting was usually postponed to allow the community members 
to meet their Valuer and the Newmont team to also meet independently with their 
advisers for reconsideration. At another scheduled meeting the process starts all over 
again with both parties haggling over the price to be paid.  
 
It will be realised from the above example that whereas Newmont sometimes  
proposed to pay less than the actual valuation price  for crops the community also often 
asked for a price higher than the actual estimate advised by the Community Valuer (as 
part of the strategy noted above). In the end both parties were able to agree on a price 
that often was often above the actual price of the Community Valuer’s true estimate. 
Until that was realised the community representatives’ did not accept offers made by 
Newmont. 
 
As a result of the haggling over the negotiated prices for compensation during each 
meeting, which was usually held over duration of two hours, on average only prices for 
about 2 to 3 crops were usually negotiated. The discussions, the agreed prices [rates] 
and the basis underlying each decision was voice recorded and minutes taken during 
negotiation sessions. During the period for negotiations the subcommittee was required 
to present regular progress reports to the CNC at plenary meetings. These were 
expected either weekly or every other week. The report usually did not give the actual 
agreed rates reached at previous meetings but it was expected to communicate the 
number of crops that had been negotiated on and issues which were facilitating or 
hindering progress. 
 
Land Sub-committee structure and procedures 
The Land Subcommittee comprised community representatives (12 including one 
traditional representative from each stool land area), the Newmont team, land experts 
(4), and selected MDAs342.  
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  Officials from the OASL and the PVLMD were the key members in this category. 
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Preparations for the negotiations on how to compensate for loss of land started even 
before the CNC was established. Act 703 requires that a mining lease holder pay for 
‘deprivation of use of land’343. This is a new item introduced by the mining law for 
compensation in Ghana. However, the law does not clearly define what this means. It 
was therefore subject to various interpretations but this needed to be clarified before 
the start of compensation negotiations (see section 7.2.2). The findings and the 
recommendations of the working groups on land were also taken into consideration 
during the negotiation process for land compensation.  
 
As was the case with the Crops Subcommittee above, both community representatives 
led by the Community Valuer and team as well as the Newmont negotiations team 
undertook independent market surveys to gather data on land transactions and land 
values in the district for comparative analysis. At one of the meetings the teams had to 
agree on the information they had independently collected so as to establish a common 
standard of land transactions and values before the actual haggling over rates 
commenced. Different rates were agreed for the payment of farm lands and building 
plots to reflect land use and location factors. It took over 3 months to agree to and 
finalise compensation rates for land in the mining-affected areas.  
 
At the end of a series of negotiations meetings, each subcommittee prepared a final 
report on the agreements reached and any recommendations on compensation issues 
for presentation to the CNC plenary for further deliberations and approval. 
 
7.3.4 Concluding agreements on the compensation negotiations 
Final approval for the negotiated compensation rates was jointly made at a CNC 
plenary. As the analysis above pointed out the Subcommittees are tasked to do all the 
technical aspects of determining compensation rates for payment, but since not all the 
members of the CNC were in any one particular Subcommittee the final decision on 
each group’s recommendations was made at the plenary. This was because it was the 
CNC as a body which was mandated to negotiate rates for compensation. It was at this 
forum that other members who did not serve on other subcommittees sought 
clarifications and justifications from the respective members of the subcommittees 
before the recommendations were put to vote. Once the rates were accepted they 
become the official negotiated rates to be paid for the year. After this the 
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representatives were then expected to inform their respective constituents on the 
prices that had been agreed344.  
 
A composite report detailing all the agreed rates was the prepared under the 
supervision of the Moderator. The outcome of the CNC’s decisions was usually 
contained in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the 
Communities and Newmont. The MoU incorporates details on the following; the 
compensation rates agreed to be paid, the guiding principles rules and procedures for 
the negotiations and the company’s commitment to the communities in relation to 
future rate negotiations. This was endorsed by Newmont Project’s Management team 
and all the other members of the CNC. After this endorsement and close out the rates 
were then processed for the commencement of payment by the finance department of 
Newmont, according to each individual’s entitlements which are based on the survey of 
lands and assets conducted as a separate activity345. 
 
As noted above (see section 7.1) the new system of negotiating compensation as 
adopted in the BND was intended to avoid problems leading to dispossession and loss 
of property as well as land litigations often associated with mining and the way stool 
land and revenue are managed in Ghana (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; 
Tsuma, 2010; Ubink, 2008 Kasanga, 2001, Andreasen et al, 2011). On the other hand 
the system though not intended provided an opportunity for chiefs' political authority to 
be reinforced through recognition of the respect for traditional authority and in land 
dispute resolution.  
7.4 Compensation negotiations and the authority of chiefs for development 
The point has to be made that traditional authorities constitute one of the main actors 
and perform important role in the negotiation process. This is because with respect to 
land they are the legal custodians and are expected to ensure that compensation is 
commensurate with the interests of the local citizens. Apart from that chiefs would also 
want to ensure that they are able to maximise the potential wealth from stool land and 
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mining lease holder (section 72 of Act 703). During this time the Company sends out a team of surveyors 
to enumerate all the land, farmlands and crops on it, buildings and other property with the names and 
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the mineral wealth embedded in it. The negotiations in the BND had a number of 
implications for chiefly authority and the control that chiefs have over stool land and 
revenue.  
 
Chiefs acting as peace brokers during compensation negotiations 
The exercise of chiefly authority during the negotiations process facilitated the 
successful determination of compensation. Observations of proceedings at the CNC 
revealed how important the authority exercised by chiefs’ was for the whole 
negotiations process and how this expedited agreement on acceptable compensation 
package for the mining affected farmers (see section 7.3.3). The negotiations forum 
provided opportunities where sometimes chiefs' relied on their subjects' respect for 
custom and traditional influence to speed up the negotiations process. It was not 
unusual during negotiations for the communities to reject offers made by Newmont and 
to threaten to boycott the process or to incite other CNC members against the 
negotiations. Traditionally, this was considered disorderly conduct before a chief and 
so was always likely to be avoided if a chief intervened. The acceptance of chief’s 
advice was because of the perceived wisdom and respect that the local people have 
for traditional authority. This was important for the negotiations.  Although the exercise 
of chiefly authority in a mediating capacity was effective for the negotiations process, it 
might be argued that this was done to expedite the process in order to encourage 
Newmont’s investment in the district. This is because the chiefs' themselves depended 
on and trusted in the Company for the delivery of development through investment in 
public goods. 
Traditional authority in dispute settlement 
The knowledge and authority of chiefs as custodians of stool land played an important 
role in the settlement of disputes, especially about land boundaries and tenure 
arrangements during the survey of property assets in the mining-affected areas. Prior 
to Newmont’s being granted mining lease, the Company contracted private surveyors 
to undertake inventory of all the land and property that potentially might be affected by 
the mining lease. This involved the recording of ownership of land and all the types of 
interests and rights in the land. The professional surveyors were assisted by local 
people with knowledge of each stool’s boundaries, land ownership and the types of 
land interest that were created between the parties. In each mining affected community 
the Chief Farmers (who were also members of the CNC) represented the traditional 
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chiefs. This was because the Chief Farmer was the person who by custom was often 
informed when a migrant was allocated farm land in their respective communities.346As 
a result Chief Farmers tend to have full knowledge of all land allocations and 
agreements that take place in the community. This was important for the negotiations. 
The Chief farmers' knowledge in these issues facilitated the settlement of land 
disputes. 
Newmont has a grievance system that allows the local inhabitants, whose land and 
property had been surveyed, to present formal complaints on issues about the process 
that they were dissatisfied with. This often served as a starting point for the resolution 
of land disputes and the ascertainment of the true ownership and rights of those 
eligible for compensation claims. But since the Company lacked local knowledge on 
the nature of customary land ownership and arrangements they had to rely on the local 
chiefs and Chief Farmers. To that extent it might also be argued that the presence of 
Newmont reinforced the importance of the authority of chiefs in the resolution of land 
disputes. However, it must be pointed out this chiefs' role in this manner did not 
determine what and how much each entitlement of compensation was claimed by 
litigants.  
Weakened authority to manage land and invest in public Goods 
Although chiefly authority is important for the negotiations process to take place, 
because of their legal status in the communities, on the other hand it has implications 
for the level of trust in the fiduciary capacity chiefs are expected to play with regards 
stool land. The innovative negotiations process is emerging because of the reported 
cases of lack of transparency and accountability with revenues derived when mining 
companies engage traditional authorities in compensation negotiations (Akabzaa, 
2000; Tsuma, 2010). This gives an indication that subjects members of stools are no 
longer dependent on chiefs to provide leadership with regards to land dealings as it 
might potentially lead to dispossession. In addition to that there is no law that prevents 
the direct engagement of people affected by mining activities to negotiate for 
compensation although chiefs are by law expected to be managers of community land. 
Thus, in the long run there is the potential that chiefs' would lose authority over all land 
transactions and there would be less expectation from their community members with 
regards to investments in public goods.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at showing the system of negotiating compensation for land and 
property to enable access to land for mining in the BND. The interest in this was 
because the system constitutes a paradigm shift from what has been going on within 
other mining communities in Ghana. In addition to that I examined the implications of 
the negotiations process for the authority that chiefs exercise over stool land, given 
their legitimate position as custodians of land.  
Large acquisitions of land for mining investment and increasing peri-urban activities 
presented challenges for the authority that chiefs’ exercise over stool and over their 
communities. This is because it tends to revive historical debates about control over 
land, which appear to be reinventions of customary principles of land tenure. In spite of 
the problematic nature of chiefly control over stool land, community members show 
respect for the institution of chieftaincy and its authority over land, although perceptions 
about the exercise of this authority by individual local chiefs differs amongst local 
people. 
In this Chapter I have examined the legal framework regulating land acquisition and 
compensation payments for mining in Ghana and pointed out that although chiefs 
manage stool land it does not include mining rights.  Mining leases are granted by the 
state and makes provision for mining lease holders to pay compensation for those 
whose land and properties are affected. Until recently mining companies have often 
negotiated and paid compensation for affected stool land to chiefs. This chapter 
showed that the revenue derived from land compensation and royalties from minerals 
tend to be treated as private income by some chiefs. This has been criticised and 
contested because it often results in loss and dispossession of assets by community 
members347. This, in addition to the problems of stool revenue management by chiefs, 
as was shown in Chapter 6, raised concerns about compensation payments to be 
made to chiefs when land was being acquired by the multi-national mining company, 
Newmont in the BND. Mining companies are aware and have shown concerned about 
how revenue from stool land that is paid to chiefs has been managed. It was as a result 
of these issues that by mutual agreement, inhabitants of mining affected communities 
in the BND (including traditional chiefs) and Newmont together developed a system 
that ensued the direct participation of all those who were affected directly by the mining 
lease in the compensation negotiations. The chapter examined the composition of the 
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Compensation Negotiations Committee (CNC), which is made of representatives of the 
different actors and institutions in the District (as discussed in chapter 5). 
Analysis of the negotiations procedure showed that compensation was determined by 
mutual agreement and from the collective effort of all the members of the CNC. 
Decisions were made based on a combination of Ghana’s statutory requirements, 
customary practices of land transactions and standard practices of valuing land and 
property for compensation claims. What was also important from the analysis was the 
role of traditional authorities in the CNC negotiations. It was shown that respect for the 
knowledge of traditional authority over land issues was important in the negotiations 
process. Where there were disputes about types of interests and ownership for land or 
boundaries traditional authorities provided guidance in resolving disputes. Chiefs also 
acted as brokers during dead locks during the negotiations, which facilitated peaceful 
determination of compensation payments. Thus, although an evolving system of 
negotiating compensation was put in place at the BND, partly to address some of the 
problems of chiefly authority over stool land and revenue, the traditional authority and 
role of chiefs in the process was not eliminated. However, how compensation was 
determined was not a matter left between the mining company and chiefs only.  
 
Generally, this chapter has shown that the negotiations system has to a large extent 
reinforced the authority that is exercised by chiefs in the communities. On the other 
hand it also draws attention to  the point that since chiefs’ alone are no longer trusted 
to negotiate compensation on the behalf of their communities when land is required for 
large scale investments the interests of mining affected people are better protected 
through innovative multi-institutional committee systems. 
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Chapter 8  
Co-Production of Public Goods: Local Initiative for Development 
8.0 Introduction 
Local government authorities in Ghana have the legal mandate for planning and 
providing development within communities under their jurisdiction. Thus, as noted in 
Chapter 4 and 5, the BNDA is the authority that has responsibility for planning 
development within the case study communities348.The BNDA depends on funds from 
both the state and its own internally generated sources to do this. Traditional chiefs, in 
their capacity as trustees of stool land are also expected to use the stool revenue, 
among others, to support development in their communities. In chapter 5 it was noted 
that these institutions faced various challenges, including financial, and were therefore 
not able to adequately fulfil these responsibilities as expected. The mining investment 
in the district provides the opportunity to provide public goods in the mine affected 
communities (see Table 11). 
 
Mining investment in the BND has not only led to issues of compensation payment for 
lost property and land (as examined in chapter 7), but has also introduced a different 
dimension to the way public goods are provided in the mine affected communities. In 
addition to the CNC a second forum was established and called the Social 
Responsibility Forum (SRF). Evidence from field data suggests that the forum seemed 
to have provided an opportunity for traditional authorities to demand development 
projects from Newmont thereby shifting the expectation and responsibility of accounting 
for their stewardship of community land revenue. This chapter focuses on the new form 
of arrangement under which the provision of public goods was negotiated. The analysis 
focuses on the multi-institutional collaborative arrangement amongst the local 
inhabitants and their traditional leaders, state institutions at the district level with 
responsibilities for resource management and development and Newmont.  
 
This chapter examines the nature of the multi-institutional form of co-production for that 
facilitates investment in public goods. This would be done by analysing the role of the 
various actors in the negotiations under the new multi-institutional co-production 
arrangement at the mining district in BND. In addition to the above, the chapter also 
analyses popular perceptions of the ability of traditional authorities’ to provide public 
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goods. This would be followed by examining the outcomes and politics of negotiating 
development and its implications for the authority of chiefs.  
8.1 Co-Production as a collaborative local strategy for development 
It has been pointed out in chapters 5 and 6 that on the one hand members of stools 
and inhabitants of local communities expect traditional chiefs to facilitate development 
through the provision of public goods using revenue from stool land. On the other hand 
chiefs tend to use their ability to provide public goods and development generally, as 
objects to secure their continued stay in power. However, chiefs have not been able to 
adequately fulfil this expectation for a number of reasons often attributed to the low 
level of financial resources available to them. Thus, where an opportunity arose as in 
the case of Birim North, it provided an opportunity for the negotiation of the sought-after 
development that was lacking in the communities.  
Traditional chiefs have the opportunity to bring development in mining communities 
because they often become the focal point for negotiating access to land. The literature 
however points out problems with how chiefly authority is exercised over land and the 
revenue it produces within other mining communities in Ghana (as discussed in section 
2.3.2). A number of issues contribute to this. Firstly, there have been claims of 
widespread property dispossession amongst local inhabitants as a result of loss of 
rights and interest in land and property affected by mining operations, but for which 
compensation paid to traditional authorities were often treated as private income. As a 
result of this community members were sometimes suspicious of traditional authorities 
of engaging in under hand dealings with mining companies leading to persistent 
conflicts in some mining communities. Secondly, mining communities tend to be 
neglected and lack basic public goods (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 2007; Owusu-
Koranteng, 2008; Tsuma, 2010; Yankson, 2010). 
On the other hand private investment entities such as mining companies have a CSR 
to the communities where they operate, and therefore have to work to be acceptable by 
local inhabitants by showing the advantages of having their operations in these 
communities. This gives companies such as Newmont the social licence to operate349. 
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Thus, mining companies have invested in public goods that are often lacking or are 
under-provided in communities where they operate. However, investment in public 
goods is often done at the discretion of the mining companies since they fund such 
projects. There is often no coordination with the local authorities, which are mandated 
by law to plan and provide development. It was in recognition of this and the success 
realised from the implementation of the CNC (as demonstrated in chapter 7) that 
Newmont and the mining affected communities mutually entered into agreement to 
form a collaborative multi-institution for the provision of public goods to facilitate 
development in the district. 
The joint effort at providing public goods in the mining-affected communities in BND is 
described as co-production in the sense that it required inputs (stool land resources, 
financial capital and expert knowledge and services) provided by traditional chiefs and 
community members, Newmont and officials of state institutions at the district 
respectively. This description follows from Ostrom (1996), who used the concept of co-
production to define the process where ‘inputs used to produce goods or services are 
contributed by individuals [actors and institutions] who are not in the same organisation’ 
(see section 2.4). Similarly, as discussed in chapter 2, other scholars have found 
service provision arrangements in developing countries, which have relied on local 
forms of arrangements to provide public goods and services as a result of the states 
weakness (Lam, 1996; Masud, 2002; Joshi and Moore, 2004; Olivier de Sardan, 
2011(a) and (b); Workman, 2011 and Leinweber, 2012).  
 
The form of co-production as observed in BND is unusual compared to what occurs in 
other mining communities in Ghana. Akabzaa (2000), Akabzaa et al (2007) and Tsuma 
(2010) have pointed out that conflicts arise in mining communities in Ghana because 
local inhabitants have often been suspicious of traditional chiefs (see section 2.3.2). 
However, community members affected by Newmont’s mining project in the BND were 
not only consulted about the provision of public goods, but had access to a formalised 
institution that was expected to serve as the forum where all the planning and decisions 
for the provision of public goods are made. This took place at the Social Responsibility 
Forum (SRF) under an arrangement, known locally as “tripartite agreement”. Under this 
agreement the mining-affected communities (including New Abirem, Adausena and 
Ntronang) constituted one party, the BND another and Newmont was the third party350.  
This was developed out of mutual need and dependence and made use of locally 
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based association of actors and institutions (Olivier de Sardan, 2011(a) and (b); 
Workman, 2011).The SRF created the arena where decisions about development 
projects were expected to be initiated and finalised. It also served as the forum where 
Newmont and the communities deliberated on a number of issues on developing 
community relationship, sustainable social investments, community development, 
capacity-building, employment and livelihood enhancement programmes for the 
mining-affected communities351.  
8.1.1 Co-production negotiations at the Social Responsibility Forum  
Before I delve into the analysis and discussions about what took place at the SRF it is 
imperative to provide a historical background to its establishment. The formation of the 
SRF was preceded by one called the Community Consultative Committee (CCC) which 
was formed in 2005, when Newmont first arrived in the BND. The purpose was to 
provide an avenue to receive and address community grievances and development 
issues as a result of Newmont’s presence in the District. This was also used as the 
platform for the Company to receive written requests from the chiefs and members of 
their communities for support to provide public goods that were lacking or 
underprovided in the various affected communities352.  The CCC had the District Chief 
Executive Officer of the BND as its chairman. Its members comprised selected 
representatives and the traditional chiefs from all the communities affected by mining 
operations and the representatives from the MDAs at the District level as well as 
Newmont. However, over the years most of the issues that had led to the 
establishment of the CCC were addressed, and yet Newmont’s investment in the area 
was still ongoing.  This required further engagement between the Company and the 
communities. The focus and objective of the CCC was reviewed to ensure a more 
sustainable way of addressing the development challenges in the area. This brought 
about a change of name from CCC to Social Responsibility Forum (SRF)353.  
 
Again (as was the case with the CNC), the original idea for the establishment of the 
SRF was proposed by Newmont officials by explaining that the Company wanted to 
engage more with the local community through a more participatory approach354. 
Furthermore, Newmont also wanted to streamline the processes of providing support to 
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the communities. This was because the Company together with the local inhabitants 
realised that developments in the communities needed to be synchronised with the 
overall development plans of the District. There was therefore a recommendation to 
involve the BNDA, as a key actor, in the negotiation Committee.  
 
The process to establish the SRF started in 2007. A MoU was drawn up to that effect. 
The BNDA welcomed the notion of the SRF since it was aimed at ensuring a 
coordinated development in the communities affected by the project355. Under the 
tripartite arrangement the local inhabitants ‘own’ all the development projects 
supported by the Company. This, it was explained was to ensure sustainability of 
projects because of the level of community participation in the planning and decision 
making process356. The agreement also set out the responsibilities of all the parties and 
projects that might be undertaken357. The members of the community were required to 
develop their own ideas and solicit support through the SRF for funding and 
implementation.  
 
The formation of the SRF created increased level of awareness amongst community 
members about the activities of Newmont in the District.  This was because the forum 
provided the opportunity for the raising and clarification of issues about the company’s 
activities. This information was then carried over into the respective communities by the 
SRF members. This contributed to improvement in the acceptability of the Company’s 
operations in the District. Although it is common in Ghana to find communities resisting 
operations of mining companies, in the BND local inhabitants rather pushed for 
Newmont to speed up its investment. For instance, in 2008 Newmont presented its 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for appraisal at a public hearing, facilitated by 
officials of the EPA. The local inhabitants from all the mining-affected communities and 
their chiefs who attended openly declared their support for the Company’s investment 
and strongly countered opposition put across by agents of an environmental Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) about Newmont’s operations in the district358. The 
latter organisation opposed the surface mining proposed by Newmont and the takeover 
and compensation for land and other property in one of the communities (known as 
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Yayaaso)359. However, this did not affect the decision to grant mining rights to 
Newmont. 
 
Following approval of the EIA, arrangements were formalised for commencement of 
negotiations leading to compensation for the release of land to commence mine project 
development. This also started the process of formalising arrangements to set up the 
SRF.  Inhabitants of the communities were aware that it was unusual for mining 
companies working in local communities in Ghana to agree to negotiate development 
projects in the manner proposed by Newmont. Thus, the community representatives on 
both the CNC and SRF have explained that the reason why Newmont had the support 
of the local communities was because the Company has been very open to them about 
their investment and mine operations, as well as the nature of the support and benefits 
the communities were entitled to over the period of their lease360. This bolstered the 
level of trust and acceptability of Newmont in the district. Newmont therefore obtained 
the social licence to operate in the District.  
 
Two conclusions can be made from the positive perception that local inhabitants have 
about Newmont’s community engagement strategy in the negotiations. Firstly, if 
Newmont’s strategy was to get the support of the communities through collaborations 
by the introduction of the SRF for development purposes then it was a successful 
strategy that made a positive impact not only for the Company but also for the local 
communities. The Company was perceived as a ‘community friendly’ institution361. 
Secondly, it was also possible that Newmont was using its project at Akyem (and 
Ahafo) in Ghana to demonstrate how responsive it was to local communities in areas 
that it operates (compared to other mining companies). This was happening against the 
backdrop of arguments advanced against mining companies in Ghana and Newmont’s 
own operations in other parts of the world which have left unfavourable legacies and 
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192 
 
negative perceptions about the activities of mining companies.362 If these arguments 
are held then the Company’s operations in Ghana provide opportunities to leave 
positive legacies in these communities. This may have the potential to influence mining 
policies in Ghana, if good outcomes are realised in the long term. 
8.2 The Social Responsibility Forum: the role of local actors and institutions 
It has been stated above that the SRF was constituted by local representatives363. 
These comprised traditional authorities and ordinary citizens of the communities, 
officials of Newmont and the BNDA and other decentralised state institutions at the 
District. Some of these representatives were already members of the CNC. The 
document which established the SRF provided for a governance structure composed of 
the following categories of people in the District364: 
a) an external Moderator, who is appointed through a selection process by the 
members of the forum;  
b) Six (6) representatives of Newmont comprising the General Manager for  the 
ESR (Akyem), the Community Development Manager, Communication 
Manager, Human Resources Administrator, Community Relations 
Superintendent and one senior Community Development Officer; 
c) The District Chief Executive of BNDA 
d) The District Coordinating Director  of BNDA  
e) Planning Officer of BNDA  
f) The Member of Parliament for the Birim North Constituency (as an observer) 
g) Two representatives from District level MDAs ( occasionally co-opted from the 
NCCE,CHRAJ,TCPD, MoFA and Labour Commission).These members are 
observers and have no voting rights at the forum 
h) The paramount chief and queen mother  of the Akyem Kotoku area or their 
representatives 
i) Nine traditional authorities (chiefs usually attend but may be represented by a 
nominated sub-chief or by an elder of the traditional council) one from each of 
the mining-affected communities. 
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j) Ten youth representatives (one from each of the mining-affected communities, 
elected at a public forum in their respective communities) 
k) Ten representatives of women’s groups (one from each of  Project Affected 
Communities) 
l) Ten other elected representatives, from each of the communities. These were 
made up of farmers because they had been identified as those mostly affected 
by the mining operations through the loss of farm lands and other property. 
 
The composition of the SRF shows that each affected community was represented by 
at least 4 different categories of people: the traditional authority, the youth, women and 
what was generally categorised as community representatives  made up of people who 
may not belong to any of the first three specific groups of people. These people were 
categorized generally as ‘farmers’. However, in practice the category included traders, 
retired teachers and civil servants living in the communities. Interviews with leaders of 
the youth and women’s groups in Adausena, and Ntronang suggested that activities of 
these groups in the District were prompted by the arrival of Newmont and its activities 
in the area365. These groups are socially recognized in the communities and operate as 
civil societies. Thus, the SRF is formed by non-partisan representatives and expected 
to remain politically neutral without the involvement of political party representatives. 
 
The agreement that set up the SRF stipulates that its membership was to be selected 
through an election process conducted by the District Electoral Officer (DEO) in a 
secret ballot366. Prior to the elections each representative group was expected to 
submit the names of their nominees in writing to the DEO who compiles and conducts 
the elections on a set date. After the election the DEO submits the names of elected 
representatives to the local chief who subsequently presents members of their 
communities to the SRF367. It is not clear why the names had to pass through the local 
chief before submission to the SRF. But it may seem that elected candidates will have 
to have the approval of the local chief before they were allowed to represent their 
respective group and community’s interest at the SRF. Otherwise, the DEO ought to 
have been required to submit results of the election directly to the Moderator of the 
SRF. This seems to suggest that chiefs have control over representatives at the SRF.  
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Each of the different categories of people that formed the SRF was expected to 
perform specific roles368. 
 
The Moderator: The SRF was chaired by an external Moderator who was expected to 
be impartial, consistent and transparent during meetings369. The Moderator’s role was 
to preside over meetings and ensuring that negotiations were conducted in a manner 
that enabled the local communities, Newmont and BNDA reach agreements on issues 
of development in the Project Affected Areas370. Similar to the CNC, the Moderator at 
SRF controlled proceedings at meetings and commanded authority during 
proceedings. The authority of the SRF’s Moderator was similar to that of the CNC 
(discussed in chapter 7). The Moderator was not the final decision-making authority. 
Decisions were reached through voting or by consensus of all the representatives with 
voting rights.  
 
The Moderator’s position was advertised locally and on all community information 
notice boards in the District when it became vacant. Preference was usually given to 
persons with knowledge of the local culture and political relations and who was 
respected by the people. Allowances and other incidental costs by the Moderator were 
paid by Newmont. Not only that, but all the representatives; i.e. the traditional 
authorities, state officials and community representatives and all those classified as 
observers are all paid allowances for each meeting they attend371. The Moderator’s role 
and arrangements and procedures for transport and meetings for the SRF were similar 
to the CNC (see section 7.3.2).372 
 
The Traditional Authorities and Community Representatives: Traditional authorities or 
their nominated representatives and the community representatives were expected to 
attend SRF meetings to participate in decision making on behalf of their constituent 
communities and groups. They were expected to identify issues of development in their 
communities and present it to the SRF for consideration and support. It was also 
expected that traditional chiefs and community representatives keep their communities 
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 Akyem SRF: Guiding Principles, Rules and Regulations (2009) 
369
 This position was filled by a Senior Lecturer of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. The selection and 
interview was done jointly by selected representatives from the SRF. But prior to 2010 he had provided 
consultancy services to Newmont during which he developed a Framework for Sustainable Social 
Investment Partnership in the Mining Sector based on the Newmont Experience.  
370
 Akyem SRF: Guiding Principles, Rules and Regulations (2009) 
371
 Each member receives Gh¢15 
372
  Comment based on observations noted in my Field notes (June-October, 2010) 
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adequately informed about Newmont’s activities in the area and all other issues of 
development that are discussed at the forum. The SRF also recognised the authority 
and power of traditional chiefs and how that could enhance its work. Thus, chiefs were 
expected to maintain peace and harmony in their respective communities and to 
provide advice to the Company on all matters of land tenure in the area. 
 
Newmont Representatives: It was expected that official representatives of Newmont 
had the mandate to make decisions on behalf of the Company. That was why at a least 
one senior management official was expected to lead the Company’s team. The team 
was expected to have the capacity to make decisions as well as provide answers to 
issues of concern that were raised during meetings.  
 
Representatives from the BNDA and State institutions (MDAs): the BNDA was the third 
party to the tripartite agreement. Its role was to ensure that decisions about 
development projects fitted into the overall development plan of the District, and for 
those affected communities in particular. It was also expected to make a contribution 
towards the cost of providing development projects in the affected districts.  
 
The BNDA together with all the participating state institutions were also there to provide 
technical advice to the SRF373.Occasionally, selected experts and resource persons 
were invited to meetings to educate or clarify issues of development to the members 
(as was the case with the CNC).  
 
In the next section I examine the processes and challenges through which decisions 
and funding of public goods were made. 
8.3 Framework for negotiating the provision of public goods  
The establishment and inauguration of the SRF in 2010 resulted in the development of 
three main documents that set out the framework which regulated the tripartite 
arrangements. These documents comprised (1) Guiding Principles, Rules and 
Regulations374, (2) the SRF relationship agreement between the Local communities, 
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 Akyem Social Responsibility Forum: Guiding Principles, Rules and Regulations (2009) 
374
 The document sets out the principles under which the SRF operates the rules, regulations, code of 
behaviour and sanctions for non-compliance. It also sets out the procedures and regularity of meetings, 
decision-making and planning for development projects. Additionally, it outlines the governance 
structure of the SRF, purpose, functions, eligibility criteria for membership and election procedures and 
dispute settlement mechanisms. It also provides schedules on the election of the body of 
representatives from the community, youth and women’s groups. 
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BNDA and Newmont375; (3) Local Employment agreement between Newmont and the 
Local communities. 
 
The SRF created a new ‘public space’ that ensured community participation in decision 
making and the establishment of local synergy for development between state and 
non-state actors and institutions (Körling, 2011:30). The SRF framework thus created a 
forum for the exercise of local authority by the various political actors and institutions in 
an attempt to maximise gains either for themselves or for the groups and institutions 
that were represented. This was where important collaborative decisions for community 
development were made. Newmont considered this as a step towards the fulfilment of 
their CSR; working in close collaboration with the local communities for the success of 
their investment while supporting the communities through the provision of public 
goods.376 . 
8.3.1 Nature of agreements and decisions process 
What community development projects were selected was always the result of the local 
community’s own initiative or from Newmont’s independent efforts at improving on 
development in the communities. In the first instance, community representatives and 
traditional authorities were expected to meet and identify what was needed by the 
community. This was to provide them with the opportunity to collate the views of the 
community for presentation. It was also expected that the community representatives 
and traditional authorities were able to agree on what to present, if for instance they 
require support for a project. This was expected to be done to avoid duplication of 
requests from the representatives and also from raising issues at the SRF that 
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 Akyem SRF Agreement between the Akyem Mine Local Community, BNDA and NGRL draft (2010). 
The purpose is to further the partnership between the Company and the communities that have been 
affected by mine operations in the area in order to sustain development in the area. This is expected to 
be achieved through the implementation of three interrelated agreements
375
: (1)The relationship 
agreement which sets out what the mining Company (Newmont) is committed to doing for the 
communities during the life span of the mining in the area and the commitment expected from the 
people in the affected communities which includes using dialogue to resolve any grievances they may 
have as a result of mining activities in the area; (2) The employment agreement which sets out the 
principles and guidelines for local labour employment in regards to the Company’s use of unskilled 
labour in the area. Through this the Company has committed itself to recruiting 100% of its unskilled 
labour force from the communities in the affected areas; (3) The Foundation Agreement. This is an 
evolving process with the long term goal of growing to become a Foundation Trust to manage a planned 
development fund. The Company aims to commit 1% of proceeds from every ounce of gold produced 
into a development fund to be managed as a trust on behalf of the communities affected by the mining 
operations.  
376
 Interview with CDM of Newmont on 17/09/2010 and DPO on 17/08/2010 
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benefited only particular individuals rather than serve the interest of the lager 
community, although in exceptional cases this may was to be considered.  
 
At SRF meetings each community nominated a representative to present their request 
for consideration and deliberation. Provision of physical infrastructural development 
topped the list of issues that were often requested because they were under provided 
or not available in all the communities. These requests become the subject for 
negotiations and debate at the SRF. What was significant about the SRF was that final 
decisions were not independently made by Newmont alone nor the BNDA, but they 
were collectively made by members of the SRF taking into account the needs of each 
community, costs involved and the social and economic benefits of the project to local 
citizens. 
 
Although decisions were made by collective agreements, records on the financial 
arrangements suggested that Newmont contributed more funds to projects than what 
was made by both the communities and the BNDA. Under the tripartite arrangement 
Newmont had agreed to provide the largest proportion of the financial cost of all 
projects compared to contributions made together by the communities and the 
BNDA377. The BNDA had agreed to make financial contribution towards projects that 
receive budgetary approval and assistance from Newmont through the SRF. Thus, 
depending on the cost involved in the provision of a public good Newmont was 
expected to provide up to 60-70% of the cost and the remaining 30% was shared 
between the BNDA and the beneficiary community. Usually 20% of the cost was taken 
up by the BNDA and the community provided 10% in the form of labour - skilled and 
unskilled. There were no records of direct financial contribution by the chiefs in the 3 
communities studied towards projects that had been provided. This was in spite of the 
claim made by some of the chiefs that they had used revenue from stool lands for 
development purposes378. This could not be verified as they did not provide any 
records or any actual examples.  
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 Interview with CDM 17/09/2010, DPO on 17/06/2010, the chiefs of New Abirem, Adausena and 
Traditional Elders at Ntronang on 10/07/2010, 11/07/2010 and 25.08/2010 respectively and OPNA on 
02/09/2010 and group discussions with Youth leaders from New Abirem, Adausena and Ntronang 
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  Interview with the District Planning officer on 17/06/2010 and Community Development manager, 
Newmont on 17/09/2010 interview with Gyasehene of Adausena on 11/07/2010; Adausena chief on 
09/09/2010and Krontihene of  New Abirem on 03/09/2010 
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An examination of interview data showed that before the inauguration of the SRF some 
development projects had already been commissioned in the communities (see 
examples below). These projects were started as a result Newmont’s own initiative in 
fulfilment of their CSR or were the result of independent lobbying of Newmont officials 
by the respective local chiefs in their bid to attract development to their communities. 
This was possible because chiefs’ depended on and made use of their legal position as 
custodians of stool land as leverage to bargain for community development projects.  
Thus, by 2010 the following projects had already been provided in the respective 
communities:  
1. The construction and renovation of school buildings at New Abirem and 
Adausena, and nurses quarters at New Abirem. Total costs of these projects 
were financed through three separate contributions of Gh¢ 20,000 by the BNDA 
while the remaining cost was provided by Newmont379.  
2. At Ntronang a 6 unit classroom facility, office and store for the Roman Catholic 
school had been constructed.  
3. At Adausena the renovation of a 4 unit classroom block, store and office was 
successful as a result of independent informal arrangements between 
traditional authorities and Newmont380.  
4. Newmont on its own also funded the construction of a new building used as the 
District police station at New Abirem. This was to ensure that adequate security 
was provided in the District, in particular in the areas where the company would 
be undertaking its mining operations. 
The above provides an indication of the kind of arrangement that preceded the SRF 
through which community development projects were provided. It was to streamline 
these and in particular to ensure that the provision of public goods was not left to be 
negotiated between only local chiefs and Newmont that led to establishment of the 
SRF for these to be negotiated. 
Living within the communities and interacting with the local inhabitants coupled with the 
permission to attend and observe negotiations proceedings provided an opportunity to 
gain wealth of knowledge and easier access to community representatives on both the 
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The equivalent of £8, 696 (£1=Gh¢2.30 as at 30
th
 September, 2010).  Interview with the CDM on 
17/09/2010. He was however unable to provide documents on the total construction cost of the project 
by Newmont. 
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 Interview with CDM on 17/09/2010; DPO on 17/06/2010; Elders at Ntronang on 25/08/2010 
Gyasehene of Adausena on 11/07/2010. 
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CNC and SRF. The latter was important for follow up discussions and sometimes 
clarifications on issues that I had observed during negotiations and in the community. 
What is presented below was drawn from minutes of proceedings at the negotiations of 
the SRF. This is to show the nature of cross-cutting issues that formed the subject for 
deliberation during SRF meetings. 
8.3.2 Examining the negotiations process and outcomes 
I have indicated from above that the SRF took up all ongoing discussions about 
development when it was formed.  Such issues were brought to the attention of the 
forum at its first meeting. The SRF was therefore the body mandated to continue and to 
ensure that these were accomplished.  The following information was gleaned from the 
minutes of the first SRF meeting and provides insight into how business was conducted 
and the level of participation and exercise of authority by the representatives381. 
 
As pointed out earlier negotiations meetings were conducted under formal 
arrangements. Thus, at the first official meeting382 of the SRF a review of the previous 
meeting was read out [in Twi to all the members] before the agenda for the day’s 
meeting was considered. All the representatives for the different categories of groups 
and institutions were present in addition to the queen mother and a representative of 
the paramount chief of the Akyem Kotoku traditional area383. After the minutes of the 
previous meeting was read out and accepted business for the day was tabled for 
deliberation.  First, an introductory remark was made by the Moderator. This was 
followed by briefing of the members about the establishment of a standing committee 
to prepare the SRF agreement framework on the nature of the tripartite arrangement 
which would guide procedures and decisions of the SRF. Second, the Moderator then 
asked all the representatives of the local communities, BNDA and Newmont to conduct 
an independent review of the document when it was ready before it could be accepted 
as working document of the SRF.  This brief introduction then paved the way for other 
issues on the agenda to be discussed. 
 
What followed exemplifies the level of collaboration that was being developed between 
the mining company and the local community and the diversity of issues that are 
discussed at the SRF.  
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 SRF meeting number 1 held on 24
th
 March, 2010 at the District Assembly Hall at New Abirem 
382
 That is after the formal inauguration of the SRF 
383
  See Chapter 4 for explanation that the selected communities of this study are all within one of 3 
divisions of the Akyem, i.e. the Kotoku division. 
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First, an official of Newmont negotiations team presented an influx mitigation plan to 
the SRF for consideration. The plan made proposals on how the Company together 
with the local communities plan to deal with the anticipated increase in the number of 
people who might migrate into the communities and nearby towns as result of the 
mining investment in district. Newmont took the opportunity to present to the 
community representatives the background, purpose and the interventions of the 
mitigation plan that the Company had prepared. The idea was twofold: (1) to get the 
community (and the BNDA) inhabitants informed through their representatives and (2) 
solicit for their input and feedback.  
 
The presentation of the proposal was followed by open discussions and feedback. 
Records of the discussions that followed after the Newmont’s presentation show that 
that the queen mother of the paramountcy (who represented traditional authority) 
spoke first. She commended the Company for its foresight. She then appealed to the 
SRF members to support the proposed plan. In effect this concluded any further 
contribution from the community representatives as it was customary that when a 
traditional authority speak at community gatherings no subordinate was allowed to 
speak on the same issue thereafter. As a result the queen mother went on to make an 
appeal to Newmont to establish ‘High standard schools’ in the communities where the 
mine activities were located to raise the standard of education in the area.  Once the 
subject had shifted to requests for projects a local chief384 also followed it up with a 
request to Newmont to support the District Police by providing them with two vehicles 
to facilitate their patrol activities. The purpose of the request was to facilitate adequate 
security coverage by the police in the mine affected communities.  
 
Second, the meeting moved on to another subject matter when a community 
representative took opportunity of the presence of the District Co-ordinating Director 
(DCD) of the BNDA to question about what was being done about the poor condition of 
roads in the District. The DCD explained to the SRF that road construction in the 
District was outside the mandate of the BNDA and indicated that it was the 
responsibility of the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA). The DCD then suggested that 
the BNDA and the traditional authorities together could lobby the GHA to ensure roads 
in the District were in good conditions at all times.  
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 The Krontihene of New Abirem 
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Third, Newmont took the opportunity to inform the members of progress that it had 
made on its own initiative to provide equipment and other logistics to hospitals in 
nearby towns Oda and Nkawkaw (which serve as referral hospitals) in the District; the 
award of contract for the constriction of 12 boreholes to local contractors to improve 
supply of potable water in the project affected communities and the plan to support the 
construction of a new female ward for a new hospital at New Abirem.   
 
The above deliberations at the forum provided an opportunity to understand the kinds 
of issues that are considered at the SRF and the nature of the decision-making 
processes during the negotiations. Although the idea of the SRF was to ensure 
participatory decision making it might be suggested that the presence of traditional 
chiefs sometimes do not help in the actual participation in discussions by ordinary 
community representatives as shown by the queen mother’s option to speak first 
followed by another traditional authority.  On the other hand the SRF worked for 
Newmont because it provided a medium for the community [representatives] to be well 
informed of plans for community development projects which they plan to support. This 
was important for the image of the Company as it ensured that traditional authorities do 
not take credit for having been able to bring development to the communities through 
the of use private [personal] arrangements with the Company. This was because in 
practice, the Company had not been able to prevent chiefs from lobbying officials for 
development (this will be discussed in section 8.3.3). 
 
Employment opportunities as a development output 
During the field work I found out that development was interpreted by local inhabitants 
to mean the provision and availability of infrastructural projects as public goods. 
However, when respondents in the popular survey conducted in all the four 
communities were asked to provide answer for what was the most important public 
good required, the data when analysed showed that the availability of employment (job) 
opportunities was considered a form of development. Ten percent of (10%) 
respondents ranked employments as the fifth important public good (development 
output) in the district385. I found out that creating job opportunities for the local 
inhabitants featured prominently in the negotiations at the SRF. Although employment 
may not constitute a public good (as defined in section 2.4) its relative importance to 
the local communities pointed to the need to explore what was being done about it. 
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I found out that one of the key agreements made under the SRF relates to the 
employment of local skilled and unskilled labour by the Company. This was aimed at 
addressing the level of unemployment in the local community, especially as the mining 
operation affected land and agriculture activities which are the main source of 
economic activity in the area. The issue of local employment was therefore considered 
a sensitive issue, as it could provide the source of livelihoods to the communities and 
therefore needed to be addressed to ease anxiety among the local people, especially 
the youth.  An employment agreement was therefore negotiated in 2010 as part of 
three relationships agreements between the local communities and Newmont under the 
SRF386. This was aimed at ensuring that Newmont remained committed to a 
sustainable economic and social development of the people living in the communities 
affected by the mine operations. Since concerns had been expressed about the lack of 
employment in the area, which was worsened by the Company taking over lands used 
for agriculture, it was imperative for the SRF to work out a solution for this. Newmont 
also recognised that failure to find acceptable solution this could have implications for 
their operations in the District. This was because the youth who were very active in the 
area could potentially prevent the Company from having access to the required lands, 
albeit they had the mining lease from government387. Thus, as part of the negotiations 
the SRF developed criteria and agreement for the distribution of employment 
opportunities available in the Company (See Table 12). 
 
The employment agreement requires that Newmont employ 100% of its unskilled 
labour force and up to 35% of skilled labour from locals living within the affected 
communities. A criterion had been designed to determine the proportion of locals to be 
employed from each of the ten affected communities. This was influenced by the extent 
of impact on the community as a result of loss of land and property by the people. Thus 
areas directly impacted negatively by the mining operations were weighted to get more 
job slots compared to those areas that were not directly affected by the mine 
operations. Five factors were negotiated used in the development of weights for 
determining employment distributions. These were:388 Mining Area (50%); Equity 
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 Agreement between Newmont and the Akyem Mine Local Community on Local Employment, 2010 
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 The youth in other mining communities in Ghana have organised protests that can stop or delay 
mining operations 
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 Agreement between Newmont and Local Community on Local Employment (2010:7-8) and SRF 
Summary report on the Local Employment: Community Durbars held from 4
th
 May to 4
th
 June 2010. (1) 
The Mining Area factor is determined by the size of impact of mining operations on the people and their 
livelihoods in a particular community. A community that loses a large share of land due to mining 
operations should benefit by getting the biggest proportion of employment. The equity factor ensures 
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(10%); Population influx (10%); Mining Lease Area (20%), and commitment to peace 
(10%).  
 
Applying the above criteria Table 12 shows the employment distribution of unskilled 
labour for the communities based on the agreed weights. For instance employment 
quotas for the respective case study communities was ; New Abirem 11%, Adausena 
18%, Ntronang 10% . Adausena had the highest proportional share of employment 
allocation compared to the others because the mine area was located mainly on its 
stool land leading to the resettlement of people living in one of its suburbs (Yayaaso). 
The loss to this community therefore extended beyond land and property; it also 
affected their social and economic lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that employment opportunities are distributed fairly among all the communities. The influx factor is in 
regards to communities with largest population size, which may be as a result of the sudden influx of 
people in the town as a result of the mining activities. (2) The Mining Lease factor is determined by the 
community with the largest proportion of its land in the mining lease area granted to the company. (3) 
The Commitment Factor is determined by the town that shows greatest commitment to the Social 
Responsibility Agreement and maintaining good relationship with the Company, maintaining peace and 
order and avoiding illegal acts such as galamsey activities that have the potential to undermine the 
operations of Newmont.  To facilitate conflict resolution grievance procedures have been established to 
receive complaints from aggrieved individuals or groups. This however does not in any way denying the 
fundamental human and Constitutional rights of the local people. The CHRAJ and NCCE participation in 
the SRF is partly to ensure that the rights of the local citizens are not in any way violated. 
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Table 12: Proportional sharing of jobs in mining-affected communities in the 
BND 
Community/Town Shared 
Equally 
(10%) 
Shared by 
Population 
Influx (10%) 
Shared 
by 
Mining 
Lease 
Area 
(20%) 
Shared 
by 
Mining 
Area 
(10%) 
Shared by 
Community 
commitment 
(10) 
Total 
Jobs 
(100) 
Adausena 1.0 1.5 5.0 9.5 1.0 18.0 
Adjenua 1.0 - - 3.0 1.0 5.0 
Afosu 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 1.0 11.0 
Hwaekwae 1.0 1.5 4.5 9.5 1.0 17.0 
Mamanso 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 6.0 
New Abirem 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 1.0 11.0 
Ntronang 1.0 1.5 1.5 5.0 1.0 10.0 
Old Abirem 1.0 0.5 0.5 - 1.0 3.0 
Yaw Tano & Hamlets 1.0 - 1.0 4.0 1.0 7.0 
Yayaaso 1.0 - 1.5 6.0 1.0 10.0 
Paramountcy - - - 2.0 - 2.0 
Total 10.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 10.0 100.0 
Source:  Agreement between NGRL and the Akyem Local Community on Employment 
(2010:11) 
 
As part of the negotiations the SRF required Newmont to compile and provide quarterly 
reports on local employment statistics. The report was expected to explain the steps 
that had been taken to achieve the targets set out in the employment agreement and 
provide reasons where there were any deviations389.  
8.3.3 Challenges of the negotiations 
The discussion above shows that issues that were considered at the SRF negotiations 
were diverse in nature compared to the CNC, which was more focussed on 
compensation for land and other property. It is to be noted also that because of the 
nature of issues for negotiations at the SRF the superior chiefs often attend together 
with other traditional authorities and were seen to occupy front row seats (similar to 
CNC arrangement described section 7.3.1). This sitting arrangement, which was made 
out of respect for traditional authorities do not seem to help community representatives 
who want to speak to catch the eye of the Moderator390. Although the community 
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 Field notes (July –September 2010) observations made and informal discussions with CNC 
representatives 
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representatives have argued that they always insisted on being given the opportunity to 
speak, if they realised that traditional authorities (sitting on front row seats) were given 
more attention to contribute to discussions than them because of their proximity to the 
Moderator391.  
 
Apart from the above traditional chiefs continue to lobby Newmont directly (as they 
used to) for support in the provision of public goods in their communities. It will be 
recalled that before the establishment of the SRF, Newmont’s support to the 
communities was not structured and did not officially involve the BNDA. Thus, 
community development projects were undertaken either through Newmont’s own 
initiative in order to win support for its project or they were based on traditional chiefs’ 
ability to lobby potential providers, including Newmont and the state, to provide some 
public goods and services. In the case of Newmont the traditional authorities were 
often successful in getting support because Newmont recognise that chiefs held 
custody over stool lands and that was essential for their investment. Without chiefs’ 
support, the Company would find it very difficult to gain local endorsement for its mining 
operations in the district (Zandvliet and Owiredu, 2005). Some chiefs were therefore 
able to attract various forms of development assistance by relying on their ability to 
lobby officials of the Company. For instance, the chief of New Abirem stated that ‘chiefs 
are initiators of local projects and they have done this over the years’. He explained 
that a computer training facility was established at New Abirem with support from 
Newmont through what he referred to as his ‘close relationship’ with the Company392. In 
addition to that the town benefited from his relationship with some officials because he 
could go over to the Newmont offices and demand for assistance on various 
development issues. For instance, the chief gave an example of asking Newmont to 
renovate some school buildings in the town after a rain storm that reaped off the roofs 
of the buildings.  
 
Similar, instances of direct contacts between local chiefs and Newmont were provided 
at Ntronang and Adausena. At Adausena, the Gyasehene indicated that Newmont has 
provided 4 bore holes to supply potable water to the community. The Company had 
also renovated the local Junior High School building.  Through the chiefs networks the 
MP of the constituency supported the construction of a kitchen to facilitate the school 
feeding programme started by the NPP government. The MP also made contributions 
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towards the development of street light projects in the town393. A similar claim was 
made at Ntronang that the chiefs was able to lobby Newmont to assist in the provision 
of standpipes to supply potable water to the community and also renovated some 
school buildings394.   
 
The above examples show how chiefs were making use of their personal networks and 
political influence at the local level to bring development projects to the communities. 
These were possible as identified by Zandvliet and Owiredu (2005) that chiefs’ legal 
authority over stool land provided leverage and a strong bargaining power in their 
personal relationship with the Company. However, in the long term negotiations at the 
SRF will not only reduce the level of expectations about the role and ability of 
traditional chiefs in the provision of public goods but will also have significant 
implications for the authority they exercise in their communities (as shown by the 
negotiations of land compensations in chapter 7).395 
 
From the above it can be argued that traditional authorities may appear to be happy 
with the kind of informal relationship that they had depended on and used to attract 
development projects to their respective communities. This was expected to change 
under the SRF. The SRF had introduced some formalities which sought to break the 
link between chiefs and the Newmont, which over the years had helped chiefs to show 
how influential and powerful they might be in attracting development projects. Even 
though it seemed the chiefs supported the establishment of the SRF and do in fact 
participate in discussions, it did not prevent them from pursuing private negotiations 
with Newmont for additional assistance for development projects outside of the SRF. 
This kind of relationship found between Newmont and some of the local chiefs had 
been described as ‘too close’ by community members. They perceive chiefs to be in 
alliance with Newmont from which they derive private benefits and therefore threatened 
the chiefs with destoolment (Zandvliet and Owiredu, 2005).  
Another challenge that the SRF as a new ‘public space’ for planning development 
faced was  how to ensure that projects agreed for implementation can be incorporated 
into the plans of the District. The BNDAs role was to ensure that agreed projects could 
be incorporated in the development plan of the respective community as well as the 
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 Interview with Gyasehene of Adausena on 11/07/2010 
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 Interview with the Council of elders of Ntronang on 25/08/2010 
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 The popular survey presented in the next section suggests that chiefs were lowly rated in terms of 
ability and responsibility to provide public goods needed most by the respective communities. 
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overall development plan of the District. Although, the DCE, DCD and Planning Officer 
were all members of the SRF, they are not the only people who design development 
projects for the District. Under the DA concept there are Committees responsible for 
this. However, it was the plan of the SRF that all community development projects fit 
within the District’s own plan for development, but because these projects are created 
by different institutions there were administrative challenges.  However, in the long run 
this anomaly could be addressed since there were some officials of the BNDA also on 
the SRF this anomaly could be addressed396.  
 
The establishment of the SRF to facilitate community development seemed to be a 
welcome idea to the local inhabitants. However, data from a popular survey conducted 
in the case study communities provide indications of the implications for the 
perceptions of the authority that chiefs exercise at the local community.  Results of the 
survey are examined in the following section. 
8.4 Popular perceptions about the authority and responsibilities of chiefs 
In chapter 6 of this thesis, the ability to bring infrastructural development was identified 
as an important criterion used by the inhabitants to determine the performance of 
chiefs.  As a result chiefs, apart from the performance of customary functions engage 
in activities that have the potential for developing their respective communities.  
To examine what community members expect of their chiefs respondents who were 
selected during the popular survey were asked about the responsibilities of chiefs to 
their communities and whether this was being fulfilled. The result of the analysis is 
presented in Table 13. The analysis suggests that a chief’s ability to bring development 
is rated highly by 59% of all the respondents who took part in the survey397. This 
supersedes expectation of chiefs’ role in dispute settlement (10%) and ensuring 
security and protection of the inhabitants, although 15% of the respondents expected a 
chief to do all the items listed on Table 13.  
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Table 13: Community members’ expectations about the responsibilities of chiefs 
Task Percent (%), (n=301) 
Bring infrastructural development 59 
Ensure security and protection of the 
inhabitants 
13 
Dispute settlement 10 
Promote investment and job creation 3 
All of the above 15 
Total  100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
Interpreting development as the provision of physical infrastructures (i.e. public goods) 
respondents were then asked to name, from their perspective, the community’s most 
important public good and who provides it. Results from all the four communities on 
Table 14 shows that health and sanitation facilities are important to the communities. 
More than one third of the respondents (34%) would like to have improvement in the 
health and sanitation conditions in the communities. 
Table 14: Most important Public Goods needed by communities 
Public Good Percent (%) 
Health and sanitation 34 
School (Infrastructure) 19 
Market 17 
Potable Water 12 
Employment and jobs 10 
Electricity 4 
Community Centre 3 
Other* 1 
Total 100 
*District Court and Housing for accommodation 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
Respondents also provided an indication of the authority that has either provided or is 
expected to provide the public good they named as most important for their community. 
Overall public goods have been provided by the state through the District Assembly.  
Table 15 shows that eighty percent (80%) of respondents either stated specifically that 
it was the BNDA or some other government institution (including Ministries) that is 
providing the public good. The results presented below also show that only 6% and 5% 
of respondents mentioned the local chief and MP respectively of having provided the 
public good they indicated. 
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Table 15: Who provides the public good listed as most important for the 
community? 
Institution Percent (%) 
District Assembly 80 
Newmont 7 
Chief 6 
Member of Parliament 5 
Ghana Water Company 2 
Total  100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
It is important to note that the results presented in Table 15 above raises important 
questions about how revenue from stool land is utilised by traditional authorities. This is 
because it appears revenue from stool land does not appear to be invested in what is 
considered an important public good required by the community. It also suggests that 
chiefs cannot on their own provide public goods for the development of their 
communities. Although, chiefs in the four communities have claimed to have invested 
proceeds they have received from stool lands in community projects, there was no 
verifiable evidence on what stool land revenue are used for that benefits the community 
inhabitants. Except in Praso Kuma, where the construction of a community health 
centre was said to have been funded mainly from revenue from the community’s farm 
project398. In all the communities chiefs and community members seem to depend on 
external support, apart from the state, for the provision of public goods. 
How does the inability of chiefs to show evidence for the use of stool land revenue 
impact on their authority? An exploration of this issue revealed that this affects the level 
of trust that members of communities have in their local chief. Popular perceptions 
about which community members were trusted to provide public goods of importance 
to the community was examined. This was based on a scale of how much trust they 
have in the named authority. Respondents were asked to show the level of trust on 
scale of (1) a lot, (2) a bit and (3) not at all. The result of the analysis is presented in 
Table 16. Those who were trusted a lot to be able to deliver public goods in the 
communities were the Government 87% (other state agencies excluding the BNDA), 
Newmont (79%), the local MP (62%) and BNDA (57%). On the other hand those who 
were rated high on the Not at all and a bit comprised the local chief, NGOs and the 
paramount chief of the traditional area. What these results show is that local 
inhabitants do not perceive local chiefs as the people who are trusted to provide public 
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within the community. Interview with Chief of Praso Kuma on 28/09/2010 and Group discussion with 
Chairman and members of Unit committee on 23/09/2010 
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goods in the communities. This may be as a result of the problematic nature of chiefs’ 
claim to authority over stool land and the revenue that it generates, and the lack of 
evidence of what it is used for. 
Table 16: Who is trusted in this community to provide public goods? (Rate the 
level of trust) 
Actor/Institution 
LEVEL OF TRUST (n=301) 
 A LOT A BIT NOT AT ALL TOTAL 
(%) 
Government 87 12 1 100 
Newmont 79 17 4 100 
MP 62 30 8 100 
District Assembly 57 39 4 100 
Chief 36 46 18 100 
NGOs 35 39 26 100 
Omanhene 
(Paramount 
chief) 
15 21 64 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
Different factors may account for the apparent lack of trust in chiefly authority with 
regards to the provision of public goods. The inhabitants’ lack of trust in the ability of 
chiefs to provide public goods and development, generally, may be partly explained by 
the reason that government is seen at all times to be the initiator and funder of 
development projects in these communities. 
The low level of trust may also be as a result of the way chiefs have managed land and 
the revenue it generates, which is perceived by the community to be unsatisfactory. 
Over the years the customary relationship between chiefs and their citizens has not 
changed but their role and ability to engage in local activities have been diminished by 
the state.399 As a result of this the development of a community is often influenced by 
the political connections that a chief has with current government. The provision of 
development projects to a community does not appear to depend solely on the 
resources available but on other factors as well. For instance, how a chief is able to 
lobby within the political circles of the ruling government and the historical pattern of 
voting of the local inhabitants400. It is generally perceived in Ghana that where a 
community has a historical pattern of voting that favours a particular party in power it 
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tends to benefit more from development projects than one that is perceived to not to be 
sympathetic in terms of votes to the government. 
Furthermore, the discovery of gold in the district leading to the arrival of Newmont 
seems to have shifted expectation and attention on who is expected to provide public 
goods from both the state and chiefs. Following from results presented in Table 
15showing who provided public goods respondents were asked to indicate who can 
better provide the public goods to the community. This was important to examine which 
authority was perceived as being the most effective and can deliver on the needed 
public goods for the community.  
The analysis shows that Newmont was perceived as the most effective institution 
capable of providing better public goods. Thirty five percent (35%) of respondents 
thought that based on what the Company had done so far in the communities (through 
the multi-institutional co-production agreements) it was capable of investing in public 
goods than all other institutions in the District, including the state. The results ranked 
chiefs in fourth place with 11%. There results did not show much difference in peoples' 
perception between the MP (23%) and BNDA (21%) as better providers of public goods 
for the communities.  
The results on Table 16 might be interpreted to mean that the presence of other 
institutions, especially Newmont, have shifted what inhabitants of local communities 
expect chiefs to  do with the revenue that they receive from stool land. Thus, chiefs 
continue to depend on Newmont and their ability to broker with politicians and the state 
to bring development to their communities. This dependence may have long term 
implications for the authority of traditional chiefs. 
Table 17: Perception of who can better provide public goods to communities 
Institution Percent (%) 
Newmont 35 
MP 23 
District Assembly 21 
Chief 11 
Government 10 
Total 100 
Source: Survey data (2010) 
Newmont’s investment in mining in the district appears to have affected perceptions of 
the level of trust that local inhabitants have about chiefs’ ability to invest public goods 
by using stool land revenue. As has been explained earlier in this chapter, it was the 
arrival of Newmont that facilitated the introduction of multi-institutional co-production in 
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the mine project affected communities. This contributed to the involvement of 
organised local institutions in the negotiation process and to plan and invest in public 
goods in the mining affected communities. However, the presence of the SRF and the 
participation of locally recognised institutions, in decisions-making for public goods 
provision raise a number of issues that might have implications for the authority 
exercised by chiefs over the communities. 
8.5 Implications of the SRF for the authority of chiefs 
From the perspective of the local inhabitants the SRF provides an opportunity for the 
ordinary citizens to contribute in a non-traditional setting towards the development of 
their community. The SRF brings traditional authority and their subordinate citizens 
together under an arrangement where unlike at traditional meetings of the local 
community, decision making is moderated by an independent authority and 
framework401. To that extent it raises questions about the exercise of authority of the 
chief. 
It has been pointed out in this chapter (and in chapter 7) that the negotiations systems 
in the Birim North District are an unusual practice, compared to other mining 
communities in Ghana. This seems to deviate from known practices where 
consultations have been held with traditional chiefs both in compensation negotiations 
and provision of community development projects (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 
2007; Tsuma, 2010; Yankson, 2010). What are therefore the implications for the 
authority of chiefs at the local level? 
Authority to invest in public goods 
Chiefs are expected to ensure development in their community. In all four communities 
selected for this research this appears to be the single criterion that people most 
frequently referred to as expected from a chief402.This has long been recognised as an 
important criterion to measure the performance of a chief (Dunn and Robertson, 1972).  
The tripartite arrangement under the SRF provides opportunities for chiefs to achieve 
this and bring development to their communities. However, it appears chiefs desire to 
fulfil this through their individual efforts rather than through some form of joint 
arrangement.  
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The role of community representatives in the SRF might seem to affect the power of 
chiefs alone to lobby for public goods, but their authority, especially over stool land is 
not affected. Chiefs’ therefore depend on this to maintain their political authority. As a 
result traditional chiefs sometimes adopt and use subtle threats and intense lobbying in 
order to attract projects which they take personal credit403.  A case in point was in 2010 
when the chief of Adausena initially resisted access to some portion of the land 
required by Newmont for the construction of a resettlement village for inhabitants 
whose land was located within the mine lease area granted to the Company.  To prove 
the level of his authority over the stool land the chief offered an alternative land which 
the Company deemed as unsuitable for the planned resettlement village.  This 
resistance stalled progress in developing the mine project. The chief wanted to use this 
as a form of leverage which might attract money payments from the Company before 
the preferred site was released for the development of the resettlement site404. 
However, members of a sub-committee of the CNC negotiating for resettlement joined 
by members of the select committee of the SRF intervened to ensure that this did not 
cause undue delay in the development of the resettlement community.  
 
Thus, although chiefs may find themselves involved in an unusual negotiations process 
over stool land they are able to use their traditional authority over stool land and to 
adapt to the evolving circumstances. This can affect the availability of land for 
development as the above has shown, and can have implication for the trust in 
traditional chiefs as providers of public goods. Therefore, having a forum which allows 
for participation of community members and district level state institutions to work 
towards co-production of public goods exercise some form of control over how chiefs 
exercise their authority for the overall benefits to community members. 
 
Local institutions in problem solving 
The existence of the SRF (as well as the CNC) facilitates development through 
informal hybrid institutions (comprising non-state405 and state institutions). What I have 
referred to in this chapter as multi-institutional form of co-production. The involvement 
of farmers, youth and women’s associations, which are locally based and legitimised by 
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 The threats are sometimes in the nature of not allowing mining their lands, if they are not supported 
in the implementation of development projects. 
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 There were speculations within the local community that the chief had been offered money. But this 
was not verifiable since neither the Company nor the chief will confirm or deny this. 
405
 i.e. refers to the institution of chieftaincy and its associated bodies as well other socio-political 
groups at the local level 
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the inhabitants to represent them at the SRF, creates the opportunity for the 
participation of ordinary citizens in decision-making for development. It also ensures 
that benefits to be derived from the exploitation of minerals from within stool land is 
spread across all the mining-affected communities and not depend on the negotiating 
ability of individual chiefs. Although chiefs control stool land and revenue and can 
negotiate to bring development to communities, what is happening in BND seem to 
suggest that the provision of public goods might be better provided where other 
legitimate local institutions are working well, than by traditional authorities only. 
 
Chiefs’ Authority reinforced in the selection of community representatives 
Chiefs played an important role in the selection and validation process of selecting 
local citizens to represent the communities at the negotiations. The selection of 
members to the SRF usually took place during community meetings. Prior to 2008 
these were usually supervised by the chief and observed by staff from the Community 
Relations Department of Newmont. The list of selected representatives was then 
compiled and presented to the chief to be officially passed on to Newmont as 
representatives of the respective community. This arrangement seems to have given 
chiefs the power to validate community representatives for the SRF and could 
potentially allow only people who are loyal to chiefs to be given approval to serve on 
the SRF. However, under the framework agreement prepared for the SRF elections are 
expected to be organised and facilitated by the District Electoral Officer (DEO)406. 
Perhaps it was in recognition of the potential challenges it created.  
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how multi-institutional co-production can contribute to the 
provision of public goods through the collaboration of locally based state and non-state 
institutions, which have various interests and rights over stool land and revenue. I have 
demonstrated that the failure to disclose and use stool revenue by chiefs for 
development, coupled with inadequate funding from the state can be overcome by 
taking advantage of investments in the local communities by private institutions which 
make use of local resources. Thus it is important to note that legitimate local 
institutions, which can represent the interests of local inhabitants are necessary for 
development to take place. The chapter also examined what the presence of the multi-
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institutional arrangement of co-production means for the authority of chiefs in the local 
communities 
This chapter examined further local efforts aimed at addressing problems through the 
negotiations for developmental outputs. I have examined how the arrival of mining 
investment in the BND has led to the development of collaboration between local 
communities affected by mining operations, the local government authority responsible 
for planning development in the District and the mining company. These were main 
actors in a multi-institutional co-production arrangement to streamline and provide 
public goods. This co-production arrangement is one that has been developed based 
on needs and dependence and uses locally based association and groups of people.  
The Social Responsibility Forum (SRF) provided a public space for decision making 
and planning for the provision of public goods for the mining affected communities in 
the BND. However, the analysis showed that agreements made at the SRF were 
mainly based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) amongst the three parties for 
implementation. The MoU also showed that the financial cost of public goods was 
contributed by all the parties, although it was Newmont that provided about two-thirds 
of the total cost. 
The chapter pointed out that SRF and the co-production arrangement evolved from the 
under provision of public goods, which result from weak state capacity and failure of 
chiefs to channel stool revenue into development. However, since corporate institutions 
such as Newmont have the responsibility to ensure development occurs in their areas 
of operation the development of the SRF facilitates that this is achieved in a 
coordinated way. The findings showed that until the formation of the SRF the 
contribution of Newmont for development was targeted at individual communities and 
sometimes did not fit in with overall development plans of the BND.  This also provided 
opportunity for chiefs to lobby the company directly to attract development to their 
respective communities. Although chiefs’ ability to lobby projects worked it depended 
on a number of factors such as the status of the chief and the extent to which the 
company’s activities directly impacted on the stool land. The SRF however aimed to 
control such personal networks from the provision of public goods, although findings 
from the analysis has shown that chiefs still maintain personal networks with officials of 
Newmont for development projects. It was also shown that because of the authority 
that chiefs have in stool land they tend to use it as a leverage when dealing privately 
with officials of Newmont. This created suspicion that they derive some private benefits 
from the Company.  
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Results of the perception in the communities on the authority of chiefs showed the lack 
of trust in chiefs’ ability to provide public goods and in the use of stool revenue. 
However, the presence of the multi-institutional arrangement under the SRF has shifted 
attention from what traditional chiefs do with revenue that stool land produces. Local 
inhabitants now look up to what development outcomes are provided under SRF 
agreements. This shows that local communities now trust representatives on the SRF 
to be able to negotiate provision of public goods better than traditional authorities only. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary and Conclusion 
9.0 Introduction 
This study explored traditional chieftaincy as a form of locally rooted political authority 
that provides problem-solving characteristics for development. The main focus of the 
research was to find out whether traditional chiefs can be effective and legitimate 
providers of developmental outcomes, linked to the way they exercise authority over 
land and natural resources. By focussing on Ghana, where traditional chieftaincy 
remains extremely strong and respected, I analysed data on how chiefly authority is 
exercised in practice over stool land. The main research question that this study 
examined was: how and to what extent do traditional chiefs in practice manage 
collective land resources for and on behalf of their community? Analyses of empirical 
data were undertaken to show the following: how stool land is managed (the authority 
and role of local level institutions - non-state and state); the specific role of traditional 
chiefs and how they exercise authority over stool land revenue,  and the role of chiefs 
within two negotiations arenas for compensation and public goods; in particular how 
traditional authority is exercised within the complex mixture of institutions within these 
public spaces, and how legitimate is the authority exercised by chiefs in their 
communities? In the following section I would explain the theoretical background to the 
thesis and draw out the main findings of the research. 
9.1 Summary of empirical findings 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided the background to the thesis. The theoretical framework for 
this thesis draws on the literature on the nature of chiefly authority and the problem of 
legitimacy of political authority in African states. This, as the review of literature in 
chapter 2 showed is linked to the state of development in African countries. I also 
explored the concept of co-production to explain the findings of multi-institutional 
collaboration identified in the BND.  
In chapter 3 I provided a detailed discussion on chiefs and the politics of land from an 
historical perspective. This was aimed at showing the nature and extent of authority 
chiefs’ exercise over stool land in Ghana.  This discussion focussed on chiefly authority 
from the pre-colonial through to the post-colonial period. I showed the implications of 
colonial rule on the authority of chiefs, in particular how chiefs became dependent on 
colonial laws for their authority, and the development of customary law, which shaped 
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land relations in Ghana. It was also shown how the position of chiefs under colonial 
administration and the policies of post-colonial governments contributed to ongoing 
contests and struggles for the control of stool land and the revenue it produces. These 
issues are more prevalent in urban and peri-urban areas where land has been 
commoditized compared to rural areas and in mining communities where the 
anticipated levels of compensation and royalty payments provide opportunity for wealth 
creation and political power (Owusu, 1970). 
To aid the analyses I explored 4 interrelated set of sub-questions derived from the 
central question of the thesis (see chapter 1). The first question was: how are stool 
land and natural resources managed in practice at the community level in Ghana? This 
question sought to establish the framework as well as the actors and institutions that 
have rights and interests in stool land and their role, if any, in the management of stool 
land in the BND. In chapter 5 it was shown that there were a multiplicity of actors and 
institutions operating at different levels of authority over stool land. It was also shown 
how stool land in the District was regulated by both customary practices and statute 
law. The chapter provided evidence of how both state and non-state actors and 
institutions play important roles in the management of stool land. Chiefs are an 
important authority because of their customary position as traditional leaders of the 
communities. They are also empowered by custom, common law and statute law to 
manage stool land on behalf of members of their communities. However, the 
management of stool land was not left under the sole authority of chiefs; the state’s 
public land agencies and the local government authority were also identified as key 
actors. The Lands Commission, represented at the district level by two agencies (that 
is the PVLMD and LVD), the OASL and the BNDA (the local government authority) 
were, expected to work in collaboration with the chiefs. However, as discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6 the study revealed that decisions about land transaction and uses 
were made by local chiefs supported by Plot Allocation Committees (PAC), which were 
not accountable to the local community members. 
Chapter 6 was used to explore the sub-question: How do chiefs in practice exercise 
authority over stool land revenue and their communities. The first part of the chapter 
explored the different types and sources of stool land revenue and how they are 
managed. Thus, I examined the management structures employed by chiefs in the 
performance of their legal duties to the community. The thesis showed that in all the 
four case-study communities of the district (New Abirem, Ntronang, Adausena and 
Praso Kuma) the chiefs had constituted [pseudo-] land management bodies known 
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locally as PACs which operated under the directives of the chiefs. Members of the 
PACs were usually handpicked by the local chief to facilitate the allocation and 
collection of land revenue.  What was significant about the PACs in all the communities 
was that apart from the sub-chiefs and members of the tradition council of elders the 
remaining members were drawn from the body of elected Unit Committees (UC).  
Thus, on the face of it the involvement of the UCs might seem to suggest that the PAC 
represented a popularly elected local institution for land management. But in practice 
they served only the interests of the chief who appointed them to the PAC. Further 
analyses revealed that since 1988 when the current decentralisation process in Ghana 
started, elections to the UCs have not been competitive, especially in the rural districts, 
and so they were often left to be filled up by unemployed youth and close associates of 
local chiefs. These findings also showed that stool land revenue was often fraught with 
a tradition of close decision making with no obligation for accountability. This tends to 
exacerbate the contestations and conflicts over the control of land revenue (Andreasen 
et al, 2010). 
The findings from the above also seemed to suggest that chiefs had some level of 
authentic authority for controlling stool land in the manner as they did. I therefore 
explored a third sub-question: what constitutes the basis of the authority that is 
exercised in practice by chiefs? This was to help determine the legitimacy and 
acceptability of chiefs’ actions and how they controlled revenue from stool land.  The 
analyses showed that custom and statute laws were being reinterpreted to suit the 
personal interests of chiefs and those who controlled land.  The result of this was the 
lack of openness in the way chiefs managed stool land, in particular the revenue it 
produces. Community members were denied benefits from the proceeds of land 
transactions and royalty payments. This had implications for the development of the 
local communities. This was because although chiefs were able to allocate land held by 
customary freeholders in return for drink money payments, the revenue was often 
treated as private income to the chiefs. Generally, local inhabitants tend not to 
challenge the authority exercised by chiefs to convert stool land for urban uses, 
although this, in practice undermined the customary freehold interest of indigenes. 
However, legally chiefs do not have the authority to undertake land use conversions 
since that is the mandate of the TCPD of the BNDA. But chiefs often did so privately by 
engaging officials of the TCPD to prepare site plans, which were then used to allocate 
land to meet the increasing demand for urban needs and mining in order to derive the 
wealth it creates and invariably for political power (Owusu, 1970). 
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The analysis helped to understand that although custom and tradition were important in 
the way chiefs' exercise authority over stool, this has been subject of constant 
negotiations and interpretations depending on the individuals providing historical 
account of land relations. The study also showed the implications of land conversions 
authorised by chiefs for the interests of the customary freeholders and statutory 
procedures. These findings were not isolated cases as studies by Berry (1993) and 
Ubink (2008) in other Akan areas of Ghana have shown. What was significant to note 
was that some chiefs were able to adapt better to the evolving circumstances. For 
instance, the states’ public land sector agencies administrative practice which required 
chiefs to endorse all stool land grants was used by chiefs as the basis to command 
stool revenue, which remain largely unaccounted. Even where other forms of stool land 
revenue, received from indirect sources had been made public by the OASL, it was 
often treated as private income. Although community members did not seem to 
challenge some of these decisions, it was the failure of chiefs’ to manage stool land 
revenue as expected by their subjects, which often created problems in the 
communities. The findings question the ability of chiefs’ to fulfil their collective 
obligations as trustees of community land. The implication of these, as the study 
showed led to the growing lack of trust for chiefs’ authority over stool land, especially 
since the arrival of the multi-national mining company, Newmont to invest in mining in 
the BND.  
The manifestation of the problematic nature of chiefly authority over land in the case-
study communities and the presence of Newmont had implications for the authority and 
mode of operation of the chiefs for local development. I therefore explored this by 
posing a fourth sub-question: what are the outcomes from activities of chiefs at the 
local level, linked to the way stool land is managed? This was examined by studying 
how mining investment in the BND, which had resulted in large acquisition of land for 
which compensation was required by law to be paid  by Newmont, had resulted in the 
establishment of two negotiations committees (Compensation Negotiations Committee- 
CNC and Social Responsibility Forum- SRF). I showed how these two committees 
were unusual public spaces for negotiations compared to other mining communities in 
Ghana.  
In chapters 7 and 8, I presented evidence of the politics of negotiating compensation 
for land (including other fixed property) and the provision of public goods under a multi-
institutional arrangement, as a form of co-production. The analysis showed that unlike 
negotiations in other mining communities in Ghana, in the BND negotiations for 
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compensation for land was determined at a forum of elected representatives of all the 
local actors and institutions (see chapter 5) drawn from all the mining-affected 
communities. Decisions on compensation and provision of public goods were made by 
mutual agreement and from the collective efforts of all the members on the two 
committees. These issues were not left to be decided by traditional chiefs and 
Newmont, as was the practice in other mining communities. However, it was noted that 
the negotiations forums provided arenas for the exercise of political authority. 
Although under the principles that established both the CNC and SRF all the actors 
and institutions were of equal status the analysis showed that under certain 
circumstances the importance of the authority the different institution were apparent. 
For instance, traditional chiefs’ authority and knowledge of custom was respected in 
the negotiations. On the other hand this did not give them the power to solely enter into 
any form of negotiations about compensation and provision of public goods without the 
consent and approval of the two respective Committees. Chief’s therefore relied on 
their traditional role as community leaders and custodians of stool land, which was 
essentially required for mining, as bargaining tools within the communities. While the 
system of negotiating compensation in the BND was to address the problems with the 
negotiating power of traditional authorities in compensation, it did not eliminate the 
relevance and authority that chiefs’ exercised over stool land. This was because of 
Newmont’s respect for chiefs as the custodians of stool land, which they did because 
access to land was an important factor for the success of their operations. This 
therefore made chiefs important in the negotiations process. The recognition given to 
chiefs by Newmont however, created a negative perception amongst community 
members about chiefs’ relationship with the Company.  
The results also showed that the presence of Newmont has had implications for the 
perception of chiefly authority in the communities.  The nature of the multi-institutional 
arrangement under the SRF seem to have  shifted attention from what traditional chiefs 
do with the revenue that comes to them from stool land (Table 17). This is because the 
local inhabitants looked up to what development outcomes were provided under SRF 
agreements. The significance of this finding was that legitimate local institutions which 
represented the interests of local inhabitants were important for development at the 
local level. 
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9.2 Wider Implications of the empirical conclusions 
The following discusses the above empirical conclusions within the context of their 
implications for the arguments about the legitimacy of traditional authority and 
investments in public goods in contemporary African states 
9.2.1 Traditional authority and development 
The empirical conclusions drawn from the BND case study has implications for debates 
in the literature about the legitimacy of traditional authority and development in modern 
African states. Landell-Mills (1992) and Englebert (2000) have argued that 
contemporary African states’ that have developed governance structures and policies 
that are based on their pre-colonial historic identity that was primarily traditional have 
done better at solving the problem of legitimacy of  authority for development to occur 
in these post-independence states. This argument on the one hand presupposes the 
existence of an authentic form of legitimate political authority that facilitated 
development. On the other hand it assumes that economic stagnation occurs in states 
where pre-colonial and post-colonial forms of political authority are disconnected. It is 
further argued that the legitimacy of political authority is important for development 
because it allows political leaders to focus more on developing and implementing 
polices that enhance development (Englebert, 2000).  
This study has shown that although chieftaincy is an established legitimate political 
institution in Ghana, the exercise of chiefly authority at the local level does not 
necessarily lead to development. A number of factors that account for this include; the 
continuous reinterpretation of customary principles as it applies to over stool land by 
chiefs to claim ownership and the establishment of poorly constituted land 
management structures that are not responsive to the community. These have created 
negative perceptions about chiefs as legitimate providers of development. It is also 
imperative to note that traditional authority is evolving in contemporary societies as a 
result of other influencing factors such as urbanisation and decentralisation policies of 
modern state governments. These factors as the analyses have shown have 
implications for the authority that chiefs exercise over their communities. Thus the 
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that traditional authority is necessary but not 
sufficient for development to occur. As a result chiefs might not be able to provide the 
form of legitimate leadership envisaged for the development of Africa.  
Notwithstanding the preceding conclusion about the sufficiency of chiefly authority for 
development to take place scholars who have studied the resurgence of traditional 
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authorities in Africa provide a number of factors that might account for recent renewed 
interests for traditional authorities to perform important roles for development. These 
factors are related to governance of the modern state. It has been identified that chiefs’ 
ability to mobilise local communities is important for the improvement of local 
governance (Buur and Kyed, 2007; Ubink, 2008a). Ubink (2008a:13-15) outlines the 
following as the justification for governments renewed interest in traditional authority:  
(1) ability to mobilise local people for development, 
(2) the legitimacy of traditional leaders and the hope to strengthen the position of 
government through the integration of tradition into governmental power, 
3) chiefs act as intermediaries between government and the local people,  
(4) government’s need for the co-cooperation of chiefs to achieve legislative 
hegemony,  
(5) for state measures and policies to meet less resistance form chiefs and  
(6) chiefs’ customary courts for dispute resolution are popular in some countries as it is 
easily accessible, affordable and without procedural technicalities of the state’s court 
system.  
Although these are plausible reasons to engage interest in traditional authorities the 
question that might be asked is how are these possible where the local populace 
perceive traditional authority to be  weak and lack trust in it . Perhaps the factors 
outlined above might be realistic where the majority of community members favoured 
and respected the authority of chiefs. The case-studies in the BND showed that were 
chiefs are trusted as legitimate authorities that can bring development usually the 
authority exercised over land are not contested as evidenced by the level of trust in the 
chief of Praso Kuma407. On the other hand in the remaining three case study 
communities perceptions about chiefs' capacity to invest in public goods were lowly 
rated. Under such circumstances, although state governments might seek to 
collaborate with traditional authority in the governance and development of the 
respective communities there is the potential that this might fail because of the lack of 
respect for chiefs’ authority. This thesis therefore cautions against theories that seem 
to suggest traditional authority as the most effective form of locally rooted authority for 
the development of Africa. 
                                                          
407
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9.2.2 Contemporary "traditional" chiefs and development 
The authority that chiefs exercise in some parts of SSA is often labelled "traditional". 
Referring to chiefs authorities as traditional does not connote a static form of authority. 
Contemporary African chiefs are perhaps traditional only in the sense that they derive 
legitimacy authority from pre-colonial history, customs and practices in African 
societies. It is important to also note that some chiefs in Africa are mainly appointed by 
the state such as in Malawi there are Town chiefs (Cammack et al, 2010). Tradition is 
dynamic and hence chieftaincy as an institution also continuous to evolve. Under 
colonial rule chiefs were given the power to tax and distribute land by the colonial 
authority. The period of colonial administration therefore provided chiefs with a multiple 
source of authority to govern and thus, chiefs began to enjoy dual legitimacy of 
authority (Mamdani, 1996; Sharma, 2003; 2004).  
This study showed how post-colonial governments pursued deliberate policies that 
were aimed at curtailing the power of traditional chiefs, but because of a lack of 
institutional capacity to govern the rural areas without chiefs they had to preserve 
chieftaincy through regulations (Baldwin, 2011; Herbst, 2000). Thus in some modern 
states in SSA (e.g. Botswana, Uganda, South Africa and Ghana) chieftaincy as an 
institution is now guaranteed under Constitutions which provide for the establishment of 
National Houses of Chiefs (Sharma,2004). Chiefs therefore continue to enjoy dual 
sources of legitimacy of authority, which was started in the colonial period. The 
contemporary chief is therefore able to claim protection for the legitimacy of authority 
from either pre-colonial histories or culture and state laws.  
Chiefs have become neo-traditional local leaders who are re-inventing themselves and 
adapting to changes to enable them engage with various aspects of development in 
local communities. Thus, in Botswana, Ghana and in South Africa, for instance chiefs 
remain important authorities to be engaged with by state and non-state institutions for 
collaborations for development. In SSA countries such as Lesotho and Botswana 
traditional authorities form an integral part of the local government structure for 
development (Sharma, 2003; 2004.; Landell-Mills, 1996). Generally some 
contemporary chiefs have assumed powerful political status because of the duality of 
legitimacy of authority. Thus, chiefs who are have strong political connections with the 
state's political system are able to exercise authority for personal benefits rather than 
seek community gains and yet remain as political authority for their communities. 
Although their actions might be construed to be illegitimate by their subjects and not 
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obeyed they continue to be chiefs because of the protection they get from state 
institutions408. 
Thus it can be argued that where the legitimacy of authority exercised by contemporary 
chiefs in SSA is derived from dual sources it is an anachronism to continue to refer to 
them as "traditional" chiefs.  
9.2.3 Mining investment and the development of local communities 
The study has shown that because of the problematic nature of the authority that chiefs 
exercise in practice, the lack of legitimacy, transparency and accountability over stool 
land transactions provided the impetus for the development of multi-institutional form of 
co-production for the delivery of public goods. 
The system of negotiating compensation and public goods in the BND constitutes a 
paradigm shift from what is known in other mining communities. While compensation 
payments have often been negotiated between traditional authorities and respective 
mining companies leading to property dispossession (Akabzaa, 2000; Akabzaa et al, 
2007; Tsuma, 2010; Ayelazuno, 2011), investments in public goods have often been 
left to the discretion of the mining companies who consider this as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).  This is because corporate institutions have often argued that 
they have CSR to ensure that communities in their operational areas are not worse off 
because of their activities. It has been  estimated that corporate bodies spend between 
0.5-1 percent (%) of profit after tax on CSR, and employ between 1-1.3 percent (%) of 
the total labour force in Ghana (Owusu-Koranteng, 2008:470; Gough and 
Yankson,2012: 661). These estimates might seem to suggest that mining companies 
are not making much contribution to the development of local communities. Thus, 
Tsuma (2010) has questioned whether the CSR initiatives were not merely public 
relation tools used by mining companies to gain access to local resources, and which 
benefits are captured by a minority group (traditional authorities), who are supposed to 
be acting on behalf of the majority of inhabitants living in these communities (Tsuma, 
2010:65). However, it can be argued that the results of the perception of community 
members about Newmont’s activities in the BND and the existence of the multi-
institutional co-production negotiations systems are good corporate practices. This is 
innovative system work ensures that benefits from the Company’s operations are not 
claimed by only a powerful elite minority group in the mining affected communities.  
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 Legitimacy is based upon the extent to which citizens accept and follow the decisions made by 
political authorities (Lutz and Linder, 2004) 
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The study has also shown that establishment of the multi-institutional co-production 
forum was based on mutual needs and dependence and targeted to  supply the most 
sought-after community needs, which were lacking. This form of locally based 
institution resonates with findings made by scholars of the APPP in other SSA. The 
conclusion they have made is that that the failure of public authorities to provide public 
goods in Africa is linked to lack of institutions which take into account local cultures and 
practices (Cammack and Kanyongolo, 2010; Booth, 2011; Cammack, 2011; Olivier de 
Sardan, 2011 (b); Workman, 2011; Leinweber, 2012). Empirical findings from across 
selected SSA including Malawi, Sierra Leone, Niger and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo show how  the development of different forms of local arrangements among 
various institutions have been approved for the co-delivery of public services such as 
water and sanitation, safe motherhood, market management, public safety and 
education. These services are provided based on formal and informal collaborations 
made under complex forms of co-production arrangements that make use of existing 
knowledge of local cultural repertoires.  
This thesis contributes to the literature above and argues that multi-intuitional forms of 
co-production, such as the SRF in the BND, which have shown characteristics and 
potential capacity to solve local problems. Multi-institutional co-production should now 
be the focus of attention for development initiatives in Africa rather than considerations 
for increasing the role of traditional chiefs. Thus, one of the main conclusions that this 
thesis draws from the Ghana case study is that perhaps there is the need to take a 
more nuanced less negative view of how mining companies are working in Africa that 
potentially can contribute to development in local communities. 
9.2.4 Strengthening chiefs authority through customary land administration  
Some of the problems which have contributed to the negative perception and lack of 
trust for chiefs’ authority are due to how stool revenue is managed. This study showed 
how chiefs have collaborated with and adapted elected representatives of state 
institutions (UC) to enhance authority over stool land in order to control the revenue 
that it produces.  The findings from analysis of politics of land management by chief 
confirms studies conducted in peri-urban areas of Accra and Kumasi in Ghana by 
Kasanga (1988; 2001), Ubink (2008) and Andreasen et al (2011). However, under the 
multi-donor funded Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) between 2004 and 2009 
the government of Ghana started piloting support to traditional authorities to establish 
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Customary Land Secretariats (CLS) to facilitate the management of stool lands409. 
Under the LAP traditional authorities were supported for the development of ‘an 
effective, accountable local structures for administration of land [including dispute 
settlement] with particular attention to be paid to strengthening the capacity of CLS’410. 
The idea was to enable traditional authorities to perform better their legal mandate as 
managers of community land.411 
By the end of the project in 2009, thirty-seven (37) traditional authorities had been 
supported to establish CLSs (although most of them remained less functional). These 
CLSs are under the direct control of traditional authorities, usually chiefs or heads of 
families412. The chiefs are responsible for the recruitment of staff and are expected to 
pay their salaries from the revenue from stool land transactions. Although, the CLS 
concept and the purpose for which it was developed are laudable, in practice it seems 
to bolster the authority of traditional leaders sanctioned by the state system. The 
implication of this is that it provides a legal basis, not just an administrative procedure 
as the study showed, for chiefs to assume the authority to document land transactions 
and collect stool revenue. This has the potential to create additional opportunities for 
chiefs to consolidate private control of stool land and the revenue it generates to enrich 
themselves, thereby denying community members access to enjoy benefits on 
community land.  
This study has shown how in New Abirem, Adausena and Ntronang the chiefs privately 
employ the services of officials of TCPD to prepare site plans for allocation of land (see 
chapter 6 and 7). This is widely practiced in parts of Ghana. Chiefs have also adapted 
the UCs to perform land management functions by acting as PAC in the various 
communities. The PACs are engaged in the allocation of plots to prospective 
developers for and on behalf of chiefs and to whom the revenue this generates are 
accounted. These practices do not augur well for the implementation of the CLS 
concept, without some form of direct state intervention. On the other hand stool lands 
are private lands of communities and do not constitute public lands and so the state is 
not obliged to be directly involved. These dilemmas compound the challenge facing the 
state in its attempt to finding solutions to making chiefs more transparent and 
accountable in the way they manage community land as was envisaged under the CLS 
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 Phase one of the LAP was supported by the World Bank and other development partners including 
the Department for International development (DFID, United Kingdom). 
410
 LAP Customary Administration Unit (CLA) completion report, September,2009 
411
 The 1992 Constitution Article 36(8)  
412
 In family land areas 
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concept. The way chiefs in the case study communities of the BND have evolved the 
local land management practices and the claims they make to control land, and 
Ghana's attempt to streamlining customary land transactions, which are mainly under 
chiefs authority provides important lessons for land governance in SSA countries. 
9.3 Study significance and contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes an important contribution to current debates about legitimacy of 
authority linked to the problems of state failure and the lack of development in Africa. I 
used the exercise of traditional authority by chiefs in the Ghana case-study to show the 
following. 
Firstly, traditional chiefs’ dependence on custom and tradition do not make them 
effective and legitimate leaders for development. This study highlighted the problems of 
lack of trust in chiefs’ authority over stool land for the development of local 
communities. The BND case-studies helped to examine the basis of authority 
exercised in practice by chiefs. The study demonstrated that although chiefs’ depend 
on custom, common law and statute to claim legitimacy of the authority exercised over 
stool land in practice these have not helped them to perform their collective obligation 
to communities as expected. This was because of the way chiefs reinterpreted and 
sometimes reinvented their authority in contrast to extant customary and traditional 
principles. The result is lack of respect for some traditional leaders. Chiefs' are 
therefore perceived as less effective to invest in the development of local communities. 
The study therefore concluded by arguing that there was the need to focus attention on 
other legitimate local political authorities that constitute multi-institutions (state and non-
state) as a form of co-production for development in Africa and the developing world. 
Secondly, there is more to be learned from the way mining companies might potentially 
contribute to development of local communities. Thus, the thesis also makes a 
contribution to debates about the implications of the activities of mining companies 
operating in Africa and the developing world and the implications for local development.  
This study draws attention to the general negative perception about mining companies 
being exploitative but demonstrates with the BND case-study in Ghana that perhaps 
we need to take a more nuanced and less automatically negative perspective about the 
activities of mining companies and their potential contribution to development, 
especially in mining-affected communities. 
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9.4 Concluding remarks 
This study helped to further explore issues about traditional authority in Africa as the 
legitimate and effective authority to promote development. This has been done by 
examining how traditional chiefs within the mining enclave of BND exercised authority 
over stool land revenue that it produces. By examining the outcomes and implications 
of how chiefs exercise authority in practice in selected case study communities, this 
thesis questioned the extent to which custom and tradition (through which chiefs derive 
their traditional authority) might make chiefs effective legitimate local leaders for 
development. This is because currently urbanisation, decentralisation policies and 
globalisation are important influencing factors that are shaping development taking 
place in Africa.  
Apart from the contribution that this study makes to current debates on the subject of 
traditional authority and the politics of development on a personal note it has broaden 
my scope of knowledge. Undertaking this study has helped me gained in-depth 
understanding and knowledge about chiefs and the politics of local development in 
Ghana and Africa.  However, this thesis does not claim an exhaustive conclusion on 
the findings and contribution to the literature on the problems of legitimacy of authority 
for Africa's development. The main empirical conclusions drawn from the study that are 
however important for current discourse in the literature are: 
(1) Traditional authorities might be important political institutions in Ghana, but how 
chiefs exercise authority over community land is not sufficient for traditional 
authorities to be promoted as effective legitimate political authorities expected 
for local development. It is therefore important to exercise cautioned in the 
elevation of traditional authority as the most effective legitimate form of locally 
rooted political authority for development in Africa, as some scholars have 
proposed. Rather attention should be focussed on the use of multi-institutional 
co-production arrangements which are legitimate at the local level, and have 
problem-solving potentials for development. 
 
(2)  The thesis also provides evidence to show that in spite of the negative 
perceptions about mining companies, they do make effective contributions to 
development through investments in public goods at the local level. There 
should therefore be a more nuanced but less negative view of the activities of 
mining companies and how they can potentially contribute to local development 
in Africa.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: List of people interviewed  
 
1) Case study communities 
New Abirem 
 Name Status/ Occupation 
1 Nana Amu Kyeretwe  Chief  of New Abirem 
2 Nana Opuni Asamoah Krontihene 
3 S.T Nkansah Teacher and Director of Non-Formal Education, 
Ghana Education Service 
4 Opanin Ofori Amoako Teacher/farmer farmer 
5 Edward Kwaning Assemblyman 
6 Dallas Nketsiah Farmer and Leader of Youth Association (Afosu) 
7 Henry Mensah Farmer 
8 Nana Yaw Kusi Chief Farmer 
9 Nana Kwaku Dompreh Adontenhene (Afosu) 
10 Emmanuel Narh Member UC/farmer 
11 Emmanuel Seth Ansah Member UC 
12 Judith Asiedu Trader and CNC representative 
13 Kate Asumang  Farmer/CNC representative 
 
Adausena 
1 Name Status/occupation 
2 Nana Boni Abankro III Chief 
3 Nana Bredu Darkwah Chief Farmer 
4 Nana Kurankyie Ababio Gyasehene 
5 Nana Ama Leader of Great Womens’ Association/farmer 
6 Kofi Harrison farmer 
7 Stella Gyegye Member UC/ trader 
8 Josephine Amankwa Assembly Woman 
9 Joseph Donkor Member, UC 
10 Oheneba Donkor Member of UC 
11 Charles Adom Boateng Leader of Adausena Youth Association/farmer 
12 Francis Nti Asumaning Secretary Youth Association 
13 Kofi Abedi Stephen Member UC/ carpenter 
14 Kelly Gyimah Mensah Community elder 
15 Narh Kwaku Farmer/CNC representative 
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Ntronang 
 Name Status/occupation 
1 Nana Frimpong-Ampem Ex-chief /community elder 
2 Nana Kwaku Duah Community elder 
3 Nana Akoraa Chief 
4 Yaw Ahenkorah Assembly man (Ahenebrono) 
5 Seth Frimpong Leader of Divine Youth Association 
6 Felix Oppong Youth Association/farmer 
7 Daniel Kyei Youth Association/farmer 
8 Nana Kwadwo Puni Youth Association 
9 Nana Nyama Kyerewaa Queen mother 
10 Akua Akyaa farmer 
11 Samuel Osei-Sarfo Farmer 
12 Joseph K. Badu Member UC/farmer 
13 Kwame Ablokwa Member UC 
14 Michael Minka Farmer 
15 Barima Asomaning  
 
Praso Kuma 
 Name Status/occupation 
1 Nana Kwaku Boateng Krontihene 
2 Nana Amoako Oteng Chief 
3 Nana A.K Agyeman-
Gyeabuo 
Elder/farmer 
4 Nana Kwasi Agyeman Elder/farmer 
5 Alice Nimo Member, PAC/farmer 
6 Sam Akowuah Chairman of UC 
7 Rauf Baba Secretary to PAC and member UC 
8 Kwaku Antwi Member of UC 
9 Gyimah Kinsley Community elder/farmer 
10 Kwame Owusu Nsiah farmer 
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2) List of public officers 
1. Mr Emmanuel Ikpe, DPO, BNDA ( 
2. Mr. Alex Owusu Addo, TCPD,BNDA 
3. Mrs Dorcas Dede, District officer, OASL, BND 
4. Dr. W. Odame Larbi, CEO, LC, Accra 
5. Mr. Maxwell Adu-Nsafoa, Senior Lands officer,PVLMD 
6. Mr. Geofrey Osei Sarfo, Regional officer, OASL 
7. Mr Jonathan, Valuation officer, LVD 
8. Mr. Ben Quaye,SLO,LAP 
9. Mr. Kwasi Dautey, Senior Stool Lands Officer,OASL 
10. Dr. Gad Akwensivie,Stool Lands Officer,OASL 
3) List of experts and academics 
1. Naa Professor John S. Nabila, President of the National House of Chiefs/ 
Senior Lecturer , Geography Department, University of Ghana 
2. Dr. Antwi Adarkwah, Land tenure consultant and former National Facilitator, 
Customary Land Administration, Ghana 
3. Professor Sebastian K. Amanor, Lecturer and Deputy Head of the Institute of 
African Studies, University of Ghana 
4. Dr. Ntifo Siaw, Moderator of SRF and Senior Lecturer University of Cape Coast 
5. Mr. Jonathan Ayitey, Community Valuer and Lecturer Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology, Ghana 
6. Professor Seth O. Asiamah, Community Valuer (Head) and Lecturer at the 
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
 
4) Newmont staff and contractors 
1. Mr. Felix Apoh, Community Development Manager/Head of  Newmont 
negotiations team 
2. Mr. William Oti-Sarpong, Land Compensation expert, Landpro Consulting 
Limited  
3. Mr. Kwasi Asare-Darko, Land Access manager, Landpro Consulting Limited 
4. Mr. Adam Babatunde, Project Manager, Newmont’s  Community Livelihood 
Programme/ SRF 
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Appendix B: Interview Guides (semi-structured questionnaires) 
 
B1-1: Interview guide for traditional chiefs and elders (opinion leaders) 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
Customary tenure 
1. Could you describe the nature of the customary tenure system in this 
community? 
 How did this stool acquire its land? 
 Does the stool family own all or part of the lands in this area? 
 What are the different types of interests in land in this community? 
 
Traditional Authority 
2. Would you describe how a chief is selected in this community? 
3. When are the responsibilities of a chief in this community 
 What traditional measures are there to ensure that a chief fulfils these 
obligations? 
4. How does your subjects show their approval (or disapproval) of your actions? 
 
Management of community resources 
5. Who controls stool land and natural resources this community? 
 Describe the specific role of chiefs in the management of land and 
natural resources on a stool land 
 What kind of structure do you have in place for managing land and 
natural resources? 
 Is there a land management/plot allocation committee? 
 Are there any issues with land in this area? 
 How about access to land by migrants for farming; mining, land use 
planning 
 
6. How are decisions about land and development issues made? 
 
7. How people express their opinions about the way land and natural resources 
are managed in this area? 
 In what way can you tell if the people accept (or reject) the way 
community resources are utilized? 
 
8. Tell me which Local Associations are involved in resource management and 
development? (Prompt: find out whether there are Town Development 
Committees, Home-Town Associations, Youth or Churches, etc) 
 Are you a member of any local association? What part do play in this 
group, if you are? 
 How does the presence of local associations, if any, influence how land 
and natural resources are managed? 
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9. What has been the role of the following in the community with regards to stool 
land and natural resources management?  
 State Land Agencies (LC,OASL,Survey Department, TCPD, Ministries 
of Agric, Environment) 
 The District Assembly and the District Assembly representatives 
 The Mining Company, Newmont 
 Any other Company or investor 
 
10. Tell me about the revenues (rents and royalties) that are received from land, 
mining and timber resources in the community? Which are collected by the 
following 
 OASL 
 Stool 
 Government 
 [prompt chief should talk about relationship with OASL and District 
Assembly and the disbursement of revenues] 
 
Provision of Developmental Outcomes 
11. What do you think are the predominant concerns and welfare needs of this 
community and how are they these addresses? 
 How and to what extent are chiefs involved in the provision of public 
goods and services for their communities? 
 
12. Who and/or what organizations or institutions (whether state or non-state) are 
involved in the provision of these community needs? (note this could include 
many other government agencies and ministries, private investors, NGOs, 
donors, etc) 
 
 
B1-2: Interview guide for chief farmers and other selected community members 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. What is your role [as a chief farmer] in the community? 
 
2. How does one become a chief farmer in this community? 
 How is a chief farmer selected? 
 How long does one serve as a chief farmer? 
 
3. Are you a member of the negotiations committees? Tell me about your role in 
this [or any other community activity involved]  
 
[ask the following for chief farmers] 
 Would you describe your specific role in the ongoing field surveys being 
undertaken by Newmont? 
 How are you able to determine peoples farm boundaries and 
ownership? 
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 Have there been any challenges and how have you addressed these, if 
any? 
 
4. How are land disputes adjudicated in this community? 
 Which people are involved and how are they selected? 
 To what extent are their decisions acceptable to the disputants? 
 
5. What are the main community needs and who provided/ would provide them? 
 
6. How is development project planned/ initiated in this community? 
 Are there any committees/or groups that do these? 
 
7. To what extent are you, [as a chief farmer], consulted in the planning and 
implementation of development projects? 
 
8. How are projects funded? 
 Sources of funds? --- Community? State? Or local investors? Or 
combination? [Prompt for discussion on all possible sources?] 
 
9. Who allocates land and grants concession for timber and minerals in this area? 
 What authority do they have for doing this? 
 Are payments received for these grants? And who collects them? 
 What is the revenue derived from these transactions used for? 
 Are there specific examples of this in the community? 
 
B1-3: Interview with groups/ associations 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. What does the association stand for in the Community? 
 How long has this Association been in existence? 
2. Would you tell me what you have been doing in this community? 
  
3. Who constitute the membership of the Association? 
 Do the chief/elders of the community have any role in your association? 
What are these?  
4. To what extent does your association participate/ influence development 
projects that take place in the community? How are you involved in planning 
and implementation of projects? 
 
5. How are your activities funded? [prompt for specific examples and why are 
funds provided] 
 
6. Do some members (or leaders) of the association serve on the Unit 
committees?  
 How were they selected? 
 
7. Would you tell me how you work to ensure that community resources are 
utilised in a way that benefits the people? 
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 Who allocates land in this community? And how? Is this a customary 
procedure? 
 If revenue is derived from this how is it utilized 
 What are the options for checking any abuses? 
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B2-1: Interview guide for the District Assembly (Birim North) 
(District Planning Officer) 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. Briefly describe your mandate with regards to development in this District? 
 What do you do to fulfil this mandate?  
  
2. What are the main community needs of this District? 
 Specifically what are the main developmental needs of the communities 
within the areas affected by Newmont Operations? [ prompt; New 
Abirem, Adausena, Ntronang, Afosu, Yayaso,Maamaso, etc] 
 Apart from the District Assembly are they any other 
institutions/organizations (formal or informal, private or state) that are 
involved in the provision of the community needs identified? 
 How are the District Assembly’s developmental projects funded? 
 Specifically, how are investment companies, such as Newmont , 
GOPDC, etc., involved in development projects 
  
3. The District Assembly gets a share of revenue collected from stool lands. To 
what extent is the Assembly involved in the collection of this revenue? 
 How is revenue from stool lands utilized? Are there any examples? 
 
4. To what extent does the Birim North District Assembly play a part in the 
management of land and natural resources and land use planning? [TCPD 
officer] 
 Specific mandates? Roles? 
 Any form of collaborations or arrangement (formal or informal)? 
 
 
B2-2: Interview with TCPD Officer of the Birim North District 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
 
1. Briefly describe the functions you perform in the District with regards to the 
preparation of planning schemes and zoning. 
 What other roles do you perform in the district 
2. Which parties are involved in the development of land use plans/schemes? 
 To what extent are the communities in the district involved in land use 
planning and zoning? What specific role, if any? 
 Who are involved and what role to they perform 
 If chiefs /traditional authorities are involved, would you describe their 
role 
 would you tell me about any land use plans that you have developed in 
recent times 
3. How is the development of land use plans funded in this district 
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4. Would you describe how you interact with traditional authorities/chiefs and other 
investment concerns, such as Newmont, in the performance of your duties  
 
5. Apart from land use planning and zoning, to what extent are you involved in the 
allocation of land, concessions for timber and minerals in the district? 
 Would you describe your role, if any, in these? 
 Would you tell me about some of the challenges encountered and how 
you address them 
 
 
B2-3: Interview Guide for Lands Commission 
(Targeted officials CEO, Lands Officers (PVLMD and LVD) for BND 0 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. What are main tasks of the Lands Commission with regards to the management 
and administration of Stool lands? 
 Specifically how do you manage the different range of interests and 
ownerships in stool land? 
 What specific role do you have in the management of minerals and 
forest products (e.g Timber) found on stool land? E.g. concurrence for 
stool land transactions, land use planning, registration documentations 
  
2. What challenges do you encounter in the management of stool lands? 
 How are these challenges peculiar to stool lands in the Birim North 
District? [NB; especially with regards to land boundaries and ownership 
claims][ 
 Can you explain how you go about addressing challenges that you 
encounter in the performance of your functions? 
  
3. Briefly describe how far the CLS under LAP is addressing its main objective of 
strengthening the capacity of traditional authorities to manage their land? 
 What has been the successes and failures (specific examples) 
  
4. What are the specific roles of chiefs over stool land areas in land allocation, 
land use planning and land registration? [Prompt for Birim North District] 
 If there are other institutions/persons involved can you list and explain 
their specific roles. 
  
5. How does the way chiefs in practice exercise their control over land and natural 
resources facilitate or hinder your functions? 
 Can you tell me about specific instance(s) of chiefs role being helpful to 
your role,(Would you recommend that) and  
 Another instance(s) where chiefs role have hindered your role.( to what 
extent did this issue constitute a set back to your work and how did you 
overcome this) 
6. From what you have said about the role of chiefs in land and natural resources, 
to what extent are they able to fulfil their Constitutional and customary role as 
custodians of their community’s resources? 
 Are they some specific examples that you can give as evidence of this? 
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  
7. To what extent does the way chiefs exercise control over land natural resources 
impact on the development of their communities? 
 
B2-4: Interview Guide for Administrator, OASL 
(District and Regional officers) 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
 
1. Briefly describe the functions of the OASL in the stool areas that your office 
covers in the Birim North district? 
 What is the range of interests in land that you deal with? 
 What kind of data base do you have that you able to determine the 
claimants and ownership of the various interests and rights to stool land 
and natural resources(minerals, timber, etc) 
 How does the OASL get to know which properties to collect revenue 
from? 
 Details about the different types of revenue collected? How are these 
collected and who collects them? (Is this done only by the OASL or are 
chiefs involved in some way? Explain?) 
 How do you deal with the issue of ‘drink-money’? is it possible to 
account for it? 
 How are the revenues (rents and royalties) disbursed? 
 What challenges are encountered (i) in revenue collection ,(ii) in 
revenue disbursement, and how do you address these issues ( give 
specific examples of these) 
  
2. How are chiefs involved in the administration of stool lands? 
 Is there any form of arrangement (formal or informal) that is working or 
not working? 
 
3. About the CLS under LAP, to what extent are they able to meet the objective of 
strengthening the capacity of traditional authorities to manage their land? 
 What challenges have you encountered in your interactions with chiefs 
and how have you addressed these? (Prompt for some examples) 
 To what extent are chiefs in a position to manage community resources 
in a way that will be beneficial to their local communities? 
o How may the CLS approach be improved upon? 
 
4. How would the operations of CLSs in stool land areas impact on the 
management of land and natural resources for the development of 
communities?  
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B3: Interview Guide for Expert authorities and researchers 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. From your experience would you describe to me the how chiefs are managing 
stool land and revenue? 
a. Structures, who are involved and how selected 
b. What is your view on this whether they can be effective and accountable 
to the community members 
 
2. Are there any challenges and difficulties chiefs encounter in the management of 
lands and how do they deal with it. 
a. Nature of challenges and how they are created? Who are those involved 
and why? 
b. How were these challenges addressed?(any specific examples) 
 
3. How would the operations of CLSs in stool land areas impact on the 
management of land and natural resources for the development of 
communities? 
4. How and to what extent do you think the way chiefs manage stool land can 
impact on the development of communities? 
 Do chiefs have the capacity to lead/influence development in their 
communities? explain and provide some examples 
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B4: Interview Guide Newmont 
(Community Development/Social Investment Manager) 
(Interview would start after brief introduction of the research objective) 
1. Briefly describe your functions with regards to community development in the 
Community? 
 What is Newmont’s policy towards the development of the community? 
 
2. What have you identified as the main needs of the people in these 
Communities? 
 What contribution have you made towards the provision of these 
needs/ 
 To what extent do you involve the local community in planning and 
provision of projects?  
 Any form of collaborations with your company? [prompt for specific 
examples and description of the responsibilities of institutions or 
persons involved] 
 Give examples of some development projects/outcomes. Describe 
the process of initiation, planning, implementation and funding. 
  
3. How do you go about acquiring land for your operations? 
 Who do you contact for land? 
 Who receives compensation? 
 Do you know how compensation received for community resources is 
disbursed/ utilized? 
4. Are they any problems experienced over the following: 
 Ownership 
 Land rights 
 Land allocations/concessions, by chiefs and other land agencies? 
  
5. What development projects have /are undertaken by your company for the 
communities in its areas of operations? 
 Do other organizations (chief, land agencies, government, etc.) play a 
part in these projects? 
 What form of arrangements do you have with these other organizations? 
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire 
This survey is being undertaken as a key component of doctoral research by Charles 
Ankisiba of the Institute of Development Studies, UK. The aim is to solicit the views and 
perceptions of selected people living in communities in the Birim North District on how 
land and natural resources are managed for the development of these communities. 
A. General 
Date................... 
Time..................... 
Town/Community.......................... 
 
1.  Gender: M F 
2. How long have you been living in this community? 
 Up to 10 years 11-20 years 21-30years 30 years and above  
3. Where do you come from (your home town)? ................................. 
4. How old are you (years)? [Respondent must be 18+ years].......................... 
5. What is your level of formal education? 
None Primary Middle/JHS Secondary/SHS Tertiary 
 
6. What work do you do? ............................................ 
 
B. Customary Tenure, Access and Management of Resources 
7. Who would you contact to get land in this community? [You  tick more than one 
response] 
The Government  Chief Family Individual  Other 
(specify)... 
8. Have you or any member of your household ever approached the chief for land in 
this community?  Yes  No [Go to Q.18] 
 
9. What was the intended purpose for you or member of your household acquiring the 
land? 
 Farming Building both farming and building Mining (Galamsey)
 other use (specify)..... 
10. Briefly describe the procedure you or member of your household went through to 
acquire land in this community?  
 
11. Would you tell me about any challenges that you or your household member may 
have encountered?  
 
12. Did you or a member of your household make any cash payment when you last 
acquired land?    Yes    No [If No, Go to Q.18] 
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13. If yes, how much was it? 
 
14. Who was the cash paid to? Chief Individual land owner  
 
Family head Government Agency Other (specify)............... 
15. Apart from the cash payment made when the land was acquired, do you/ member 
of household make some periodic payment of money?  Yes   No [Go to Q.18] 
 
16. How often is this periodic payment made?   
 Monthly Seasonal (farming)  Yearly other 
(specify)........... 
17. To whom are the periodic payments made to?  
Chief Land owner  Stool lands District assembly other 
(specify)..... 
 
18. What do you think the cash payments for land and natural resources are used for? 
Upkeep of the chief Support local projects Government keeps it 
 Don’t Know  
19. Who in this community is/are responsible for managing land, forest products and 
minerals? 
 [Respondent may tick more than one] 
Family Head  Local Chief  Omanhene   
 Government Agency (specify).............. Other (specify) 
 
20. Is there a Committee for the allocation of land (plots) in this community?  
 Yes No [Go to Q.22] 
 
21. If yes to Q.20, tell me about how people get to serve on this land allocation 
committee? 
 
22. Looking at the way land is allocated in this community, would you say the process 
is working well? Please explain 
 
Control and rights over land and natural resources 
 
23. In this community who could take land away from you? [Respondent may tick more 
than one] 
 Government Chief Land Owner (indigene) Family head 
  
 Other (specify).......... 
 
24. What is your reason(s) for your response to Q.23?  
 
25. Who do you think has the right to control land and natural resources in this area? 
 Family head Government  Chief Other (specify)...... 
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26. Which of the following would you prefer to manage the land and natural resources 
in this stool land area?  
 The traditional chief  Lands Commission  Town and Country 
Planning  
Stool Lands (OASL)   Other (specify)............ 
C. Traditional Chiefs Authority and Development 
 
27. Would you tell me about the responsibilities of a chief to the community?  
 
28. What happens if a chief is not able to fulfil the expectations of the people in this 
community? 
 
29. How do the chief and people of this community take decisions on the development 
of the town? 
 
30. Have you ever been to a meeting at which the chief and elders discuss the 
development of the town?   Yes   No [Go To Q.36] 
 
31.  If yes, what was the particular development issue?  
 
32. Would you tell me about your contribution to the discussion, if you were able to 
make any?  
 
33. What decisions were made? 
 
34. How was the particular development project funded? 
 
35. Would you describe your experience when you took part in the discussions?   
 
36. Which of the following Institutions/ Associations are in this community? 
 
Name of Association Tick if present in 
community 
Youth  
Town Development Committee  
Other(specify)  
 
37. What is the role of the association(s) that is present in Q.36 in the development of 
the community? 
 
38. What role does the chief play in the above association(s), if any? 
 
Let us talk about leadership in this community.  
 
39. What leadership qualities do you expect from a chief? 
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40. Please list what you consider to be the 3 most important leadership qualities of the 
chief of the community.  
 
D.  Developmental Outcomes 
 
41. What do  you consider to be the most important public good of this community 
 
42. Do you know who provides item in this community? 
Item Provided by/ to be 
provided by 
[Indicate whether 
the respondent 
knows or don’t 
know] 
1   
2   
3   
 
43. In the Table below indicate your level of trust for the following in their ability to 
provide the needs of the community you listed in Q.41 above.  
 
Person/Institution Level of trust  
[Indicate whether a lot; a bit; not at all] 
District Assembly  
Member of Parliament  
Local Chief  
Omanhene (Paramount chief)  
Government (Ministry 
of..................) 
 
ewmont (Mining Company)  
NGO  
Other (Specify........................)  
 
44. Please list any development projects that you are aware have been provided 
specifically with revenue realized from land allocations, timber and mineral royalties 
in this community?  
 
45. What would you expect to find in a community that can be described as developed  
 
46. Overall which of the following person(s) or institution(s) do you think can provide 
the items listed in Q. 46, if any? 
 MP Local chief District Assembly Newmont Government 
(Ministry.......)  
 
Other (specify).............  
 
 
End Interview and Thank Respondent  Time: 
 
